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HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
A CRITIQUE OF WASTE
THEORY
Maxwell J. Mehlman*
The high cost of health care has led to proposals to reduce
wasteful medical technology under Medicare and other payment
systems. Professor Mehlman warns that achieving this objective,
while laudable in theory, is problematic because of the difficulties
of defining, detecting and eliminating technology waste.
A particulardanger is that, in an effort to reduce waste, patients will be denied not only technologies that are wasteful from
the patient'sown perspective but technologies thatyield net patient
benefit. This risk is exacerbatedby the Medicareprospective payment system, which rewards hospitalsfinancially in inverseproportion to the amount of care they furnish patients. Professor
Mehiman describes legal methods to reduce this risk, and recommends significant changes in the Medicare administrativeprocess.
INTRODUCTION

THE NEED TO control health care costs in the United State has

been widely recognized.' Much of the blame for rising costs has
been focused on health care technologies-in particular, expensive,
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University, with funding provided by the W. M. Keck Foundation. The author is indebted to
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preparing the manuscript, and to the following for their comments: James Blumstein, Alexander Capron, Ronald Coffey, Barbara DeCaesare, Ernest Gellhorn, Timothy Jost, Theodore
Marmor, E. Haavi Morreim, Duncan Neuhauser, Seymour Perry, Gordon Schatz, and Randall Shorr.
1. Expenditures for health care in the United States rose from $35.9 billion in 1965
(comprising 3.9% of the gross national product) to $355.4 billion in 1983 (10.8% GNP).
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Report and Recommendations to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,446, 24,457-58 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as PROPAC 1985]. For a history of government efforts to control health
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"big ticket" items and services.' This Article explores the ways in
which health care technology is affected by regulatory efforts to
control health care costs, especially those programs adopted for the
Medicare system.3 The legal implications of these regulatory efforts
will also be investigated.
In this Article, the term "medical technology" will connote a
drug, device, or medical or surgical procedure used in medical
care.' This definition is admittedly broad, including all aspects of
the detection, prevention and treatment of disease, but excluding
health care delivery organizations.' Focusing on technology 6 percare costs, see K. WARNER & B. LUCE, COST BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POTENTIAL 28-32 (1982).
2. See generally MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE
COSTS (S. Altman & R. Blendon eds. 1979). "Big ticket" technologies are expensive on a per
unit or per treatment basis. They may not, however, be solely responsible for the cost crisis.
See Moloney & Rogers, Medical Technology--A Different View of the Contentious Debate
Over Costs, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413 (1979) (blaming low unit-cost technologies such as
laboratory tests for increased health care costs). Unfortunately, segregating technology-related cost increases from increases due to other factors is difficult. See generally OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PRO-

GRAM 45-61 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OTA MEDICARE]. Nevertheless, for purposes of this

Article, it is assumed that technology has played a substantial role in the increase in health
care costs over the last fifteen years.
3. Medicare was established in 1965 (Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)) to provide
medical care to the elderly without regard to their ability to pay. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th
Cong., 1st. Sess. 4, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 1945-46. Medicare currently accounts for approximately 35% of national health care expenditures, OTA
MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 23, and for 40% of all hospital revenues. Medical Technology
Assessment: Hearingson H.R. 5496 before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment
ofthe Committeeon Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Hearingson H.R. 5496] (statement of Raymond Dross, M.D., on behalf of Health Insurance Association of America). Expenditures for Medicare increased from $7.1 billion in fiscal
year 1970 to $65 billion in fiscal year 1984. PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,458. Medicare's impact extends beyond the program itself insofar as other institutional purchasers of
health care, such as private insurers, typically follow Medicare's lead with regard to medical
technology. See OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 23.
4. This is the definition formerly used by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIES FOR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OTA STRATEGIES]. It resembles the one
favored by economists. See Warner, Effects ofHospital Cost Containmenton the Development
and Use ofMedical Technology, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 187, 191 (1978) (describing economists' general definition of technology as a "defined configuration of all inputs, both
human and nonhuman, used in a specific production process"). Some commentators, including Warner, exclude labor inputs from the meaning of the term, defining it primarily as medical hardware. See id. at 191. See also Fineberg, Technology Assessment: Motivation,
Capability,and Future Directions, 23 MED. CARE 663, 663 (1985) (defining technology as
"knowledge applied to a purpose").
5. Health care delivery organizations, such as hospitals, physicians, and health maintenance organizations, are the entities that provide health care. The OTA has recently broad-
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mits discussion of relatively discrete drugs, devices, and surgical
and medical procedures that can be evaluated and regulated, more
or less, as units.
Classic examples of discrete medical technologies include drugs,
such as aspirin and penicillin, and medical devices, such as scalpels
and respirators. Although both drugs and medical devices are often
used in conjunction with other medical inputs, they can to some
extent be treated as separate entities, and indeed are regulated
largely as such by the federal government.7 Surgical and medical
technologies are less often thought of as discrete entities, but are
somewhat amenable to being so treated.8 Nevertheless, the utility
of this heuristic approach must not be overestimated. As will be
explained,9 it is often extremely difficult to isolate a particular technology from the medical context in which it is used.' 0 It is even
more difficult to manipulate its development, diffusion and use.
ened its definition of medical technology to include "the organizational and supportive
systems within which [health] care is provided." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST,
QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY xi (1985).
6. The term "technology" in this Article refers to medical technology unless otherwise
indicated.

7. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-379(a) (1982) and
regulations thereunder, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-10.90 (1985).
8. Surgical and medical procedures, however, are more difficult to deal with in this
fashion than drugs and devices. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
10. Different medical technologies can be categorized in terms of their respective functions. One taxonomy might distinguish between information-gathering technologies such as
diagnostic tests and patient monitoring devices, information-processing technologies such as
computerized diagnostics and computerized recordkeeping, and treatment technologies. See
Anbar, Penetrating the Black Box: Physical Principles Behind Health Care Technology, in
THE MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE: STRATEGIES FOR USING TECHNOLOGY IN PATIENT CARE

23, 32 (S.Reiser & M. Anbar eds. 1984) [this collection of essays will hereinafter be cited as
MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE]; see also Smits, The Clinical Context of Technology Assessment,
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 31, 35 (1984) (distinguishing between diagnostic and therapeutic technologies, with preventive technologies as a subset of the latter). Another approach is
to classify technologies according to usefulness. Technologies that provide new information
or patient outcomes might be distinguished from technologies that yield marginally greater
information or better outcomes. Technologies that produce the same information or outcome
as another technology might be distinguished on the basis of relative cost or ease of use. See

id. at 35-37.
A classic division within therapeutic technologies is Lewis Thomas' breakdown of "decisive" and "half-way" technologies. The former, epitomized by antibiotics, are preventive or
curative, and result from genuine understanding of disease mechanisms. Half-way technologies, exemplified by kidney dialysis, "make up for" a disease or postpone disease-related
death. L. THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 5-42 (1974).

Smits, however, cautions against singling out half-way technologies for scrutiny and criticism, pointing out that, although they are in need of eventual replacement with definitive
technologies, they are not "half-way" in terms of current value. See Smits, supra, at 33-34.
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Prior to the recent profound changes in the health care system," a particular set of perverse incentives affected medical technology. Medicare, for example, paid health care providers for each
technology employed each time they employed it. Consequently,
providers were motivated to apply as much technology as possible,
regardless of cost. 2
The providers' desire to do everything possible to help patients 3 , the attraction of using state-of-the-art techniques, 4 combined with the aforementioned incentives, are said to have created a
"technological imperative"' 5 that led to inappropriate and excessive
development, acquisition, and use of technology.1 6 In particular,
11. See infra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
12. See generally OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 30-39.
13. See Anderson & Steinberg, To Buy or Not to Buy: Technology Acquisition Under
Prospective Payment, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 182, 183 (1984). Hellerstein emphasizes the
desire of physicians to appear able to benefit their patients even when they may not be able to
do so. Technology, he states, serves to distract providers from the "woeful inadequacy" of
medicine. Hellerstein, Overdosingon Medical Technology, 86 TECH. REV. 13, 15 (1983). Indeed, "[tiechnology often serves the purposes that religious ritual once did. Better than
prayers or candles, technology brings hope." Id. Warner agrees that "technological sophistication is viewed by many-patients, physicians, and administrators-as a surrogate for high
quality care." Warner, supra note 4, at 193.
14. The replacement of the scalpel by the laser in surgery is one example of the switch to
state-of-the-art technology. See Anbar, supra note 10, at 32.
15. A classic example of the operation of this imperative is the development of the intensive care unit (ICU). The ICU first appeared during World War II as a recovery area for
post-operative patients. See L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL ADVANCES AND THEIR DIFFUSION 41 (1979). By the mid-1950's, "mixed" ICU's were developed in which both post-operative and critically-ill patients were treated. Id. at 42-43. This
led to specialized ICU's such as coronary care units, neonatal intensive care units, and burn
units. Id at 43. This proliferation occurred despite data indicating that ICU benefits were
marginal. Id at 70. Hellerstein comments that "'[i]ntensive care' sounds like love, so the
dying patient is surrounded by monitors and catheters and respirators." Hellerstein, supra
note 13, at 15. Another example of the technological imperative is the CT scanner. See
Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of Medical Technology: Future Policy Directions, 55
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 25, 30-35 (1977).
16. Besides the desire to help patients and to use the newest and best techniques, the
technological imperative is fueled by a number of other factors, including: (1) increased specialization by physicians, see Banta, EmbracingorRejecting Innovations: ClinicalDiffusion of
Health Care Technology, in MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE, supra note 10, at 82; Schroeder,
Curbing the High Costs of Medical Advances, 1 Bus. & HEALTH 7, 10 (1984) (noting the
higher incomes of high-technology specialists); (2) increased numbers of doctors competing
with one another for patients, relying on more intensive use of expensive technology to make
up for fewer patient visits, see id. at 9-10 (noting predictions of a surplus of 70,000 doctors by
1990 and 150,000 by the year 2000); (3) the increase in patients whose care is paid for by
third parties, see Banta, supra, at 83; Schroeder, supra, at 9; (4) increases in malpractice
liability and insurance costs, see Banta, supra, at 82; Schroeder, supra, at 9; (5) competition
among hospitals for patients and referring physicians, see Health Services Research and
Health Statistics Amendments of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 4869, 10839, 11762, and 12166
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and
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the old system is said to have permitted, indeed fostered, "waste" in
technology. By eliminating this waste through cost-containment efforts, the quality of care could arguably be maintained and even
enhanced while costs could be stabilized or reduced.
The leading exponent of this viewpoint is Dr. Arnold S.
Relman, editor of the prestigious New EnglandJournalof Medicine,
who states: "The cost culprit is not technology per se, but only technology that is ineffective, superfluous, or unsafe."17 Echoing
Relman are the new Prospective Payment Commission (PROPAC),
the group of experts charged with overseeing and guiding Medicare
cost control programs,18 and the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), the agency within the United States Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) charged with administering
Medicare. 19
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88-89 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson H.R.
4869] (testimony of Dr. Steven A. Schroeder); and (6) the lack of adequate incentive to be
first to abandon, as apposed to adopt, a new technology, see Hawkins, Evaluating the Benefit
of Clinical Trials to Future Patients, 5 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 13, 14 (1984).
17. Relman, An Institute for Health Care Evaluation, 306 NEw ENG. J. MaD. 669
(1982). Additional proponents of the need to eliminate waste include Morreim, The MD and
the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 30, 31; Smits, supranote 10, at 32; and
Braun, Need for Timely Information Justifies HCHCT, 15 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 302
(1981). See also H.R. REP.No. 818, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984).
18. PROPAC states that "[i]ncreases in payments for hospital care can be limited while
maintaining a high level of quality when productivity is improved. Productivity is improved
when fewer or less costly resources are used to yield a product of given quality ......
PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,464. PROPAC was established by the Social Security
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. As amended by the Medicare and
Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1061,
this legislation authorizes the Director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
to appoint a 15-member commission to collect and assess information on health care, particularly on the need to make adjustments in the prospective payment system, and to make recommendations to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and
Congress. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 ww(d)-(e) (Supp. 1984). PROPAC is specifically authorized to assess the safety, efficacy and cost effectiveness of care. See id. at § 1395ww(e)(6)(E)
(Supp. 1984). PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, issued in June, 1985, was its first report.

19. See DEP'T

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION,

FUNCTIONS, AND DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,247-49 (1984). HCFA
states that "[b]y reallocating inputs and outputs toward more cost-effective practice patterns,
cost per discharge can decrease in real terms, while quality of care can be potentially improved." 50 Fed. Reg. 24,443 (1985). See also Relman, Assessment of Medical Practices:A
Simple Proposal,303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 153 (1980). Bunker argues that eliminating waste is
necessary to provide effective care, stating that "[p]urchase of care that is ineffective or of
undocumented efficacy for some patients will almost certainly result in a failure to provide
effective care to other patients." Bunker, Evaluation of Medical-Technology Strategies:Proposalfor an Institutefor Health-CareEvaluation, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 687, 691 (1982). Yet,
he does not explain why he conceives of health care decisionmaking as such a zero-sum
proposition. The purchase of wasteful technology need not preclude proper care for others,
although it may prevent the purchase of other non-health care goods, or increase the national
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Eliminating wasteful technology appears a desirable and simply
attainable objective for cost containment: merely identify and eliminate wasteful technologies or uses of technology. This will save
money without compromising the quality of care. Indeed, it may
save enough money so that more extreme cost controls, such as
technology rationing20 or preventing the development or use of
nonwasteful technologies,21 would be unnecessary.
Unfortunately these directives are extremely difficult to achieve.
First, the definition of "wasteful" technology is by no means clear.
A technology may be wasteful in one sense but not in another. For
instance, a technology may not provide a great deal of health care
compared to its cost, but may provide more benefit than any alternative technology. Moreover, a technology that is wasteful when
viewed from one perspective- say, that of a group insurance plan
concerned with holding down its premiums-may not be wasteful
when viewed from another perspective-such as that of an individual beneficiary who wants the best technology and is relatively indifferent to the effect of its cost on premium levels. The first task,
then, is to define what is meant by "waste," and to decide the perspective from which technology should be evaluated, since this will
debt. See Moore, SurgicalStreams in the Flow ofHealth CareFinancing:The Role of Surgery
in National Expenditures: What Costs are Controllable?, 201 ANNALS ON SURGERY 132
(1985) ("The United States' expenditure for medical care is not a 'budget' voted by any responsible body or enacted by some state health system. It is instead a flow of funds from
many sources, expended for various aspects of the health care system.").
20. Technology rationing refers to the denial of technology to some needy patients due
to the high cost of providing the technology to all. See generally H. AARON & W.
SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984); EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., RATIONING HIGH-COST HEALTH CARE: THE CASE OF ORGAN

1984); Platt, Sounding Board: Cost Containment-Another
OF MED., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, DISEASE BY DISEASE TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE? (1973). Another type of rationing is denying certain population segments, such as the poor, adequate
health care. See, eg., Blendon & Altman, The Hidden Cost of "Little Ticket" Advances, 1
Bus. & HEALTH 12, 16 (1984).
21. Some commentators argue that elimination of wasteful technology will be insufficient to curb health care costs. Schwartz and Jaskow, for example, state that attributing the
health care cost problem to "unnecessary" technologies or to those provided at "avoidably
high cost"-arguably examples of waste-is an oversimplification, since they count at most
for only a small fraction of rising health care costs. Schwartz & Jaskow, Medical Efficacy
Versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1464 (1978).
To the extent that wasteful technology is interpreted as technology that does not confer any
benefit on patients, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment agrees, stating: "Unfortunately, the rapid rate of growth of Medicare expenditures cannot be stemmed simply by
eliminating technologies that do not provide any benefit, because most technologies do provide some benefit, however small or costly the benefit may be." OTA MEDICARE, supra note
2, at 4.
TRANSPLANTS

(Issue Brief #31,

View, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 726, 729 (1983); INST.
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determine which technologies are targeted in the cost-containment
effort.
Assuming agreement can be reached on how waste should be
defined, however, major obstacles confront attempts to identify specific wasteful technologies (or their wasteful use). Costs, risks and
benefits must be compared, often involving complicated measurements and valuations. These assessments are particularly difficult
when a comparison must be made between different intangible bene-

fits, such as additional years of life or relief from pain.
Finally, once "waste" is defined and wasteful technologies are
identified, their elimination may be problematic. Deciding what action to take against wasteful technologies raises profound issues
concerning the proper relationship betweeen government and the
private health care sector. Moreover, there is a serious risk, especially within the Medicare system, that cost control incentives may
deny access to nonwasteful as well as to wasteful technologies. The
absence of an adequate statutory or regulatory statement of the
technologies to which beneficiaries are entitled will further exacerbate efforts to implement a sound anti-waste policy for Medicare.
I.

WHAT IS WASTE?

While there may be general agreement that eliminating waste is
desirable, there is little consensus on how the term should be defined.2 2 Nevertheless, an attempt to define waste might yield the
following general categories, which will be discussed in turn: (1) un-

safe and or ineffective technologies (or their unsafe or ineffective
use), (2) non-cost-effective technologies (or their non-cost-effective
use), and (3) technologies that do not yield adequate net benefits.
22. Commentators have described wasteful technology as: (1) ineffective technology, see
Bunker, supra note 19, at 691 (1982); Relman, supra note 17, at 669 (1982); (2) care of undocumented efficacy, see Bunker, supra note !9, at 691; (3) useless technology, see H.R. REP.
No. 818, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984); (4) redundant technology, see id.; (5) unsafe or dangerous technology, see Relman, supra note 17, at 669 (1982); Morreim, supra note 17, at 31
(defining wasteful technology as interventions leading directly or indirectly to iatrogenic injury -that is, injury inadvertently caused by the physician or other health care provider);
H.R. REP. No. 818, supra, at 4; (6) superfluous technology, see Relman, supra note 17, at
669; (7) use of more or more costly resources than necessary to yield a given product, see
PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24642; (8) unnecessary technology, see Moore, supra note
19, at 135 (discussing unnecessary surgery); (9) poor quality technology, see id. (discussing
incapable surgeons); (10) technology that is marginally beneficial at best, see Lack of Data
CausesMedical Procedure Waste, 58 HosP. 28 (1984); and (11) technology that inflates costs
without significantly increasing the quality of care, see Smits, supra note 10, at 32).
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A.

Unsafe and or Ineffective Technologies

A technology or its particular use is considered unsafe, and
therefore perhaps wasteful, when its risks exceed the benefits to the
patient.2 3 Risk of harm is defined in terms of the probability and
severity of harm.24 Therefore, if the probability and the severity of
harm from a technology are greater than the probability and the
magnitude of the benefits it purports to provide, the technology is
unsafe.2 5 A surgical procedure would clearly be unsafe, for example, if it had a 50% probability of killing the patient but only a 10%
chance of correcting a condition that created a 25% probability of
the patient's death.2 6
Safety is a relative concept. A safe technology has a low risk
(probability times severity of harm) compared with its potential
benefits (probability times magnitude). As a result, the greater the
potential benefits of a technology, the greater the risk that might be
acceptable for the technology to be deemed safe.2 7
A technology is ineffective if it produces no discernible benefit to
the patient.2 8 For example, a technology that either produces no
positive change in a patient's condition, or that produces a positive
23. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment defines "safety" as a "judgment
of the acceptability of risk (i.e., the probability and severity of an adverse effect) associated
with the use of a technology." OTA STRATAGIES, supra note 4, at 23.
24. See id.; H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, TOWARD RATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE 98 (198 1) (defining "risk of harm" as "the probability of an adverse or
untoward outcome's occurring and the severity of the resultant harm to health of individuals
in a defined population, associated with use of a medical technology, applied for a given
medical problem under specified conditions of use"). This definition is reminiscent of
Learned Hand's classic expression of the basic standard for determining if an actor exercised
reasonable care so as not to have acted negligently: "[I]f the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P ....
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
25. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1979).
26. The issue becomes more complicated if the harm and the benefit are different health
outcomes. For example, suppose a surgical procedure had a 50% probability of killing the
patient, but if it did not cause this outcome it had a 100% probability of eliminating severe
pain that the patient would otherwise experience for the rest of his life. In this case, it would
be necessary to compare the risk of death with the potential relief from pain; the technology
would only be unsafe if the former could be said to outweigh the latter. This conclusion might
vary, furthermore, from patient to patient and from time to time.
27. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 23.
28. Banta defines "effectiveness" as "[t]he probability of benefit to individuals in a defined population from medical technology applied for a given medical problem under average
conditions of use." H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & 3. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 98. It is
important to distinguish "effectiveness" from "efficacy." The latter refers to the probability
of benefit under ideal rather than average conditions. See id.; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4,
at 10, 23. Ideal conditions include those that obtain in a carefully conducted clinical test.
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change no more frequently or of no greater magnitude than would
occur without applying the technology,2 9 would be ineffective. Arguably, providing this technology to patients would be wasteful.
Medical history reveals a number of technologies that flourished
for a time but that were eventually determined to be ineffective.
One example was the tying off of an artery in the chest in order to
treat angina pectoris, a painful symptom of coronary artery disease. 30 This technology was discarded after several studies in the
late 1950's failed to show that the technology produced any positive
results. 3' An example of an ineffective diagnostic technology is the
Wasserman test for syphilis, which was used for forty years before
it was discovered to identify uninfected people as carriers fifty percent of the time.32 Ineffective technologies are by no means rare;
expert panels established by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that approximately one-third of the drugs
marketed in 1962 lacked sufficient evidence of efficacy to justify
their use.33
29. This distinction is necessary because a technology may appear to produce a positive
change in some patients, but the same changes may appear with the same frequency as a
matter of chance in a group of patients with the same disease who are not given the technology. For example, administration of a drug may be associated with the alleviation of disease
symptoms in 20% of a group of patients, and the drug therefore might be thought effective.
However, the symptoms might disappear in 20% of another, equivalent group of patients
who are merely left alone. The comparison of a group of patients receiving a technology with
an equivalent group that does not receive it is known as a "controlled" experiment, and is
discussed infra at notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
30. This technique is called internal mammary artery ligation. See Fineberg & Hiatt,
Evaluation ofMedicalPractices: The Casefor Technology Assessment, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED
1086, 1088 (1979); Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and Rationing Decisions (pt 1), 249 J.A.M.A. 2047, 2049 (1983).
31. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1088.
32. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J.WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 121. In contrast to
the Wasserman test's 50% false positive rate, the ELISA test for detecting the presence in
blood of the antibody to LAV/HTLV-III, the virus associated with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), and thus whether the person has been infected with the virus, is
reported to have a false-postive rate of 1.7%. See McDougal, Screening Tests for Blood Donors Presumed to Have Transmitted the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 65 BLOOD
772, 772-74 (1985). One commentator lists as ineffective technologies, along with internal
mammary ligation, colectomy (removal of the colon) for treatment of epilepsy, hypogastric
artery ligation (tying off the hypogastric artery) to treat pelvic hemorrhage, sympathectomy
(surgical removal of nerves) for treatment of asthma, adrenalectomy (removal of the adrenal
glands) to treat essential hypertension and "wiring" to treat aortic aneurysm, or a bulge in
the wall of the aorta. See Evans, supra note 30, at 2049.
33. See Moses & Brown, Experiences with Evaluatingthe Safety and Efficacy of Medical
Technologies, 5 ANN. REV. PuB. HEALTH 267, 288 (1984). These panels were known as the
Drug Efficacy Study Implementation, or "DESI," panels. They reviewed the efficacy of virtually all drugs on the market in 1962 which, by virtue of the 1962 New Drug Amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), were
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Some wasteful technologies are both unsafe and ineffective, pos-

ing risks but no benefits to patients. A classic example of such a
technology is gastric freezing, which was developed in the mid1950's to treat peptic ulcers.3 4 The technique involved swallowing a
balloon connected to a nasogastric tube through which alcohol
cooled to minus 15 degrees Centigrade was circulated for one
hour.3" Initial reports in 1962 of results in dogs and in twelve
human patients were said to show relief from ulcer symptoms, healing and no serious side effects.36 By the end of 1963, over 15,000
gastric freezing procedures had been performed, and over 1000 machines to chill and pump the alcohol had been sold.37 In 1964, however, published reports of experiments with the technology revealed

that it had no real effectiveness but that it did create a risk
of serious
39

side effects. 38 By 1966, use of the technology was rare.
Even if they produced no direct adverse effects on patients, ineffective technologies might be deemed to be prima facie unsafe since
they might cause patients to forego treatment with effective alternatives. This was part of the Supreme Court's rationale in upholding
the FDA's prohibition on terminal cancer patients obtaining

laetrile."
Another type of wasteful technology might be one that was less
safe or less effective than another technology.4 1 The FDA, which
required for the first time to be efficacious as well as safe in order lawfully to be marketed in
interstate commerce.
34. Gastric freezing was developed by Owen Wangensteen, a well-known surgeon at the
University of Minnesota Medical School, in conjunction with a small, private refrigeration
company, Swenko. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4; Id., at 167 app. E; Banta &
Behney, Efficacy, Safety, and Health Care Policy, 44 CONN. MED. 377, 377-88 (1980).
35. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4; Miao, GastricFreezing:An Example ofthe
Evaluation ofMedical Therapy by Randomized Clinical Trials, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY 198 (J. Bunker, B. Barnes & F. Mosteller eds. 1977) [this collection hereinafter cited as COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY].
36. These reported results included a reduction in stomach acid, immediate relief of
ulcer pain, and x-ray evidence of ulcer healing. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4.
37. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4. The technology was sufficiently accepted
that Blue Cross reimbursed providers for performing it on Blue Cross subscribers. See Moses
& Brown, supra note 33, at 270.
38. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4.
39. See id. See generally Greer, Medical Technology: Assessment, Adoption, and Utilization, 5 J. MED. SYSTEMS 129, 139-40 (1981) (describing the gastric freezing episode as a
"medical and financial fiasco"). Greer notes that, in 1963, the technology was evaluated and
condemned by the American Gastroenterological Association, and laments that no regulatory restraints were placed on the procedure on the basis of this evaluation. Id. at 140.
40. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1979).
41. More precisely, relatively unsafe and/or ineffective technologies are those that are
less safe than other technologies expected to produce the same benefit; or less effective than
other technologies available to treat or to diagnose the same condition, and that present the
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must approve the safety and efficacy of drugs4 2 and medical devices4 3 before they may be marketed lawfully in interstate commerce,' has occassionally, albeit rarely, denied approval to market
a drug on the basis that it was less safe or less effective than an
alternative already on the market.4 5
B. Non-Cost-Effective Technologies
46
Thus far, the effort to define waste has not considered CoSt.

same risks; or that are more effective but so much less safe than other technologies available
to treat or to diagnose the same condition, or that are safer but so much less effective than
alternate technologies, that, on balance, they could be regarded as providing fewer net benefits (benefits minus risks) than the alternatives.
42. The term "drug" is defined in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as any article
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man
or other animals, or any article (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body, or any article intended for use as a component of such an article. 21
U.S.C. § 321(g) (1982).
43. The term "device" is defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to mean
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or i'elated article which has the same intended uses as a drug but which does not
achieve any of its principal intended purposes through chemical action within the body. 21
U.S.C. § 321(h) (1982). The category of devices is broad, ranging "from surgeon's gloves to
jelly-filled teething rings, cardiac pacemakers, hypodermic needles, oxygen units, kidney dialysis machines, surgical sponges, prophylactics, air purifiers, crutches, and tongue depressors." Iglehart, supra note 15, at 43-44 (1977).
44. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-60 (1982), the
FDA regulates the introduction of "new" drugs and medical devices into interstate commerce. "New" denotes not only technologies being introduced for the first time but also
technologies that, on the basis of scientific evidence, are not generally recognized as safe and
effective by medical experts. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (definition of "new drug"). The Act
does not explicitly refer to "new" devices, but employs a combined classification and
premarket approval grandfathering system to distinguish between "old" and "new" devices.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)-(e). Under the Act, the FDA must approve the new drug or device
before it may be marketed in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 351(f),
355. For a general description of the drug and device provisions of the Act, see OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 159-60 app. D; Cole, History of PremarketApproval Provisionsof the
Device Amendments, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 568 (1980); Sauberman, Impact of FDA
Regulations on the Cochlear Implant Field, 405 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sm. 451, 451-52 (1983).
For a history of the medical device provisions, see Iglehart, supra note 15 at 43-47.
45. Conversation with William Vodra, former Associate Chief Counsel for Drugs, Food
and Drug Administration (Sept. 16, 1985). The FDA has denied approval of the less effective
drug on the basis that it was unsafe, since it would yield less benefit to the patient but with the
same degree of risk. Id. It is questionable that the agency has the statutory authority to
refuse to approve the marketing of a drug or a device on the basis that it is less effective than
an existing alternative.
46. "Cost" refers to the opportunity cost of the technology, i.e., the value of foregone
benefits and additional risks associated with a particular technology. Thus, the discussion of
waste in terms of unsafe and ineffective technologies might be regarded in part as a discussion
of cost. However, to simplify the analysis, the term cost will be used in its narrow, monetary
sense unless otherwise indicated.
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An unsafe or ineffective technology would be regarded as wasteful
even if, so to speak, it grew on trees. Merely determining that a
technology is safe, effective, or relatively safe and effective, however,
does not establish that technology as a wise use of resources. A
technology might also be regarded as wasteful if it is expected to
yield the same net benefit as another technology but at a greater
cost-that is, if it is not the most efficient,47 cost-effective technology to treat or to diagnose the patient's condition.4 8

This point is illustrated by comparing several technologies capable of preventing death from end-stage renal disease (ESRD),4 9 in-

cluding kidney transplantation, dialysis at home, dialysis in a
special dialysis center, and a technique called continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis.5 ° The analysis of the relative cost-effectiveness of each technology requires selection of a health outcome as a
benefit endpoint.51 Examples of benefit endpoints include years of
47. See Weinstein, Economic Assessments of MedicalPracticesand Technologies, 1 MED.
DECISION MAKING 309, 310 (1981) (purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis is ".... to assess the
efficiency with which limited resources are being allocated to achieve the desired benefits");
K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 59 (goal of cost-effectiveness analysis is "efficiency,"
defined as the "attainment of the greatest social good [however defined] permitted by the
limits on resources") (bracketed material in original). Warner and Luce's approach assumes
an identifiable limit on resources, which may be problematic. A variant on the "efficiency"
objective of cost-effectiveness analysis is a "business" orientation. See Kristein, Using CostEffectiveness and Cost/BenefitAnalysisfor Health Care PolicyMaking, ADv. HEALTH ECON.
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 199, 211 (1983) ("One may regard the application of [costeffectiveness analysis] as an attempt to introduce in the nonbusiness sector the point of view
of the business sector").
48. A technology also might be regarded as wasteful if it yielded less net benefit at the
same cost as another technology, but this more properly might be deemed a case of relative
ineffectiveness. Note that the issue of the cost of a technology-in terms of its opportunity
cost-arises only in comparison with the cost of other goods, such as alternate technologies
to treat or to diagnose the same condition. Absent other uses for these resources there would
be no issue of cost. It is therefore incorrect to ask "how cost-effective is technology X?" The
correct question is "how much more cost-effective is technology X than technology Y?" See
K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 43-44. In this Article, however, "non-cost-effective" denotes a technology that is not the most cost-effective alternative available.
49. End-stage renal disease results in the inability to remove impurities from the blood.
Toxic substances build up and eventually cause death. The blood of victims of this disease
can be artificially cleansed by means of a technique called dialysis, and in some cases a donor
kidney can be successfully transplanted. See Delmez, PathophysiologicalPrinciplesin Treatment of Patients with Renal Failure, in THE KIDNEY AND BODY FLUIDS IN HEALTH AND

DISEASE 492-93, 499 (S. Klahr ed. 1983).
50. See Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability ofResource Allocation and
Rationing Decisions (pt. 2), 249 J. A.M.A. 2208, 2209 (1983). As other examples of costeffectiveness technology comparisons, Evans cites a comparison between transplantation and
traditional medical and surgical management for end-stage cardiac disease as well as a comparison between coronary artery bypass surgery and percutaneous transluminal coronary
angioplasty as treatments for atherosclerosis. Id.
51. A "unifactorial" analysis employs only one health outcome as the benefit endpoint.
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life saved by the technology, days without pain, the patient's ability
to resume his or her career, or a combination of these. Once the
benefit endpoint is identified, the relative ability of each technology
to achieve the greatest amount of the endpoint5 2 is measured. The
technology that achieves the greatest amount of the benefit for the
lowest cost is deemed the most cost-effective. 3 All less cost-effective technologies would be regarded as wasteful.
In practice, cost-effectiveness analysis is much more complicated. Alternate technologies are likely to yield varying degrees of
different benefits accompanied by different types and amounts of
risk. For instance, dialysis and transplantation may yield the same
number of additional years of life to a patient with end-stage renal
disease. However, while transplantation may afford a better quality
of life, dialysis may have a greater likelihood of producing its admittedly more limited benefit, since transplants have a higher rate of
failure. In order to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, these variables must all be reduced to a net benefit expressed in terms of the
54
same health outcomes.
The cost of a technology only becomes a factor in defining waste
in the case of a safe and effective technology. Only if the benefits of
If more than one outcome is used, the analysis is called "multifactorial." See Butt &
Neuhauser, The Machine and the Marketplace:Economic Considerationsin Applying Health
Care Technology, in MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE, supra note 4, 140.
52. This would be a function of the probability that the technology would achieve the
endpoint.
53. See Kristein, supra note 47, at 204 (1982); Klarman, Application of Cost-Benefit
Analysis To Health Systems Technology, in TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN

THE 1980's 227 (1972).
54. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. Weinstein offers another approach to
defining waste in cost-effectiveness terms. Three categories of technologies are distinguished:
those that produce a positive expected net health benefit (net referring to benefits minus risks)
and a negative expected net cost (net referring to costs minus savings, such as savings from
avoidance of future illness); those that produce a negative expected net benefit (i.e., unsafe,
ineffective or both); and those that produce positive expected net benefits and positive expected net costs.
By virtue of reducing costs as well as providing benefits, the first category of technologies--called cost-saving technologies-should be fostered in an effort to combat waste. The
second category would be attacked as clear cases of waste. The third category--comprised of
cost-increasing technologies that confer net benefits--could be ranked in order of the increasing ratio of costs to benefits. If there were a fixed budget for how much could be spent on
technology, cost-increasing technologies could be considered non-wasteful descending from
the top of the list until the budget limit were reached. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 311.
Alternatively, technologies on the list could be considered wasteful if their cost of achieving a
health outcome exceeded a preset amount. See Neuhauser, Cost-Effective Clinical DecisionMaking: Implicationsfor the Delivery ofHealth Services, in CosTs, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF
SURGERY, supra note 35, 30-34. For example, technologies that cost more than $X per additional year of life might be regarded as wasteful.

19861

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

the technology exceed its risks- i.e., if it is expected to yield net
benefit to the patient-does the question of whether the technology
yields the most net benefit given its relative cost arise. This suggests
that, in principle, the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a technology in order to determine if it is wasteful should be performed
only after the technology is demonstrated to be safe and effective.5 5
C.

Technologies That Yield Inadequate Net Benefits

In comparing technologies to determine which yields the greatest net benefit for the lowest cost, benefit has been considered in
terms of health outcomes, such as additional years of life or days
without pain. While this facilitates comparing technologies that are
expected to yield the same health outcomes, it does not allow a very
precise comparison of technologies that are expected to yield different health outcomes, or different mixes of health outcomes. How is
a treatment that is expected to provide a patient with additional
years of life, for example, to be compared to a technology that only
reduces pain? Or how should a technology that is expected to yield
five additional years of life and increased mobility, but with little
pain relief, be compared with a technology that is expected to yield
only three additional years of life, no increased mobility, but substantial pain reduction?
One approach is simply to delineate these different benefits,
along with the costs of each technology, and to allow the decisionmaker-the patient, for example-to select the technology that offers what seems like the best benefit package for the money. This
entails an assessment of the relative utility of the various expected
benefits, which will be contingent on each individual decisionmaker's benefit preferences.
An alternative approach to the problem of different expected
benefits is to convert the benefits into common units. This is often
referred to as "cost-benefit analysis," in contrast to cost-effectiveness analysis, described above.5 6 One such common unit is a "quality-adjusted life year" or QALY.5 7 To compare technologies in this
55. See Ball, Prospective Payment: Implications for Medical Technology, 100 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 606, 606-07 (1984) (cost-effectiveness analysis is complementary to safety
and effectiveness evaluation of technologies).
56. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
57. The term was coined by Bush, Chen & Patrick, Health Status Index in Cost Effectivenesw" Analysis ofPKU ScreeningProgram, in HEALTH STATUS INDEXES: PROCEEDINGS
OF A CONFERENCE (R. Berg ed. 1973). See also K. WARNER & B. LUCE,supra note 1, at
148.
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manner, all health benefits are converted into additional years of
life, adjusted for non-life benefits such as days without pain or increased mobility. 8 Theoretically, once their benefits are converted
to common terms, technologies can be compared, and those that
yield fewer QALY's at the same cost, or the same QALY's at
greater cost, can be deemed wasteful.
Technology benefits might also be converted into a common denominator of dollars and compared in terms of how many dollars of
benefit result from a given dollar cost. Technologies that are expected to yield fewer dollars of benefit per dollar of cost than other
technologies can be regarded as wasteful. For example, if the value
of an additional year of life is $100,000, a technology that was expected to yield an additional year of life to a patient at a cost of
$75,000, or a net benefit of $25,000, would be preferable to a technology that was also expected to yield an additional year of life to
the patient, but at a cost of $85,000. Providing the latter rather
than the former would be regarded as wasteful. If various health
benefits can be assigned dollar values, technologies that produce different benefits can be compared directly.59
In the discussion so far, converting benefits to dollars would fulfill the same function as converting benefits to QALY's; the only
difference is the common unit employed. One advantage of converting benefits to dollars, however, is that technologies can be evaluated in terms of whether or not they provide a net benefit in
58. See Hellinger, Controlling Costs by Adjusting Paymentfor Medical Technologies, 19
INQUIRY 34, 40 (1982).
59. "Cost effectiveness analysis" is often used to refer to evaluations that compare technologies according to how much they cost to yield a unit of the same health outcome, such as
additional years of life. See, eg., Weinstein, supra note 47, at 310-11. In contrast, evaluations that compare technologies that produce different health outcomes are often referred to
as "cost-benefit" analyses. See Fuchs, What is CBA/CEA, and Why are They Doing This To
Us?, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 937, 937-938 (1980). In this sense, a comparison of technologies on the basis of QALY's might be regarded as cost-benefit rather than cost-effectiveness
analysis. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 40; K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 48-49.
Another distinction that is often made between cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, however, is that only the latter typically measures benefits as well as costs in dollars. See,
e-g., Butt & Neuhauser, supra note 51, at 139-40. According to this distinction, QALY comparisons would constitute cost-effectiveness rather than cost-benefit analyses. Nevertheless,
cost-effectiveness analysis can be performed so long as benefit is measured in common units
for all technologies under consideration, and this can be in dollars. See Weinstein, supra note
47, at 311. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis need not measure benefits in monetary terms. See
id. at 312.
In this Article, cost-effectiveness analysis will refer to evaluations and comparisons aimed
at determining which technology produces the greatest amount of a given health outcome at
the least cost. Cost-benefit analysis will refer to evaluations and comparisons of technologies
where the benefits are converted into common units, such as QALY's or dollars.
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dollars.6' For example, if an additional year of life were valued at
$50,000, a technology that was expected to yield one additional year
of life at a cost of $100,000 would be wasteful.
This in turn compels an evaluation of whether a cost-effective
technology to achieve a given health outcome is worth it. Costeffectiveness analysis merely aims at pinpointing which technology
is the cheapest to achieve a given health outcome; cost-benefit analysis aims to determine if achieving the health outcome in the most
cost-effective fashion is desirable or if it is an efficient use of
resources.
To illustrate, cost-effectiveness analysis may disclose that technology A can save a patient one year of life for $100,000 while technology B could save a year of life for only $90,000; this presumably
would lead to a preference for technology B, and under these circumstances technology A might be regarded as wasteful. But no
information has been provided on whether a year of life is worth
$90,000-that is, whether technology B is also wasteful. Nor can
cost-effectiveness analysis determine if technology C, which relieves
a patient's pain for one week for $9,000, is preferable to technology
D, which relieves the pain for two weeks for $15,000.61 Even
QALY-based cost-benefit analysis cannot answer these questions; it
can reveal which technology alternative is expected to yield the
greatest amount of QALY's per unit of cost, but not whether the
purchase of this quantity of health outcome is a wise use of resources.6 2 Converting benefits into dollars, however, in theory permits these comparisons to be made.6" If a pain-free week is valued
at $25,000, then technology C is cost-beneficial and not wasteful; if
each additional week is also worth $25,000, then technology D is
preferable to technology C.64
60. Unless benefits are converted to units such as dollars, assessing net benefit must be
restricted to the non-cost-related question of whether the benefits from the technology are
greater than the risks. See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
61. See Butt & Neuhauser, supra note 51, at 140.
62. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 311-12 ("Because it avoids the problem of assigning
economic value to health benefits, [non-monetary] cost-effectiveness analysis does not provide
an unambiguous basis for concluding that a technology is or is not 'cost-effective.' Such a
determination would have to depend on the judgment as to whether the calculated costeffectiveness ratio exceeds an appropriate cut-off level.").
63. This approach is fraught with practical difficulties, however. See infra notes 213-29
and accompanying text.
64. It would be incorrect to describe technology D as "cost-beneficial" compared to
technology C. Instead, technology D yields a greater expected net benefit than C. See K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 106-07. It is also preferable to express cost-benefit
comparisons between technologies in terms of relative net benefit rather than ratios of costs to
benefits. Cost-benefit ratios are sensitive to whether a positive technology effect is considered
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Once benefits are converted into dollars, health care technologies can be compared to non-health care technologies and to other
competing potential purchases. For example, if the net benefit of a
life-extending technology were $100,000 per patient and the net
benefit of providing adequate housing were $200,000 per person, the
former could be regarded as a less efficient use of resources-wasteful, perhaps-in comparison with the latter.65
D. The Problem of Perspective
The three approaches to defining waste described above differ
according to the parameters they evaluate: risk versus benefit for
safety and effectiveness assessment, cost versus health outcome for
cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost versus benefit for cost-benefit
analysis. These are not merely alternate ways of saying that a particular technology is wasteful. The technologies that would be regarded as wasteful change depending on the definition that is
adopted. A technology that is safe and effective, and therefore not
wasteful on that account, nevertheless might be wasteful by virtue
of not being cost-effective, and a cost-effective technology might be
wasteful by virtue of providing inadequate net benefit. 6
Different technologies may be classified as wasteful not only because different definitions of waste may be employed, but also by
virtue of the choice of perspective, the standpoint from which the
risks, costs, and benefits of technology are assessed. A number of
perspectives are possible, reflecting the fact that evaluation of technologies occurs at a number of levels in the health care system. At
the microlevel, there is first the perspective of the individual patient.
This in turn can differ depending on the patient's circumstances.
For example, a patient in need of a technology, insured either by a
government program such as Medicare or by private health insurance, would be likely to have a different perspective than a patient
who is not insured and who therefore must pay directly for the technology. 67 Furthermore, a patient in need of a technology in order
to be a benefit or a negative cost factor, although such a distinction actually should be inconsequential. See id.
65. See id.
66. These three principle parameters can be grouped in order of priority. Generally
speaking, a technology that would be deemed wasteful because it is unsafe would not need to
be evaluated for cost-effectiveness, and a technology that is not cost-effective would not need
to be assessed for its net benefits.
67. Some commentators believe that waste can best be curbed by making health care
consumers (i.e., patients) and payors the same. This view has led to proposals to increase the
degree to which patients resemble consumers in a market-proposals characterized both by
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to save his life might have a different reaction to the risks, benefits,
and costs of a technology than a potential patient contemplating
what type of health insurance package to purchase.6 8
Similarly, a potential patient deciding which health insurance to
buy views his need for health care from a different perspective than
the insurance company itself. The insurance company is presumably interested in maximizing its net income, the combined premiums of all of its policyholders less administrative costs and the

payments the insurance company must make for their health care.
The potential patient, in contrast, presumably is interested in maximizing his own individual utility, which would be affected by the
total group of policyholders only to the extent that fluctuations in
their premiums or in the company's payments for their care affected
his premiums or the type of care for which the company would reimburse. 69 The perspective of a government third-party payment

program, such as Medicare, also differs from that of a private insurer; the objective of the government program is unlikely to be the
maximization of net revenue, but instead the achievement of social
or political goals.
making patients pay for care and by making the health care system as much of a free market
system as possible. See, ag., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY UNDER PROPOSALS TO INCREASE COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 58

(1982) [herein-

after cited as OTA COMPETITION] ("Procompetitive proposals attempt to aline (sic)
individual preferences and costs more closely with social preferences and costs. Almost by
definition, such convergence is professed to assure and improve quality."). A key feature of
this approach is prepaid health care. Its proponents recognize that "the sick or worried
patient is in a poor position to make an economic analysis of treatment alternatives." A.
ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF
MEDICAL CARE (1980), quoted in OTA COMPETITION, supra.

The viability of this "consumer-competitive" approach is questionable; because they lack
knowledge and expertise, patients are unlikely to behave like rational consumers in a true
market. See infra notes 257, 386-87 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the third-party payment system, by divorcing the purchaser of health care from the
beneficiary, creates incentives for waste. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
68. One commentator advocates the insurance purchaser viewpoint as the appropriate
one from which to determine how to maximize utility, considering that the cost of a technology will be borne largely by those who never use it. Goddeeris, MedicalInsurance, Technological Change, and Welfare, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 56, 58 (1984). Goddeeris does not, however,
consider the impact of intangible costs and benefits in his utility assessment. See infra notes
213-29 and accompanying text. Moreover, Goddeeris ignores the distinctly different risk
aversiveness-hence different willingness to pay-of a sick patient contemplating a health
insurance purchase, on the one hand, and a well patient, on the other. See infra note 229 and
accompanying text.
69. The divergent points of view of insurers and insureds have been the subject of much
litigation and commentary, especially in tort law. See, eg., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (insurance company liable in tort for rejecting
reasonable settlement offer); Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liabilityfor an Insurer's Failure to
Settle: A Balanced Planfor an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 901.
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Health care providers, moreover, possess perspectives that may
differ greatly from those of patients and third-party payors. The
perspective of the physician caring for the patient differs from those
of his professional colleagues, and their perspective in turn differs
from that of hospitals and other health care provider
organizations.7 °
Finally, there is the somewhat elusive perspective often referred
to as that of "society. '' 7 1 This perspective is most often contrasted
with that of the individual patient.72 The clearest illustration of the
divergence between the perspective of an individual patient and that
of society arises in a choice between a preventive and a therapeutic
technology for the same disease. From a societal standpoint, the
net benefit to be expected from the preventive technology may be
greater than the net benefit from the therapeutic technology, since
preventing the disease may avoid substantial future health care expenditures. From the standpoint of a patient with the disease, however, the preventive technology would offer virtually no benefit at
3
all.

7

70. Smits discusses how the various perspectives affect the selection of diagnostic technologies. The physician's perspective focuses on which test provides the best information
about the patient. The insurer does not care which test is used so long as it does not cost
more than the alternatives and so long as only one test is used. The hospital administrator is
most concerned about expensive tests that disproportionately affect his budget. Finally, the
manager of a hospital floor views diagnostic technologies in terms of the "relative value of
items that have low unit costs but are used frequently." Smits, supra note 10, at 32-33.
71. "Society" presumably refers to the United States, not the entire world.
72. See, e.g., Weinstein, Pliskin & Stason, CoronaryArtery Bypass Surgery: Decision and
Policy Analysis, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY, supra note 35, at 363 ("What
is optimal medical care for the individual patient may not be optimal where we, as society
collectively, consider what it is costing us."). The paper discusses a study of coronary bypass
surgery in which the authors conclude that the operation is more effective than nonsurgical
treatments for most patients, but that it is more expensive than nonsurgical treatments in
terms of the cost per additional QALY (quality-adjusted life year). Id. QALY's are discussed
supra at notes 57-58 and accompanying text. In other words, from an individual patient's
standpoint, bypass surgery yields a greater net benefit than alternative treatments, while from
a broader, societal perspective aimed at obtaining the most additional QALY's at the least
cost, the technology is not the most cost-effective. Other commentators distinguish between
the perspectives of providers, consumers and society, see OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67,
and between the perspectives of physicians, patients and society. See Tancredi, Social and
EthicalImplications in Technology Assessment, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 93-99 (B. McNeil & E. Cravalho eds. 1982) [this collection hereinafter cited as CRITICAL
IssuES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY].
73. The divergence between societal and patient perspective is widely recognized. See
Dunlop, Our Emerging Technology-How Much is Enough?, 28 MD. STATE MED. J 42, 42-44
(1979) (statement of the past president of the American College of Surgeons that "[w]hat is
the optimal medical care for the individual patient may not be optimal when society collectively considers what it is costing"). Often the dichotomy is portrayed from the standpoint of
the patient's physician versus society. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1090 (physi-
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Differences in perspective are reflected in the different approaches to defining wasteful technology. Safety and effectiveness,
cians' aim "to mobilize all resources that might help the patient" conflicts with "the social
objective of obtaining the greatest possible benefit to all from available resources"); OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE IMPLICATIONS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OTA IMPLICATIONS] ("If a patient is
not harmed economically by performance of a certain procedure, even though only a small
medical benefit might be expected, what are the ethics of the individual physician's denying
or recommending against the procedure in order to represent society's cost and benefit priorities?"); Cahill & Beljan, Technology Assessment: Differing Perspectives, 252 J. A.M.A. 3294
(1984) ("Where the generally accepted medical credo strives for the greatest good for the
individual, the new economic imperative calls for 'the greatest good for the greatest number,'
within clearly defined limits on available resources.").
Due to current and future potential financial pressures on physicians to lower the costs of
health care, however, it may not be correct to consider the interests of physicians and patients
as completely alligned. See supra notes 302-09 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, by
virtue both of proximity to actual patients and professional training, the physician may be
incapable of taking a societal perspective on the risks, costs and benefits of a technology. See
Dunlop, supra, at 44. As one physician points out, "[m]ore than others, doctors live their
lives close to the unlimited health care demand of a public seeking immortality." Fisher,
Impact ofFinancingon Medical Technology, 86 PENN. MED. 32, 33 (1983). This may in part
account for the fact that, in 1982 for example, 20% of Medicare expenditures were spent on
the last six months of patients' lives. See Debakey & Debakey, The Ethics and Economics of
High-Technology Medicine, 9 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 6, 8 (1983). Veatch presumably
addresses the difference in patient and societal perspective in stating: "I am strongly inclined
toward promoting justice, even if that means lower aggregate indicators of utility." Veatch,
Justice and Valuing Lives, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 156 (S. Rhoads ed.
1980).
Among the most vehement critics of the societal perspective is the American Medical
Association, which has consistently testified against efforts to establish new federal programs
to evaluate technology on the ground that they would take a societal perspective which would
be at odds with the physician's responsibility to his patients. See, eg., Hearings on H.R.
4869, supra note 16, at 384 (testimony of William C. Felch, M.D., American Medical Association) (criticizing efforts to establish such a program as leading to the overemphasis of costeffectiveness analysis to the detriment of the "true purpose of medical treatment and technological development-the saving of lives, the alleviation of pain and suffering, and the rehabilitation of those who are ill"); Health Care Technology Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R.
2562 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2562]
(testimony of Dr. Joseph Boyle, American Medical Association) ("The advantage the individual physician has over any national center or advisory council is that he or she is dealing
with individuals in need of medical care, not hypothetical cases. The consequences of every
medical decision are real and immediate, not conjectural."). Without expressly saying so and
perhaps without recognizing it, the AMA has put its finger on a major problem in attempting
to value health benefits: By taking a nonpatient perspective on the costs and benefits of treatment, there is a tendency to underestimate the value of a technology to a patient.
This type of criticism led the director of the National Center for Health Care Technology
(NCHCT), one of the principal federal agencies assessing medical technology at the time, to
declare that the NCHCT "needs and solicits the active participation of... the patient receiving the benefits a new technology offers." Acosta, Health Care Technology: Studying It at The
National Center, 4 FORUM 30, 32 (1980) (remarks attributed to Seymour Perry). For a discussion of the NCHCT, see infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. As a practical matter,
however, patients played virtually no direct role in the agency's activities.
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for example, are invariably assessed from a patient perspective; a
technology that is unsafe for a patient or that has no demonstrable
therapeutic effect cannot be safe or effective in any other sense.74
Cost-effectiveness assessments, however, may be made from a
number of perspectives. For example, a technology may be evaluated in terms of whether or not it is the most cost-effective method:
(1) of achieving a desired health outcome in a particular individual
(patient perspective); (2) of maximizing a desired health outcome in
a group such as a pool of insureds (insurance perspective); or (3) of
maximizing total utility in an economic sense (societal
perspective).7
The choice of perspective will dictate which technologies are
wasteful by virtue of not being cost-effective. A technology might
be the cheapest way of prolonging a particular patient's life, but
may not be the cheapest way of prolonging lives generally. For example, a vaccine may save lives far more cheaply than heart transplants. From the lifesaving perspective of society, therefore, heart
transplants may seem wasteful because they are not as cost-effective
a means of achieving the desired health effect of saving lives as the
vaccine. However, the transplant may well be cost-effective from
the point of view of the patient. Furthermore, different perspectives
yield different waste targets when technology is evaluated by costbenefit analysis.7 6
In short, the definition of waste in technology is dependent not
only on which criteria of waste are adopted but also on the perspective from which the technology is assessed. A waste control program must make a choice between the foregoing alternatives, if only
to say that waste according to any perspective is a legitimate cost
control target. Before discussing which definition and perspective
74. Conceivably in an experiment, a patient might be exposed to risks or denied benefits
from a technology in order to generate information that might lead to benefits for others.
Although the technology might be deemed unsafe or ineffective from that patient's standpoint, it would not be considered wasteful from a broader societal perspective. Such an experiment, however, raises serious ethical and legal objections. See infra notes 196-98 and
accompanying text.
75. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 310 (cost-effectiveness analysis is only appropriate,
even from the patient's viewpoint, when it is conducted "in the context of explicitly limited
resources"); K. WARNER & B. LuCE, supra note 1, at 43, 60 ("[w]e assume a societal perspective on costs and benefits, the traditional perspective of CBA-CEA [cost-benefit and costeffectiveness analysis].").
76. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 310; Kristein, supra note 47, at 222; Schwartz &
Jaskow, supra note 21, at 1462. Kristein defines "uneconomical spending" for health care as
an instance "where (a) the marginal cost to the individual is less than the marginal cost to
society, and (b) where the marginal benefit to the individual is greater than the marginal
benefit to society." Kristein, supra note 47, at 220.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

should be selected, however, the problems in attempting to identify
specific wasteful technologies will be explored.
II.

PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFICATION

Once wasteful technology is properly defined, the next step is to
identify specific technologies that fall within the definition. The
process of defining and identifying wasteful technologies is known
as "technology assessment." The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment defines technology assessment as "[a] comprehensive form of policy research that examines the technical, economic,
and social consequences of technological applications."" As formally defined, technology assessment is a comprehensive process
that produces the information that should form the basis of health
care decisionmaking by physicians, patients, hospitals, health planners, insurers, and public program managers.78 These decisionmakers must make choices between alternate technologies on the
best available information, which is often far from ideal in quality
and quantity.7 9 A less rigorous process of evaluation also occurs as
a form of technology assessment, and will be included within the
meaning of the term in the following discussion.
The task of identifying wasteful technologies raises difficulties
apart from those encountered in the effort to define the term waste.
Some of these problems are inherent in any effort to assess technology, while others arise in the context of specific technologies being
assessed or specific assessment methods being employed.
A.

General Problems of Waste Identification

1. Selection of Technologiesfor Assessment
The process of selecting technologies to be assessed raises an initial set of problems, particularly when undertaking the more comprehensive form of technology assessment envisioned by the Office
of Technology Assessment. 0 A technology assessment system
designed to control costs should focus on costly technologies, in77. See OTA STRATEGIES,supra note 4, at 201-02.
78. See Banta & Behney, Policy Formulationand Technology Assessment, 59 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 445, 448 (1981) ("Technology assessment is seen as a comprehensive
form of policy research that examines short- and long-term social consequences (e.g. societal,
economic, ethical, legal) of the application of technology.").
79. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. In contrast, when informal technology
assessment is undertaken for practical, day-to-day health care decisionmaking, the choice of
technologies is likely to be dictated largely by patient management considerations.
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cluding both those with high per-unit costs and high aggregate costs
due to the volume of use." Conceivably the most expensive technologies would be assessed first, followed by less expensive ones,
until assessment resources had been exhausted.
Assessment priorities might be further established on the basis
of the expected magnitude of net benefit, its probability of occurrence, and the size of the treatment population. This would lead to
the following breakdown:
TABLE 1
Technology
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L

Net
Benefit
small
small
small
large
large
large
small
small
small
large
large
large

Probability
low
low
low
low
low
low
high
high
high
high
high
high

Patient
Population
large
large
small
small
large
large
large
large
small
small
large
large

Unit Cost
large
small
large
large
large
small
large
small
large
large
large
small

At one extreme, technologies A and B are most likely to be regarded as potentially wasteful, and therefore in need of assessment.
Their small benefit, coupled with the low probability of its occurrence, will produce valid negative results with relatively small patient populations in clinical trials. At the other extreme,
technologies J, K, and L, which offer the most favorable benefitprobability ratios, are also likely to be easily and cheaply evaluated
in small studies. The remaining technologies, on the other hand,
offer only marginal net benefit (benefit minus risk), either because
the benefit is small, or because the probability of its achievement is
low, or both. Moreover, these are likely to be the most expensive
and most difficult technologies to assess, with large populations required to generate statistically significiant results. They are less
81. An assessment system not designed primarily to control costly technology would
presumably make an initial selection of which technologies to assess on some other basis.
Presently, technologies are chosen for assessment either because they are new drugs or medical devices, see infra note 82 and accompanying text, or because they are existing technologies
that compete with new technologies. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 98; Arnstein,
Strategyfor Health Technology, 13 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 14, 15 (1979) (existing technologies assessed primarily by serving as controls in studies of new technologies).
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likely than the other four technologies to be extremely wasteful or
useful, however, and therefore their continuing spread and use or
lack thereof is arguably of less immediate concern. Their assessment priority accordingly should be lower.8 2
82. This system of priorities assumes that the net benefit, probability of its occurrence,
size of the patient population and unit cost are known or can be accurately estimated. This is
less likely to be true of new than of existing technologies with which there has been some
experience, and is one of the reasons that technology assessment might focus on the latter
rather than on the former. Another reason for focusing on existing technologies is that many
may be obsolete. The Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA), a trade association of manufacturers of medical devices, has advocated concentrating technology assessment on "relatively old" technologies since many are mere "historical carryovers" in need of
assessment. Health Care Research and Research TrainingAmendments of 1981: Hearingson
S. 800 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson S. 800] (testimony of Dimitri V. d'Arbeloff on behalf
of HIMA). Furthermore, singling out new technologies for assessment might hinder their
development, and this might prevent or unduly postpone the availability of important medical advances. See Health Care Technology Assessment: Hearings on S. 2504 Before the Senate
Comm. on LaborandHuman Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 2504] (testimony of Frank E. Samuel, Jr., President of HIMA); Hearingson
H.R. 4869, supra note 16, at 381-82 (testimony of the American Medical Association). A
negative impact on technological innovation is premised on the belief that unrecoverable assessment costs will be borne by the innovator and that the increased cost of capital necessary
to compensate for the increased project risk will exceed the expected return on investment.
On the other hand, it might seem wise to concentrate on new technologies since, due to
the lack of experience with them, less may be known about them than about existing technologies, and therefore it may be harder to identify those that are wasteful without some special
effort. Furthermore, new technologies may be less entrenched than existing ones, and therefore wasteful new technologies may be easier to eliminate. See Schroeder, Medical Technology and Academic Medicine: The Doctor-Producers'Dilemma, 56 J. MED. EDUC. 634, 635
(1981). The process by which wasteful technologies might be eliminated is discussed infra at
notes 245-95 and accompanying text.
New technologies might be assessed routinely as they reached a particular stage of development, thus avoiding the need to predict their net benefit, probability of the benefit occurring, size of their future patient population, and unit cost. This is essentially the selection
system imposed on the Food and Drug Administration by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 94. Even so, the FDA reviews technologies according to a priority system. New chemical entities believed to offer significant benefits
over existing products are required to undergo a rigorous assessment process, but the agency
gives them review priority over other products. On the other hand, products that are merely
minor modifications of existing products, such as drugs that differ in dosage strength from
those on the market, are put through a less rigorous approval process but at a slower pace.
In lieu of the priority system suggested in the text, another system that has been suggested
is to select for assessment first those technologies that are believed to provide some benefit but
that are suspected of being capable of providing more under different patterns of use, followed by technologies suspected of being dangerous or useless, followed in turn by technologies that are widespread or expensive. See Banta, Behney & Andrulis, Assessing Medical
Technologies, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 113, 118 (1978). The authors do not explain why
technologies with greater potential benefit deserve to be assessed ahead of those that pose
risks.
Due in part to objections that assessment stifles new technologies, a major federal technology assessment agency, the National Center for Health Care Technology (NCHCT), formed
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Timing

Related to the issue of which technologies to assess is the determination of when to conduct the assessment. Timing is likely to be
a concern primarily with formal, programmatic technology assessment, such as investigations of the safety and efficacy of new technologies conducted for the FDA. 83 Because informal, day-to-day
technology assessment usually occurs at the time the technology is
identified as a patient management option, timing is not an issue in
that context.
Technology develops in stages: basic research and development,
applied research, introduction in humans, diffusion, and eventually
obsolesence.8 4 Technology can be assessed at a number of these
stages. The later the assessment, the less its result can influence the
developmental process. To facilitate identifying wasteful technologies before they become so widespread as to cause substantial harm
or economic disutility, or become so entrenched that curbing their
during the Carter administration, was subsequently denied funding by the Reagan administration. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. In an effort to keep the agency alive
in the face of criticism, its director, Seymour Perry, ackowledged that "emerging" technologies (which he defined as "actively evolving") should only be the subject of "full blown assessment.., in unusual circumstances involving serious ethical or legal issues," and not merely
because such technologies promised to be costly. Perry, The BriefLife ofthe National Center
for Health Care Technology, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1095, 1099 (1982).
83. See Greer, supra note 39, at 130.
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act mandates the assessment of a technology under the agency's jurisdiction before it is marketed. New products, such as new drugs and medical devices, must be assessed before they
are allowed to be shipped in interstate commerce. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text. Agency approval is conditioned upon a finding that a drug product has been shown, by
substantial evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, to be safe for
use under prescribed conditions, and to have the effect it is represented to have under those
conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Agency approval to ship a device must be based on a showing of reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective under the conditions of use in
its labelling. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d).
FDA assessment and approval is required not only for commercial introduction, but for
shipment for purposes of clinical assessment (the term "clinical" in connection with experiments refers to experiments in human subjects); a manufacturer is prohibited from shipping a
technology to a research establishment for testing in humans without obtaining prior FDA
approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (providing procedure for obtaining FDA approval for shipping
investigational drug); 21 U.S.C. 360j(g) (providing procedure for obtaining FDA approval for
shipping new device). In determining whether or not to permit a drug or device to be shipped
for purposes of conducting human experiments, the agency examines chemistry, laboratory,
and animal data submitted by the sponsor of the study. In the case of a product that already
has been approved, the FDA requires a separate approval before the manufacturer lawfully
may promote the product for a new use. The FDA has no jurisdiction to require approval of
a new use that the manufacturer does not promote, such as an unapproved new use by a
physician on his patients. Nor does the agency have jurisdiction over medical and surgical
technologies, except to the extent of their use of drugs and devices.
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use would encounter substantial public opposition, it is advisable to
conduct technology assessment as early as possible."5
The basic research and development stage is generally conceded
to be premature for assessment, since the resulting technology is as
yet insufficiently defined for-meaningful assessment.8 6 The first assessment opportunity, therefore, is at the applied research stage.
However, early assessment risks stifling new technologies that
might later prove nonwasteful.8 7 This stems from the fact that technologies and the contexts in which they are applied change over
time.8 8 Indeed, technologies may change during the assessment period,8 9 so that by the time the assessment data are available, the
technology has evolved and the results no longer apply. 90 Moreover, the risks, costs, and benefits of a technology at an early stage
of development are hard to foresee, and the earlier the stage of development of the technology, the less confident the projection.
3. Shortage of Data
Technology assessment is an analysis of information on a technology. Its quality and hence its usefulness are proportional to the
quality and quantity of the data on which it is based. The lack of
adequate assessment data creates a serious obstacle to identifying
85. The developmental stages of medical technology have been likened to an S-curve,
with the extent of human use plotted on the X axis and time plotted on the Y axis. The curve
is flat along the time axis until the technology is first introduced in humans; it then ascends
fairly steeply before levelling off at the point of maximum acceptance or saturation. Eventually it may fall back as the technology becomes obsolete. See Banta, supra note 16, at 65;
Greer, supra note 39, at 134.
86. See Banta & Behney, Medical Technology: Policies and Problems, 5 HEALTH CARE
MANAGEMENT REV. 45, 50 (1980).
87. See Schroeder, supra note 82, at 635; Hearings on H.R. 4869, supra note 16, at 38182 (testimony of the American Medical Association).
88. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087; Banta, Behney & Andrulis, supranote
82, at 118.
89. This period may be protracted. See infra note 90. See Derzon, Influences of Reimbursement Policies on Technology, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 72, at 149 (third-party payors "cannot wait the desired length of time needed to assess
many technologies" before deciding whether or not to pay for them).
90. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087-88. This problem, known as latency,
arises when the rate of change in a technology exceeds the rate at which it can be assessed.
See Eddy, Measuring the Effectiveness of TherapeuticSurgicalProcedures: A MasterPlan, in
NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH SERvs. RESEARCH, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 40, 43 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY]. It is compounded by the length of time necessary to measure certain health outcomes; cancer survival, for example, is typically measured
in five- or ten-year units. Id. at 43-44. Moreover, some types of technology assessment, such
as the randomized, controlled clinical trial, cannot easily be changed midstream to take account of a change in the technology under investigation. See id. at 44.
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wasteful technologies. 9' The shortage extends not only to economic cost and benefit data required for cost-effectiveness and costbenefit analyses, 92 but also to the data needed to conduct basic assessments of safety and effectiveness. The Office of Technology Assessment has estimated that only between ten and twenty percent of
all technologies used in medical practice have been shown to be efficacious in controlled clinical investigations.9 3 Safety and effectiveness data are particularly scant for technologies other than those
drugs and devices that require FDA approval prior to being marketed.9 4 Furthermore, the more novel the technology, and therefore arguably the greater the need to predict its future risks, costs
and benefits, the less data that are likely to be available.9" While
techniques have been developed to facilitate technology assessment
in the absence of hard data,96 generating such data must remain a
91. See Klarman, supra note 53, at 234 (noting especially the lack of longitudinal data);
Weinstein, supranote 47, at 317-18 (noting the "softness" of data to establish probabilities for
predicting future costs and benefits).
92. See infra notes 211-29 and accompanying text.
93. Controlled clinical trials are required to determine the safety and efficacy of technologies. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
94. See Banta & Behney, Policy Formulation and Technology Assessment, 59 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND. Q. 445, 454 (1980). For a description of the FDA approval process, see
supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
95. See Warner, Effects of Hospital Cost Containment on the Development of Medical
Technology, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 187, 190 (1978). This perhaps puts novel
technologies at a relative disadvantage; the absence of available data and greater risk of
safety, efficacy, or cost problems makes such technologies less likely to be adopted than technologies more similar to existing technologies. On the other hand, there might be a bias in
favor of novel technologies, especially compared with existing technologies that have a
known but somewhat disappointing track record.
96. One such technique is sensitivity analysis. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 317;
Hearingson H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 462-63 (testimony of the National Center for Health
Care Technology); Klarman, supra note 53, at 236; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 67.
Sensitivity analysis tests the sensitivity of the end result to variations in the uncertain variables. By testing across a complete range of possible values, sensitivity analysis determines
whether or not that factor is significant. For example, in testing for net benefit, if even the
worst-case value for one factor, say the discount rate, yielded a positive dollar figure, one
would properly conclude that the assessment was not sensitive to the selection of the discount
rate. On the other hand, if the outcome varied substantially depending on the discount rate,
greater resources could be devoted to predicting the rate with accuracy, or the assessor could
resign himself to a weak result produced by the uncertainty in the rate. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 67.
Sensitivity analysis can also be used to calculate best- and worst-case estimates for specific technologies. See K. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note 1, at 101. One example is "minianalysis," as urged by Kristein, in which, to determine if a technology is cost-beneficial, benefit is calculated using for uncertain variables the highest values within the range, while cost is
calculated using the lowest. If the result does not reveal a net benefit for the technology
under these "best-case" conditions, then the technology is not likely to be cost-beneficial in
reality. See Kristein, supra note 47, at 215. The process of mini-analysis resembles the use of
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high priority in attempting to control health care costs by identifying wasteful technologies."
4. IsolatingEffects
Technologies are employed within a health care context that
may include prior or subsequent use of other technologies, all of
which may affect patient outcome,9 8 costs, and other trade-offs.
Consequently, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the particular
technology being assessed. 99 This problem is exacerbated in assessing diagnostic technologies that may have multiple applications (for
example, a multichannel blood analyzer that can diagnose a large
variety of abnormal conditions), or that may lead to different further interventions, such as further diagnostic tests or different
treatments. 1oo
worst-case analysis to deal with uncertainty in projecting the environmental impact of a federal project under the National Environmental Policy Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (requiring worst case analysis where essential information is either unknown or too costly to
obtain); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal agencies must prepare
environmental impact statements detailing environmental effects when action is proposed
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."). It should be noted that
sensitivity analysis is only possible when a range of values for an uncertain variable can be
estimated.
97. See Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzeck, supra note 19, at 688 (primary objective of proposed quasi-public Institute for Health Care Evaluation is establishing a uniform patient data
base to facilitate technology assessment). For a listing of data bases currently available for
technology assessment, see OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 113-26 app. A, B.
98. Decision analysts term this the problem of "downstream decision nodes." See
Weinstein, supra note 47, at 316-17.
99. See Greer, supra note 39, at 130.
100. See id. at 131; infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text. An additional problem
with technology assessment is its susceptibility to biases. Entities with a proprietary interest
in the technology or with a financial stake in producing results beneficial to the sponsor (such
as a contract laboratory assessing a technology on behalf of a manufacturer) may knowingly
or unknowingly color the findings. See Ezekowitz, The Uncontrolled Proliferationof Technology, 81 CHEST 140 (1982). There may always be negatively biased assessments, for instance where the manufacturer of a competing technology sponsors an assessment of the rival
technology with the intention of producing negative results. See id. Another source of bias is
the preference of scientific journals for publishing positive results. See id.
Technology assessment may also create a problem of information overload. While technology assessment is needed to provide better data for health care decisionmaking, there is a
limit to how much data can be useful. See Perry, The Assessment of Technology in Medical
Care: Recent Developments, 1 TRANSACTIONS AND STUDIES OF THE COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF PHILADELPHIA 99 (1979). The National Library of Medicine may index as many
as 260,000 new articles. In 1971-72 alone, for example, it indexed 372 articles just on breast
cancer. Id. It is difficult to imagine a practicing oncologist having time to read and digest
such a volume of literature on only one of the many cancers with which he must deal. This
suggests the importance of synthesizing raw assessment literature into more a manageable
form for practitioners.
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5. Cost of Assessment
Formal technology assessment is extremely costly to conduct.
Clinical testing to establish the safety and efficacy of drugs often
costs millions of dollars per drug.'o' Even an analysis of preexisting
data to determine the costs and benefits of a technology can run into
hundreds of thousands of dollars. 10 2 One commentator recommends a national technology assessment effort with a budget of
03
$200 to $300 million.'
This raises the question whether comprehensive technology assessment is itself cost-beneficial. Under certain conditions, for example, where costs of assessment exceed the cost of the technology,
assessment is wasteful."' However, it is not always possible to project such conditions105 Nevertheless, an effort must be made to
identify prior to assessment those technologies that are only marginally wasteful and yet would be costly to assess. The breakdown
of technologies in Table 1 may provide a starting point for this
analysis.
A related issue is who should bear the cost of technology assessment. For new drugs and medical devices, the burden of paying for
technology assessment falls substantially on the manufacturer, who
must sponsor the safety and efficacy trials necessary to obtain FDA
approval.' 0 6 Insofar as technology assessment is aimed at identify101. For an attempt to estimate the costs and benefits of a series of large, controlled
clinical trials, see Hawkins, supra note 16, at 19-20. To the out-of-pocket expense of conducting the tests must be added the costs of the delay in making the technology widely available while the testing is conducted.
102. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 48.
103. See Relman, Assessment of Medical Practices:A Simple Proposal,303 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 153, 153-154 (1980).
104. See Fuchs, supra note 59, at 938.
105. While urging that cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses not be performed when
doing so would not be cost-effective, Fuchs does not specify how this can be determined
before the assessment is conducted. Id.
106. However, safety and efficacy studies on some products, such as certain cancer drugs,
are sponsored in large part by the federal government. Furthermore, the Orphan Drug Act
provides manufacturers with a tax credit of 50% of the costs of research and development,
and a minimum of seven years of exclusive marketing, for drugs with such small patient
populations that manufacturers would not otherwise expect sufficient return on investment to
justify the costs of obtaining FDA approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982).
An additional cost of technology assessment is the cost of the FDA's review. The agency's
activities are funded by federal taxes. Recently, however, the agency proposed that manufacturers submitting data for review for purposes of obtaining permission to market new products be required to pay a "user fee." See 50 Fed. Reg. 31,726 (1985). The FDA did not
propose to charge directly for the review of requests to ship products for clinical experiments.
Instead, the agency proposed that one-half the cost of that review be added to the charge for
reviewing a request for marketing approval. Id. at 31,728. In effect, then, only technologies
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ing wasteful technologies, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies
are needed in addition to the safety and efficacy data currently required from the sponsor, and the cost of these additional studies
might be imposed on manufacturers seeking government approval
of their products."0 7 Manufacturers, in turn, fear that these extra
10 8
costs will prevent the development of drugs for small markets
and will drive small manufacturers out of business.' 0 9
One alternative would be to spread assessment costs by charging
manufacturers on some sort of pro rata basis, such as based on sales
revenue. However, this ignores the fact that many technologies, in-

cluding most medical and surgical procedures, are not proprietary;
they are not patented, or sold or licensed to other physicians or

surgeons.1 0 Thus, manufacturers would be forced to increase the
price of their proprietary-i.e., non-medical and non-surgicalproducts in order to recover the assessment costs of their nonprothat had progressed far enough with research-and-development to merit submitting data to
obtain marketing approval would be charged for permission to conduct research at an earlier
stage. This presumably reflects the FDA's recognition of the high relative cost of capital for
conducting early research and development, and its desire to mitigate the effect of its user fee
plan on innovation.
107. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 184-85.
108. See Health Statistics, Research, and Technology Assessment Reauthorization, 1984:
Hearings on HR. 5496 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 536-37 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Hearingson HR. 5496] (testimony of Frank Samuel, President, Health Industry Manufacturers Association). Presumably this is a concern to manufacturers despite passage of the Orphan Drug Act, described supra at note 106.
109. See Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 536-37 (testimony of Frank Samuel,
President, Health Industry Manufacturers Association).
110. There does not appear to be any legal impediment to patenting new medical and
surgical technologies that do not entail the invention of new drugs or devices. Presumably
such technologies would be entitled to a process patent. See 35 U.S.C. 101 (1982) (allowing
patents for "any new and useful process"). "Process" is defined as a "process, art or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). The fact that the innovator is likely to publish the new technique in a scientific journal will not preclude obtaining a patent so long as the patent application is filed within one year of the publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Nevertheless, patents
for such technologies are virtually unknown. Telephone interview with Michael Lechter,
Esquire, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Dec. 12, 1985). This apparently results
from the fact that surgeons and medical innovators are primarily interested in maximizing
the spread of their innovations; licensing arrangements with other practitioners might hamper efforts to expand development and use of technological innovations.
A further impediment to patenting such technologies might be the difficulty of detecting
infringement, especially in cases of small changes in existing procedures or innovations with
little public visibility. Conversely, the inventor of a new coronary artery bypass or human
heart transplant procedure at one hospital can easily determine that another hospital has
suddenly begun promoting the same procedure to the public. Proprietary claims on surgical
and medical technologies might increase if cost control pressures intensify competition between providers or significantly reduce the incomes of innovating health professionals.
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prietary products. 11 ' In a cost-sensitive market, this practice would
discourage the use of proprietary technologies in favor of non-proprietary ones. In the absence of evidence that proprietary technologies, on the whole, are more likely to be wasteful than nonproprietary technologies, this result does not seem justified.
Another alternative is to finance technology assessment with
contributions, either mandatory or voluntary, by insurers.' 12 However, as noted earlier," 3 and discussed more fully below,114 insurers
have a different perspective on waste than physicians, patients, or
society. Insurers are therefore likely to sponsor technology assessment that focuses only on those approaches that have the greatest
potential for reducing their costs. While the resulting data would
be useful as part of an overall assessment program, they are liable to
divert technology development and use away from technologies that
might be nonwasteful when viewed from another perspective.
It has also been suggested that technology assessment be funded
by a combination of private contributions and government funding," 5 or that the government be the primary sponsor. The question then arises whether the entity that pays, particularly if it is the
government, should perform or control technology assessment, a
question that is addressed in the following section.
111. This confounds the suggestion of one commentator that the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), be amended to authorize the
FDA to approve medical and surgical technologies, and that physicians and hospitals pay for
the technology assessment data that is required by the FDA for approval. See Note, The
Open-Ended Investigation:A Method for Regulation of New Medical Services, 91 YALE L.J.
550, 560 n.53 (1982). For a discussion of other problems in regulating medical and surgical
technologies, see discussion infra at notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
112. See Willems & Banta, Improving the Use of Medical Technology, 1 HEALTH AFF.,
Fall 1982, at 86, 91 (noting that insurance companies "have much to gain in both cost savings
and improving the efficiency of the services that they support").
113. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
114. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
115. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1090 ("Government, health-insurance companies, corporations and foundations should provide the requisite financial resources.");
Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzeck, supra note 19, at 689 (advocating that technology assessment
be paid for by third-party payors, including the government as the operator of Medicare and
Medicaid). Congress recently adopted a joint private-public funding approach by creating a
new Council on Health Care Technology. See Health Promotion and Disease Prevention
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551, § 309(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2820. The Council is funded
in part by grants from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), but the law
stipulates that DHHS grants can defray a maximum of two-thirds of the Council's start-up
costs and only one-third of its operating funds. The remainder must come from non-federal
sources. See id. § 309(a)(2)(A)-(B). The Council, established under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the new National Center for Health Services Research and
Health Care Technology Assessment created within the DHHS, replaces the National Center
for Health Care Technology, discussed infra at notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
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Who Performs Technology Assessment

Historically, technology assessment has been performed by a variety of government and private entities, depending on the type of
technology (e.g., proprietary drugs, surgical procedures) and on the
purpose of the assessment (e.g., safety and efficacy trials sponsored
by a manufacturer seeking FDA marketing approval, cost-effectiveness study by third-party payor). Private assessment entities include physicians,116 patients," 7 hospitals,11 8 third-party payors,11 9
manufacturers, 120 and medical professional organizations such as
116. Physicians perform at least an informal technology assessment whenever they decide
which technology alternative to provide their patients. Government physicians, such as those
employed by the Veterans Administration, are considered private technology assessors for
this discussion, insofar as their technology selection resembles that of private physicians.
117. The role of patients in technology assessment has been significantly increased by the
growth of the doctrine of informed consent. Under that doctrine, patients are entitled to a
description of alternative treatments, along with their risks and benefits, as part of the process
of deciding which treatment they will be provided. See discussion infra notes 333-37 and
accompanying text.
118. Hospitals conduct a variety of types of technology assessments. For example, hospitals must decide which technologies to acquire. This may entail a comprehensive evaluation
of risks, costs and benefits, or a more limited inquiry to determine the most reliable manufacturer of a certain type of equipment. Massachusetts General Hospital, for instance, has established a Resource Allocation Board to evaluate requests for the acquisition of new
technologies. See Sanders,Adoption ofNew Technologies in Hospitals,in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 72, at 34. Hospital managers are being urged to adopt
technology evaluation and acquisition methods, or "TEAM," to evaluate new technologies in
terms of need, safety, effectiveness, reliability, cost and impact on hospital structure and function. SeeAH4 Offers "TEAM" Programfor Evaluating CapitalRequests, 55 Hosp. 75 (1981).
A private, nonprofit organization called ECRI (formerly the Emergency Care Research
Institute) evaluates smaller medical devices and other hospital equipment and produces
"Consumer Reports"-like information for subscribers, typically hospital administrators. See
OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 78. In addition to assessing technology proposed for
purchase, hospitals also engage in a form of assessment when they conduct experiments on
human subjects. In this event, they are required by federal law to establish Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs) to evaluate ethical implications of the proposed research in terms of
the risks to subjects. This entails a review of the likely safety and efficacy of the experimental
technology. See, eg., 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.110-.111 (FDA IRB regulations).
119. See Greenberg & Derzon, DeterminingHealth Insurance Coverage of Technology:
Problems and Options, 19 MED. CARE 967, 972-73 (1981). In 1977, the largest private thirdparty payor, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association, began a Medical Necessity Project in
conjunction with the American College of Physicians, the American College of Surgeons and
the American College of Radiology. See id.; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 38-39 (1982). Its
purpose is to obtain information to facilitate curtailing payment for "outmoded, unproven or
duplicative" technology. Greenberg & Derzon, supra, at 972. Since 1977, Blue Cross/Blue
Shield has proposed to discontinue payment for 68 specific surgical and diagnostic procedures. See id. These tend to be noncontroversial. See He~linger, supra note 58, at 38. In
addition, a medical advisory committee, composed of the medical advisors of six affiliates,
makes over 100 recommendations a year on reimbursement issues involving specific technologies. See Greenberg & Derzon, supra, at 972.
120. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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the American Medical Association 12 ' and the American College of
Physicians.122 There are now at least forty-five groups in the private sector engaged in some form of technology assessment, 12 3 leadAssessment to describe
ing the congressional Office of Technology
1 24
"pluralistic."
as
system
the present
Along with these private assessment efforts, the government has
long been involved in various aspects of technology assessment.
The Food and Drug Administration reviews safety and efficacy data
submitted by manufacturers to determine whether or not to approve
a drug or device for introduction into interstate commerce.12 1 In
1972, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established
12 6
to advise Congress on the consequences of technological change.
A specific program to address medical technology was initiated by
the OTA in 1975.127 Like the FDA, the OTA does not generate
substantial technology assessment of its own; instead, it reviews and
synthesizes existing data and disseminates the results. 12 The National Institute of Health generates a great deal of safety and efficacy data, either directly or by sponsoring extramural research. It
does not, however, evaluate the social and economic impact of the
technologies it assesses. 129 The newly established Prospective Pay121. The American Medical Association conducts a Diagnostic and Therapeutic Technology Assessment Program. See Jones, The American MedicalAssociations'sDiagnosticand
Theraputic Technology Assessment Program, 250 J. A.M.A. 387 (1983).
122. This program, known as the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project, or CEAP, is described in Schwartz, Ball & Moser, Safety, Efficacy, andEffectiveness of Clinical Practices. A
New Initiative, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 246 (1982) ("The project's primary objective is
to determine the medical merit of selected practices in internal medicine. At present, economic, political, and other important factors are excluded from CEAP's analysis.").
123. See Legislation Expands Federal Role in Medical Technology Assessment, 252 J.
A.M.A. 3235, 3236 (1984).
124. OTA STRATEGIES, supranote 4, at 93. For a general description of current technology assessment programs, see Moses & Brown, supra note 33, at 268-71.
125. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. The FDA also generates some limited
efficacy and safety data of its own, typically in order to confirm results submitted by product
sponsors.
126. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 47.
127. See id. This is now part of the Health and Life Sciences Division of OTA.
128. See Smith, The American Medical Association and Technology Assessment, 67
RHODE ISLAND MED. J. 113, 114 (1984).

129. See Blumenthal, FederalPolicy Toward Health Care Technology: The Case of the
National Center, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 584, 595 (1983). Through its Office of
Medical Applications of Research (OMAR), the National Institute of Health also sponsors a
type of technology assessment known as "consensus conferences." These are convocations of
experts who review and synthesize the literature and other avaliable data on particular technologies. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. OMAR was created in 1977 to
make NIH reserach more accessible and useful to practitioners. See Blumenthal, supra, at
601.
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ment Commission (PROPAC) 3 ° is authorized by statute to commission technology assessment. PROPAC has yet to exercise this
mandate, and it is unclear how extensively it will do so in the
1 31

future.

The agency responsible for implementing the Medicare program, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), also reviews and commissions technology assessment. 132 This assessment
function is known as HCFA's "coverage" program. HCFA as-

sesses technologies both on its own initiative, based on trends in
technology development, as well as in response to specific coverage
questions.1 33 The responsive aspect of HCFA's coverage program
is complicated by the relationship between the agency and its program elements. Medicare is administered at the local level by a sys34
tem of contractors hired by HCFA to handle individual claims.1
One of the responsibilities of these contractors is to process claims
for reimbursement received from individual providers, such as hospitals or physicians, or directly from patients. In processing claims,
the contractor will deny payment for technologies that it deems are
not covered under the statutory scheme.135 A coverage question
that the contractor is unable or unwilling to resolve itself 136 is
refered to one of HCFA's regional 37offices which, in turn, can refer it
1
to HCFA national headquarters.
Technologies are first assessed in terms of whether they fall
within the statutory provision prohibiting Medicare from reimburs130. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
131. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 598.
132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
133. In 1981, 25% of the coverage issues handled by HCFA at the national level were
presented by manufacturers of specific technologies seeking an HCFA ruling on whether or
not Medicare would reimburse for their provision. See Ruby, Banta & Bums, Medicare Coverage, Medicare Costs, and Medical Technology, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 141, 146
(1985).
134. Under the portion of the Medicare program that covers hospitalization, known as
"Part A" (after the part of the Social Security Act in which it is established) these contractors
are called "fiscal intermediaries," Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 968, and are often
local Blue Cross affiliates. In 1982, there were 77 fiscal intermediaries, each covering a different geographic area. Hellinger, supra note 58, at 37. Under Part B of the Medicare program,
which covers physician charges, the contractors are called "carriers." Greenberg & Derzon,
supra, at 968. There were 43 carriers in 1982, often Blue Shield affiliates. Hellinger, supra,at
37.
135. Note that the contractor must ascertain that such a technology has in fact been
provided before it can rule on whether or not it is covered. The claims system under Medicare makes this task rather difficult. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
136. Contractors vary in the aggressiveness with which they pursue coverage issues. See
Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 968.
137. See id. at 969; Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 458.
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ing for "items or services... which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve
the functioning of a malformed body member."' 138 This assessment
differs in scope depending on whether it is being performed by
HCFA's national office or by one of the Medicare contractors. A
contractor's assessment triggered by a claim for reimbursement will
usually be limited to an evaluation of whether the technology was
medically necessary in the particular case (a fairly straightforward
determination of whether it is generally accepted medical practice
to provide the technology to a patient under the circumstances of
the case) and whether or not it was provided in an appropriate setting (for example, whether it could have been provided on an outrather than on an in-patient basis). 139 However, contractors may
extend their evaluation to matters such as whether the technology is
generally accepted by the medical community (a broader inquiry
than whether it is appropriate for a particular patient), and whether
development of the technology has progressed to the point appropriate for Medicare reimbursement." 4
If the coverage question reaches HCFA's national office, it is
referred to the Office of Coverage Policy."'4 When medical advice
is deemed necessary to decide the coverage question, a panel of
medical experts on contract with the agency reviews the technology.
This panel may decide the question itself or refer it to the Public
Health Service, either as an informal inquiry or with a request for
full-scale assessment. 4 2 Within the Public Health Service, the matter is referred to the National Center for Health Services Research
14 3
and Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCTA),
where it is reviewed by the Office of Health Technology Assessment
(OHTA). OHTA conducts a review of the literature on the technology, and, in the case of a full-scale assessment, issues a notice of
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y(a)(1)(A) (1982).
139. See Ruby, Banta, & Bums, supra note 133, at 145, 146-47 (1985).
140. See Banta & Behney, supranote 78, at 458; Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at
968.
141. See Ruby, Banta, & Bums, supra note 133, at 147.
142. See Brandt, Technology Assessment, a Private-PublicPartnership,99 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 329 (1984); Ruby, Banta & Bums, supra note 133, at 147.
143. Ruby, Banta & Bums, supra note 133, at 147, n.31. The National Center for Health
Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment was recently created by Congress. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Formerly, the agency was called the
National Center for Health Services Research, and contained a small Office of Health Technology Assessment to perform the agency's technology assessment function. While this office
still exists, its importance has been upgraded, as reflected by the change in the agency's name.
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its inquiry in the FederalRegister, soliciting public input.' 44 A special consensus conference, 145 sometimes sponsored jointly by the
Office of Medical Applications of Research in the National Insti-

tutes of Health, 14 6 may be held to permit experts to discuss and

synthesize available assessment data. A draft assessment document
is eventually prepared and circulated within the Public Health Service, and a final coverage recommendation is sent to HCFA. 47
HCFA then issues a coverage ruling, and publishes the ruling in
148
manuals distributed to Medicare contractors.
As this discussion reveals, federal technology assessment is fragmented among a number of agencies. After the failure of early efforts to form a coordinating umbrella organization, 149 Congress
established the National Center for Health Care Technology
144. See Brandt, supra note 142, at 329.
145. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147. See Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 147.
148. The rulings are also circulated to state Medicaid agencies, which tend to follow
HCFA in making coverage decisions concerning Medicaid, to the American Hospital Association, where the HCFA rulings are reported in the association's ANNUAL TECHNOLOGY
GUIDE, and to insurance companies and other third-party payors. See Brandt, supra note
142, at 329.
149. In the early 1970's, Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) and Representative Andrew Maguire (D. N.J.) attempted to establish within the Public Health Service a National
Institute for Health Care Research, on a par with the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
See Greenberg, Health-CareTechnology: A Small Office vs. A Big Problem, 302 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 243 (1980). The new institute would have consisted of the existing National Center for
Health Statistics and the National Center for Health Services Research, as well as a new
National Center for the Evaluation of Medical Technologies. The concept was to create an
agency at a sufficiently high level within the Department of Health and Human Services to
provide department-wide coordination and leadership. Ie
Kennedy and Maguire did not regard any of the existing administrative units as appropriate to be given this role. The NIH excludes consideration of social and economic impact
from its own research efforts. See supra notes 129 and accompanying text. Indeed, in the
mid-to-late 1970's, the NIH did not employ a single professional economist. See Blumenthal,
supranote 129, at 585. Kennedy and Maguire felt that the National Center for Health Services Research lacked sufficient prestige, appearing to be on the decline, having suffered a
budget reduction from $80 million in 1968 to $30 million in 1978. See Greenberg, supra, at
243. Finally, the Health Care Finance Administration, which would make the most direct
use of technology assessment in determining which technologies to reimburse for under
Medicare, lacked the personnel and experience to conduct technology assessment on its own.
See id at 244. Kennedy and Maguire may also have been concerned that HCFA would be
biased against technologies that did not reduce costs.
The effort by Kennedy and Maguire encountered heavy opposition from technology manufacturers, and was defeated. See Greenberg, supra, at 243. Joseph Califano, who was then
secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, responded by establishing a new
Office of Health Technology in the office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. This was
eventually absorbed by the National Center for Health Care Technology, discussed infra at
notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
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(NCHCT) in 1978.15° The NCHCT coordinated federal technology
assessment by assembling a list of emerging technologies and identifying those particularly in need of assessment, sponsoring actual assessments, including the generation of assessment data, 151 and
disseminating the results both to HCFA 15 2 and to the public. 153
Nevertheless, the NCHCT met stiff opposition from a number of
directions.15 4 Following the Reagan administration's refusal to seek
150. Pub. L. No. 95-623, § 309, 92 Stat. 3447. The NCHCT was placed under the control of the Assistant Secretary for Health in the Department of Health and Human Services,
and was on the same level as the National Center for Health Services Research and the
National Center for Health Statistics. The agency replaced and absorbed the Office of Health
Technology in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. See infra notes 156-157.
Under an earlier proposal, the agency was to be amalgamated with the National Center for
Health Services Research and the National Center for Health Statistics. See id. No doubt to
avoid opposition from those bureaucracies, Congress instead retained them alongside the new
agency.
For a description of NHCHT's activities, see Perry & Eliastam, The National Centerfor
Health Care Technology, 245 J. A.M.A. 2510, 2511 (1981); Perry, supra note 82, at 1096-97.
The NCHCT was directed by Seymour Perry, M.D., who had been the first director of the
Office of Medical Applications of Research (OMAR) when it was established within the National Institutes of Health in 1977. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 49-50. For a
discussion of OMAR, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151. The NCHCT sponsored two sorts of technology assessments: reimbursement-oriented assessments, a limited effort usually conducted in-house to guide HCFA's administration of the Medicare program; and multifaceted assessments on major new technologies like
coronary artery bypass surgery, usually performed by outside contractors. See Perry & Eliastam, supra note 150, at 2511.
152. The NCHCT responded to over 70 requests from HCFA for assistance in making
coverage determinations under Medicare and Medicaid, and HCFA almost invariably followed the center's recommendations. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 604. Blumenthal
notes that HCFA benefitted from the arrangement by being able to attribute politically sensitive coverage restrictions to the center's scientific assessments. Id. at 605. By identifying and
assessing emerging technologies, the NCHCT also would enable HCFA to anticipate controversial coverage decisions in advance. See Hearings on H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 538
(testimony of Dr. Helen Smits).
153. Private health insurers were especially interested in the center's assessments. See
Perry, supra note 82, at 1098. The NCHCT sent its findings, for example, to the American
Council of Life Insurance for distribution to other commercial companies. See id.
154. The NCHCT incited a turf battle within the Department of Health and Human
Services with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR) and the Office of Research and Demonstrations within the Health
Care Finance Administration, entities that also had jurisdiction over technology assessment.
See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 595. As Blumenthal observes, "[t]he Center's research
mission embroiled it in the politics of health care research, an arena in which the warfare is
no less intense for the fact that the gladiators sometimes don white coats." Id. at 599. Of
these opponents, the most powerful was the NIH, which viewed the NCHCT as a direct
competitor for congressional appropriations. See id. at 596.
Another source of opposition to the NCHCT were those who objected to what they
viewed as excessive government regulation of the health care system and the technology industry. See id. at 606. David Stockman, then Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, referred to the center and its supporters as "latter-day Luddites." Id. The center was
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funding for fiscal year 1982, the Center ceased to exist in October of

198 1.155
For two years after the NCHCT's demise, its functions were
taken over by the small, understaffed Office of Health Technology
(OHT) in the National Center for Health Services Research. 15 6 Despite responsibility for coordinating all technology assessment activity within the Department of Health and Human Services,
including advising the HCFA on coverage policy, OHT employed
registered nurses and two health servonly four professionals-two
1 7
1
researchers.
ices
The inadequacy of this effort prompted the powerful Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences to call for the estabattacked by such powerful lobbies as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the
Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA), a trade association comprising over
450 manufacturers of medical devices. Id. at 600-01. The AMA was particularly concerned
about a provision in the NCHCT's enabling legislation that authorized it to establish norms
and criteria for technology use. While none were ever proposed, the AMA argued that this
provision authorized the center to interfere with the physician's patient treatment prerogatives. See id. HIMA particularly opposed the NCHCT's authority to establish a list of
emerging technologies, fearing that the mere appearance of a technology on the list, possibly
targeting it for technology assessment at an early stage of development, would discourage
innovation. See id. at 601; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 85; Hearingson S. 800, supra
note 82, at 27 (testimony of HIMA).
In response to these criticisms, the center and its supporters argued that the center was
not a regulatory agency, and that its critics, therefore, had nothing to fear in terms of its
impact upon their activities. See Perry, supra note 82, at 1099. Nevertheless, its director
admitted that the Center's activity was bound "to constrain industry's freedom in the marketplace," id., and amid objections that its regulatory disclaimer was disingenuous (see Hearing
on H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 578 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Boyle, AMA), the chairman of
the Center's national advisory committee acknowledged that it was at least a "quasi-regulatory" body. Hearingon S. 800, supra note 82, at 35 (testimony of Dr. Charles A. Sanders).
In a last-ditch survival effort, the NCHCT shifted its focus from new technologies to those
already in existence, but to no avail. See Perry, supra note 82, at 1100.
The NCHCT was also hampered by a lack of support from an identifiable constituency,
beyond the relatively small and powerless assessment contractors it directly funded. The
NIH, on the other hand, could mobilize the numerous beneficiaries of its biomedical research
program. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 594.
155. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 593. The Senate had voted in 1981 to dismantle
the NCHCT, but the House of Representatives reauthorized it after Congressman Henry
Waxman (D.Cal.) tacked the measure onto a Medicaid bill that had strong backing from state
governors. The House prevailed in conference. Id. at 592-93. The NCHCT's enabling legislation authorized a three-year appropriation of $73 million, but in 1981 Congress reduced the
budget authorization for the following three years to $12 million. Only $7.8 million had
actually been appropriated by the time the center ceased to exist in 1981. Id. At the time of
its demise, the center was funding approximately 20 technology assessment projects. It had
an official staff of 20, but actually employed 39. Id. at 592-93.
156. See Iglehart, Another Chance for Technology Assessment, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED.
509, 510 (1983).
157. See id.
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lishment of a quasi-public consortium to assess technology.'
This
development, in turn, led to the enactment of the Health Promotion
and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984159 and to Congress's
creation of the National Center for Health Services Research and
Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCTA). 6 This expansion of the former National Center for Health Services Research
encompassed an additional responsibility of advising the Secretary
of Health and Human Services on specific technologies and reimbursement by federally financed health programs, 16 1 while taking
into account the "safety, efficacy, and effectiveness, and, as appropriate, the cost-effectiveness and appropriate uses of the technology.' 162 In addition, the law established a non-profit, quasi-public
Council on Health Care Technology in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences to promote, coordinate and sponsor
1 63
technology assessment.
158. Seeid. at 511.
159. Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815 (1984).
160. See id. § 5.

161. See id.§ 5(a)(3).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 8. Public Law 98-551 also established a National Advisory Council on Health
Care Technology Assessment to advise the National Center for Health Services Research and
Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCTA) on criteria and methods to be used in
making coverage recommendations. Id. § 5(a). A number of factors may have been responsible for Congress's reinstatement of federal technology activities resembling those of the
NCHCT so soon after its demise in 1981. First, it may have become clear that technology
assessment was necessary to control health care costs, and that the Office of Health Technology in the National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR), which had inherited the
tasks of the NCHCT, did not have the resources to handle the responsibility. This view was
reflected in the strong support for the bill to create the new agency by the American Association of Retired Persons, the Health Industry Association of America, the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association, the American Association of Medical Colleges, and the American
College of Physicians, but most of all, by the Reagan administration. See Hearingson H.R.
5496, supra note 108. Assistant Secretary for Health Brandt represented the administration
during hearings on H.R. 5496, the bill introduced by Congresman Henry Waxman (D.Cal.)
that eventually became Public Law 98-551, and endorsed the key features of the proposalthe creation of a public/private partnership to undertake technology assessment, with the
public function to reside in the NCHSR. Id. at 469-71 (testimony of Assistant Secretary
Brandt).
Second, the new entity's location within the NCHSR probably defused a considerable
amount of opposition within existing units of the Department of Health and Human Services,
since the bill avoided the creation of a new, high-level agency with sole responsibility for
technology assessment. Furthermore, the concept of a quasi-public technology assessment
council, including representatives from technology manufacturers, health professionals, hospitals, insurers, employers and consumers, and with only three members appointed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, may have satisfied those who opposed federal dominance of the technology assessment field. Nevertheless, both the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA) opposed the
measure. The AMA reiterated its long-stated resistance to a government role in technology
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Although it is too soon to evaluate the performance of either the
NCHSRHCTA or the Council on Health Care Technology, their
creation has revived the issue of government's proper role in technology assessment. Some favor leaving technology assessment
largely to the private sector. 164 Strong arguments can be advanced
in support of this view: government often has its own agenda, including bureaucratic self-preservation, which may not be consistent
with appropriate technology assessment; government may lack the
necessary technical expertise and personnel, which may be attracted
to the private sector by better salaries and opportunities for advancement; bureaucrats tend to be removed from the real world of
medicine, and their judgments, therefore, may be erroneous and
meddlesome; and finally, bureaucracy is costly and inefficient.
On the other hand, several factors militate against a purely private approach. As the country's single largest purchaser of health
care-providing care directly to the military and to veterans, and
indirectly to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries 16 5-government
has a vested interest in ensuring efficient operation of the health
care system. Moreover, technology assessment data resemble a
public good, insofar as it is difficult and contrary to public policy to
allow them to remain the private property of a private sponsor. 166
Private sponsorship of technology assessment thus gives rise to a
free-rider problem, since those who do not pay for the assessment
can nonetheless appropriate it for their own use.167 This might lead
assessment, and questioned whether the new NCHSRHCTA would adequately consider
quality of patient care and social, ethical and economic factors in addition to cost in its
evaluations of technologies. See id. at 513. HIMA did not oppose the creation of the new
federal entities, but argued that, in light of other government cost-cutting measures, the assessments should be confined to Medicare coverage questions, encourage technological innovation, and pay only limited attention to considerations of cost. See id. at 518-42.
164. The AMA has consistently opposed federal technology assessment, at least beyond
that performed by the Food and Drug Administration. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See also Blendon & Altman, supra note 20, at 15.
165. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 157 app. B. Medicare alone accounts for
40% of all community hospital inpatient revenue. DHHS, HCFA, Medicare Program:
Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1987 Proposed Rates; Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,970, 20,017 (1986).
166. See Bunker, supra note 19, at 689; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 5-6. Safety
and efficacy data submitted by drug and device manufacturers to the Food and Drug Administration, the details of which are kept secret due to the free-rider problem discussed infra at
notes 167-68 and accompanying text, provide an exception to this view. Public policy would
seem to favor widespread dissemination of technology assessments to achieve better patient
management decisions as well as to curb waste. At the same time, it is difficult to keep the
results secret because of the impetus to publish them in the scientific literature, if only to
communicate positive results to prospective purchasers and users.
167. See Bunker, supra note 19, at 689.
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to less than optimal amounts of technology assessment. 168 The freerider problem is normally alleviated by collective purchase of the
goods. Technology assessment by public, governmental institutions
would, therefore, address the free-rider problem. For these reasons,
it seems appropriate for the government to play at least some role in
the production of technology assessment.
The extent of governmental involvement in technology assessment, assuming it should have at least some role, is open to question. One possibility is direct sponsorship of assessment as well as
selection of the technologies to be assessed, as was the case with the
NCHCT and is somewhat the system adopted for the new
NCHSRHCTA and Council on Technology Assessment. 169 Alternatively, government could underwrite technology assessment performed by private entities. 170 Another approach would require
private sponsors to submit technology assessments to the government in order to market technologies, 1 7 ' or in order to qualify for
reimbursement under government-operated third-party health
1 72
programs.
All of these alternatives have serious drawbacks. Government
assessment, whether direct or subsidized raises the objections of bu168. Less than optimal amounts of technology assessment might result because the
nonexclusivity of the assessment would diminish its value to any potential private purchaser.
This nonexclusivity would lead to the purchase of less assessment than if the purchaser based
his decision of how much assessment to purchase on the total value of the assessment measured across all who might benefit.
169. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
170. See Hearingson H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 542 (testimony of Dr. Peter Bunker).
Bunker advocates that the government rather than private sponsors pay for all clinical trials
on new technologies. A related alternative is for the government to subsidize private assessments by providing interim Medicare reimbursement while assessments are undertaken. See
Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 974-75.
171. This is the policy embodied in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for new
drugs and devices. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, however,
the Act does not authorize the Food and Drug Administration to compare the costs and
benefits of a technology, nor does the FDA regulate surgical and medical technologies, except
insofar as they employ new drugs and devices. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
172. Former Secretary of Health and Human Services, Patricia Harris, announced in
1980 that new technologies such as the artificial heart should be evaluated on the basis of
their "social consequences" as well as their safety and efficacy before the Health Care Finance
Administration financed widespread use. See Evans, supra note 30, at 2050. Banta recommends technology assessment prior to reimbursement rather than a prohibition on disseminating a technology without such assessment. See Banta, supra note 16, at 82-84. See also
OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 25; Russell, supra note 15, at 41-42. France has adopted a
policy that the government will not pay for new drugs under that country's national health
system unless the drug has been shown to be either more efficacious or cheaper than existing
alternatives. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 177.
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reaucratic political agendas mentioned earlier. 73 While restricting
either dissemination or reimbursement pending assessment could
deter unwarranted diffusion of untested technologies, focusing on
reimbursement alone could cause disproportionate burdens to fall
on those patients who cannot afford a new technology absent thirdparty payment.' 74
B. Specific Problems in Assessing Specific Technologies
In addition to the general issues and problems connected with

technology assessment, three specific types of technologies create
particular obstacles for assessment.
1. Diagnostic Technologies
Diagnostic technologies are particularly difficult to assess because of the difficulty in associating a specific diagnostic technology
with a specific patient outcome, and hence with a specific set of
risks, costs and benefits.' 7 5 A range of medical interventions are
likely to occur after the use of the diagnostic technology.17 6 A
treatment decision may be the product of a number of diagnostic
inputs and prior treatments, making it hard to isolate the role of a
particular diagnostic technology in the treatment decision, let alone
in the resulting outcome.' 7 7 Complicating matters further, a diagnostic technology may be used to detect a number of different
1 78
conditions.
The costs of a diagnostic technology may also be difficult to
gauge, thereby impairing cost-based technology assessments. The
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
174. On the other hand, a system in which wealthy patients financed technology assessment in return for access to speculative technologies might be desirable. The additional price
the wealthy would pay for the assessment on top of the other costs of the technology would
be offset by giving them the first access to new, potentially beneficial technologies. The poor
would not have this opportunity, but would also not bear the risk of exposure to potentially
unsafe or ineffective technologies. In addition, a "market" in unproven technologies would
be established that might help in valuing health benefits by assigning prices to them on the
basis of expected or hoped-for results. Finally, a market for technology assessment would be
created, which might help in determining its cost-effectiveness.
175. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 24; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 41; Rock,
Technology Assessment in LaboratoryMedicine: Rationalizingor Rationing, 1 CLINICS LABORATORY MED. 3, 13-14 (1981).
176. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 24.
177. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 41.
178. For example, an automated multichannel chemical analyzer is used not only for
diagnosing patients but for screening them and monitoring their progress. It provides data
enabling the detection of a host of abnormal values indicative of a large number of diseases.
It is therefore difficult to assess the device as a whole. See Rock, supra note 175, at 13-14.
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hospital or laboratory charge for a diagnostic test is often an unreliable cost indicator because it may be inflated to cover the expenses
of other services.1 79 Furthermore, providers tend to employ old and
new diagnostic technologies in tandem until adequate experience
has been gained with the new technology to permit confidence in its
use. Thus the initial cost of a new diagnostic technology may be
high, but may decline with time.'" 0 Initial cost-benefit ratios therefore may be unduly pessimistic predictors of future cost-benefit
81
relationships. 1'
The benefits of diagnostic technologies also present assessment
problems. Based on the results of initial assessments, diagnostic
technologies may appear to present greater benefit than they will
actually produce in later, full-scale use.' 8 2 Many diagnostic technologies are first evaluated at large hospitals where the target disease is more prevalent.' 8 3 As a result, a diagnostic technology may
appear to be more efficacious (i.e., better able correctly to diagnose
the disease) than when employed among populations with a lower
prevalence of the disease in question.' 84
2.

Surgical and Medical Technologies

Although surgical procedures account for approximately thirty
percent of the total U.S. expenditures for health care,' they are
largely unregulated and unassessed. The practice of surgery is regulated primarily by state licensing laws which address practitioners'
qualifications. 8 6 The Food and Drug Administration regulates sur179. See id.
180. See Schroeder, supra note 81, at 635.
181. Initial costs, however, may be an overly optimistic indicator of future cost per case.
Since the cost of a diagnostic procedure is a function of the prevalence of the target disease,
the cost per newly detected case rises as the number of undetected cases declines. The more
successful the technology is in detecting a disease, the more it will reduce the number of
remaining undetected cases, further increasing its cost. See Steinwachs, Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis: Role in Evaluation of Alternatives for Improving High Blood Pressure Control, 33
MD. STATE MED. J. 225, 226 (1984).
182. See Rock, supra note 175, at 11.
183. See id. Testing sites for diagnostic and indeed for all technologies are selected in
part to maximize the size and severity of illness of the target patient population to ensure
enough subjects to produce statistically significant positive results. See id. For a discussion
of statistical significance, see infra note 195 and accompanying text.
184. See id. The accuracy of a diagnostic technology assessment could be increased by
employing the technology in a variety of settings, but this would significantly increase assessment costs. See id.
185. See Moore, supra note 19, at 134 (1985). In 1981, this amounted to about $90 billion. Id.
186. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 160 app. D.
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gery indirectly through its regulation of surgical drugs and devices.

As a result, some surgical technologies, such as transplants of artificial hearts, are subject to pervasive FDA controls while other surgical technologies intended to achieve similar patient outcomes, such
as human heart transplants (or even transplants of xenografts, i.e.,
organs from nonhuman species), go largely unregulated due to the
fortuity that there is no device central to the procedure. The same
is largely true of medical technologies that do not employ drugs or
devices."8 7 The lack of oversight of surgical and medical technologies is especially striking when contrasted with government regulation of drugs and devices."8 ' The Office of Technology Assessment
regards the lack of assessment of surgical and medical technologies
weakness" of this country's technology assessas the "overriding
1 89
ment program.
The lack of medical and surgical assessment is explained partly
by the difficulty of detecting new surgical or medical procedures or
changes in existing ones. 190 Due to the complexity of some surgical
procedures, it is difficult to detect a subtle change in the way they
are conducted.' 9 ' Over time, however, numerous incremental
changes in a complex procedure will yield a different procedure,
with different risks, costs and benefits than the original technology.
The difficulty of assessing medical and surgical technologies suggests that surgical and medical waste is more likely to go undetected
than other types of wasteful health care practices.
187. See id.; Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 454. For a discussion of medical procedures, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
188. See Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 454. However, the Food and Drug Administration does not regulate the prescribing behavior of physicians. Physicians therefore are free
to prescribe a drug for uses the agency has not approved. Insofar as surgery and medical
treatment that does not employ drugs or devices are applications of techniques by a health
professional, they may be deemed comparable to physician prescribing, and their nonregulation by the FDA may therefore be unremarkable.
189. OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 99.
190. The long-standing opposition of powerful physician groups like the American Medical Association no doubt is also a siguificant factor.
191. See Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 970. Another factor complicating the
assessment of surgical technologies is the ethical constraints on conducting controlled surgical research. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 130 app. C. This results from the risks
associated with the typical invasive surgical procedure. It would be highly unethical, for
example, to evaluate a new coronary repair procedure by opening up every subject's chest but
only performing the repair on the group of subjects designated as experimental. Without this
type of placebo control, however, it may be difficult to isolate the effects of the surgical technology from the effects of havings one's chest opened.
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C. ProblemsAssociated with ParticularTypes of Assessment
Beyond the issues raised in connection with technology assessment generally and in connection with assessment of diagnostic,
surgical and medical technologies in particular, a number of concerns relate to specific assessment techniques.
1. Safety and Efficacy Assessments
The basic tool for safety and efficacy assessment 92 is the controlled clinical investigation. 9 3 To understand the value of the controlled clinical investigation, consider the alternative case report or
anecdotal method which involves administering a technology to patients in an uncontrolled fashion and simply observing and reporting the results. With the exception of technologies that treat
previously incurable conditions, so that any improvement is per se a
demonstration of net benefit, 194 uncontrolled trial and error is of
little true assessment value. Without a group of control subjects,
there is no way to tell if the patient outcomes are the result of the
technology or of chance or some peculiar characteristic of the patients being tested. Assessment conclusions based on case report
data are therefore unreliable. Nevertheless, because they are relatively simple and inexpensive, case report data probably provide the
basis for an overwhelming majority of treatment decisions.
The controlled clinical investigation, in contrast to the case report, is a powerful assessment tool. In theory, it can identify technologies that are unsafe or inefficacious. By adding multiple control
groups exposed to alternative technologies, technologies that are
unsafe or inefficacious on a relative basis can also be identified. Un192. Formal safety and efficacy assessment dates back at least to John Lind's scurvy experiments 200 years ago. See Fineberg, supra note 4, at 663.
193. For a general description, see Moses & Brown, supra note 33, at 271. Controlled
clinical investigations can either be experimental or observational. In the former case the
investigator controls who gets what technology, while in the latter case the investigator observes the results in subjects whose exposure to the technology has been independent of the
investigator. See, e.g., OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 34-39. The standard experimental
study is a randomized, controlled trial. See id. at 34. A common observational study is an
historically controlled investigation, in which the control population has been treated prior to
the development of the technology being assessed, and can therefore serve as a group that has
not been exposed to the technology for purposes of comparison with the group that has been
exposed. See id. at 134 app. C. For a discussion of historically controlled studies, see Moses
& Brown, supra note 33, at 274-76.
194. In this case, the experiment more nearly resembles an historically controlled study
than an uncontrolled experiment, since patients treated unsuccessfully prior to the advent of
the experimental technology in effect serve as controls.
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fortunately, its theoretical value is compromised by several
shortcomings.
The use of controlled clinical trials is significmntly limited by
their cost and their ethical problems. Because of the large populations that must be studied to yield statistically significant results,
controlled trials are very expensive to conduct. 95 Ethical problems
arise because of the need to compare the experimental technology to
a placebo or alternate technology. 19 6 Withholding a known effective technology from a patient is unethical, even if doing so facilitates the evaluation of a potentially superior technology. 197
Randomized, controlled trials therefore can be employed ethically
only in two cases: (1) if there is no technology known to be safe and
effective for the condition in question; or (2) if the risks and benefits
of the experimental technology are truly uncertain. In these cases, a
positive control, in the form of another technology that may not
prove to be as safe or effective when the experiment is completed,
may be used clinically as the standard of comparison.1 98
A more serious drawback is the limited ability of controlled
clinical trials to identify wasteful technology due to the fact that
195. Large study populations reduce the risk of erroneous negative conclusions (known
as "false negatives" or beta type II error) that can result from small sample sizes. See Russell, The Role of Technology Assessment in Cost Control, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 72, 133-34. For example, many new technologies represent only
modest improvements in patient outcomes. A large test group is needed to detect the positive
effect of these technologies and to establish that the effect observed is not due to chance. See
Moses and Brown, supra note 33, at 275. A survey of 71 investigations reporting negative
results, for example, revealed that the negative results were due primarily to the small size of
the study populations. See Freiman, Chalmers, Smith & Kuebler, The Importance of Beta,
The Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of the Randomized,
Controlled Trial:Survey of 71 'Negative' Trials,299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 690 (1978). In 67 of
these studies, there was a greater than 10% chance of missing a true 25% therapeutic improvement, and 50 of the studies had a greater than 10% chance of missing a true 50%
improvement. See id. Avoiding such error, however, requires large populations, which
drives up the cost of the study, since cost is primarily a function of the number of subjects.
See Hawkins, supra note 16, at 13-14. Moreover, the high cost of avoiding beta type II error,
and thus the costs of controlled trials, increases as the marginal expected health benefit from
the experimental technology decreases. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, supra
note 24, at 117.
196. See Butt & Neuhauser, supranote 51, at 142; OTA STRATEGIES, supranote 4, at 93;
Eddy, supra note 90, at 44; Moses, Statistical Concepts Fundamental to Investigations, 312
NEW ENG. . MED. 890, 896 (1985) ("there may be ethical obstacles; if a patient can definitely be expected to benefit more from Treatment I than from Treatment II, that should
preclude his being assigned to Treatment II").
197. See Eddy, supra note 90, at 44; Moses, supra note 196, at 896.
198. See Moses, supra note 196, at 896; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 93 ("However, when a technology is in widespread use, risks and benefits are either already known or
are widely believed to exist, and randomization may be neither possible nor appropriate");
Eddy, supra note 90, at 44.
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they tend to assess efficacy but not effectiveness.' 9 9 Deliberately
conducted in a carefully contrived and controlled setting, such as a

prestigious medical research center, with highly trained investigators following a detailed protocol or set of instructions, the results
of these studies are unlikely to reflect the risks, costs and benefits of
the technology in actual clinical use.2 "° This does not present a
problem if the results of the study are negative; a technology that is
unsafe or inefficacious in a carefully controlled experiment is not
likely to be safer or more effective in actual use.20 1 Risk, benefit and
cost projections based on positive results from a controlled trial,
however, may be highly overoptimistic.2 °2
199. This distinction is discussed supra at note 28.
200. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087 ("The results of technology assessment
in one setting may not apply to others... The performance of a medical technology depends
on the particular circumstances in use"); Hellinger, supra note 58, at 35. Hellinger cites the
example of human heart transplants, which achieved a much higher rate of success when
initially performed at Stanford University than after the technology spread to other medical
centers. Factors that tend to limit the applicability of the results of controlled, clinical investigations to other settings include differences in skill between researchers and practitioners
(see Note, supranote 111, at 552) and greater patient compliance with the treatment regimen
under experimental conditions. Cf. Hawkins, supra note 16, at 16. Particularly in the case of
drugs, patient compliance may reflect cost considerations. Since even insured patients often
must pay for their own drugs, there is a tendency to reduce dosage and frequency of administration to save money, thereby reducing drug effectiveness. In clinical studies, however, the
subjects typically do not pay for the experimental technology. Cf id. at 19.
201. The same may not be true for an assessment of cost. Administrative costs are likely
to be higher under controlled study conditions than under normal conditions of use, and
economies of scale may be realized as the technology is diffused. On the other hand, in the
case of proprietary technologies such as drugs and devices, the price of the technology at the
experimental stage may be less than after it is introduced commercially because the manufacturer may not be able to charge a profitable price or perhaps any price for a technology under
investigation. Food and Drug Administration regulations, for example, prohibit a sponsor of
an experimental device from charging more than the reasonable costs of manufacture, research and development. 21 C.F.R. § 812.7 ("A sponsor, investigator, or any person acting
for or on behalf of a sponsor or investigator shall not ... commercialize an investigational
device by charging the subjects or investigators for a device a price larger than that necessary
to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and handling."). While there is no
comparable prohibition on commercializing experimental drugs, investigators and subjects
typically are not charged for these technologies in controlled clinical experiments.
202. Randomized, controlled trials on chemonucleolysis, a new technology to treat
slipped discs involving the injection of an enzyme called chymopapain into the disc, showed
that the technology was extremely safe as well as effective, and much less costly that the
traditional surgical treatment (laminectomy). In actual use, however, adverse reactions began to occur at much higher rates, perhaps because the injections were performed by less
well-trained personnel than in the clinical experiments. Drugfor Slipped Disks is Linked to 5
Deaths, 28 Serious Disorders,Wall St. J., June 7, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
A number of technical difficulties also arise in attempting to assess technologies for safety
and efficacy, but in contrast to the problems of cost, ethical constraints and projection to
actual use, they are somewhat amenable to technical solutions. Defining the end-point of a
clinical trial is often difficult. In the case of coronary artery bypass graft surgery, for exam-
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2. Consensus Conferences
Another assessment method that presents special problems is
the consensus conference. This widely-used technique consists of a
group of experts reviewing the available data on a technology and
reaching an accord on its risks, costs, or benefits. 20 3 The major
drawback of this technique is that it does not generate data but only
reviews, synthesizes and disseminates existing data. 2" Consensus
conferences therefore may be prone to conclusions based on inadequate data or bias on the part of the conferees.2 "5 Nevertheless, the
consensus method is a relatively inexpensive means of obtaining at

least some expert assessment of a technology. 20 6 To the extent that
pie, should benefit be measured in terms of relief from the pain of angina pectoris, or increase
in lifespan, or both? If both, should the technology still be deemed to be efficacious if it only
reduces pain? This example is presented in Banta & Behney, supra note 34, at 378.
Ensuring the validity of study results is a further problem. Results must prove attributable to the technology being tested rather than to chance or to some other variable (internal
validity), and must be generalizable to populations other than the one being studied (external
validity). See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 33-34; Moses, supra note 196, at 890-91.
Statistical methods are used to determine if study results are due to chance rather than to the
effects of the experimental technology. See generally Moses, supra. The risk that the results
are attributable to factors other than the technology being tested can be reduced by "blinding" the investigators and, if possible, the subjects--that is, preventing them from being
aware which subjects are being exposed to the experimental technology. This avoids the
possibility of deliberate or unconscious bias in the observation and reporting of the results.
See id.
203. The use of consensus conferences as a methodology for assessing health care technologies began within the National Institute of Health (NIH). The first consensus conference
was held in 1977 to assess screening methods for detecting breast cancer. See Perry, supra
note 100, at 97-98; see also Iglehart, supra note 15, at 50-55. The NIH brings together a panel
of experts to listen to presentations over a two day period. On the eve of the second day, the
panelists draft a "consensus statement," which they read to the audience for their reaction.
This is followed by a press conference to announce the tentative results of the conference.
The panel then disperses, and the statement is circulated to them for finalization. See OTA
STRATEOIES, supra note 4, at 63.
204. See L. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 134 (consensus approach "assumes, of course,
that whatever steps the profession has taken to learn about the benefits of various technologies are sufficient to support the judgments that are made").
205. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 94 ("Many syntheses are informal, overly
subjective, group-generated norms and are not based on a rigorous assessment of the scientific
evidence"); Hearings on S. 2504, supra note 82, at 120 ("The consensus method is vulnerable
to oversimplification, errors in reasoning, and obvious biases, such as financial and professional biases.")
The risk of bias influencing an assessment may be reduced by selecting neutral panelists.
However, it is unlikely that any expert panelist would lack a personal or professional viewpoint on the technology being assessed. An approach that can reduce the potential for bias is
the Delphi technique, which feeds panelists' views back to one another anonymously. See K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 99; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 62. However,
Delphi sacrifices face-to-face group interaction.
206. See Hearings on S. 800, supra note 82, at 25 (Testimony of the Health Industry
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they reflect the shared views of leading experts in the field, moreover, consensus conclusions tend to be less controversial than those
reached by more independent or objective methods. At the price of
rigor, therefore, consensus assessment may be more politically acceptable than other approaches. 0 7
3.

Cost-Sensitive Analyses

Special problems arise with cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit
analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis aims at identifying technologies
that are not the most cost-effective methods of achieving a desired
health outcome.20 8 The analysis entails a number of steps. First,
the health problem and the desired objective must be identified (for
example, for patients with coronary heart disease, the objective
might be to ameliorate the symptoms of angina pectoris); next, various technologies for achieving the objective must be considered (for
example, the desired goal could be reached by use of drug therapy, a
combination of therapy and lifestyle changes, or through coronary
artery bypass graft surgery); finally, the costs and benefits of each
technology must be calculated and compared to determine which
provides the greatest net benefit at the least cost. 20 9 Many of these
steps are technically troublesome. Cost-effectiveness analysts often
fail to consider all of the available alternate technologies,2 10 and
Manufacturers Association). There are no data available on the percentage of consensus conclusions later proven erroneous by more rigorous assessment.
207. Arguably, consensus findings are more likely to be accurate for technologies that, by
virtue of being toward the extreme ends of the risk, cost and benefit continua, present the
clearest cases of waste, than for those that are merely marginally wasteful or nonwasteful.
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Consequently, the primary risk is that a marginal technology might be erroneously praised or condemned. This risk may well be outweighed by the advantages of a relatively simple, inexpensive assessment method like
consensus.
208. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. Selma Mushkin introduced cost-effectiveness analysis into the health care field in 1958. See Mushkin, Toward a Definition of
Health Economics, 73 PUB. HEALTH REPTs. 785-93 (1980); See also Klarman, The Road to
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 585 (1982).
209. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 59-113.
210. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 313. This results in part from the analyst's bias.
For example, a surgeon tends to compare alternate surgical procedures but to ignore nonsurgical alternatives such as drug therapy; from the surgeon's standpoint, what is relevant is
which of his tools is the most cost-effective. In addition, comparisons among technologies are
often difficult to make because of varying quality and quantity of data. Unless the analyst
goes to the trouble and expense of conducting his own clinical trials, the data relied upon to
establish the values for one technology may not be comparable to those for another; for instance, there may be a great deal of data of questionable quality for an old technology, and
only a small amount of high quality data for a newer one. Furthermore, as noted supra at
notes 88-90 and accompanying text, technologies change over time, which may render data
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in identifying, measuring and
often encounter serious difficulties
21 2
2 11
valuing costs and benefits.
on one version of a technology inapplicable to current or future experience. See Neuhauser,
supra note 54 at 33.
211. Measurement determines the quantity of inputs required to achieve the health objective, such as the number of physician hours, scalpels and drug tablets, while valuation assigns
the inputs a dollar value. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 79-80. For purposes
of cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost of a technology is assessed by the technology's marginal
opportunity cost (measured by the value of the resource in its next best use) rather than the
technology's average cost or market price. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 39-40; K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supranote 1, at 108-09. To illustrate the distinction between marginal
and average costs, Neuhauser calculates the cost per additional case of colon cancer detected
by repeated stool guaiac tests to increase from approximately $1200 for the first test to $47
million for the sixth. See Neuhauser & Lewicki, What Do We Gain from the Sixth Stool
Guiac?, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 226, 228 (1975). Using average rather than marginal cost
would submerge the tremendous increase in cost per detected case.
Marginal cost, however, is not easy to calculate. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 320.
Both measurement and valuation problems arise. See Klarman, supra note 53, at 226. How
should costs be measured when a technology is used for many purposes, or is employed in a
treatment program along with a number of other technologies? See OTA STRATEGIES, supra
note 4, at 40; Klarman, supra note 53, at 230; K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 74.
How should overhead be treated? Should only the marginal increase in overhead resulting
from the technology be measured, or a proportion of fixed costs? See OTA STRATEGIES,
supra note 4, at 40. Should research-and-development expenses be included? See K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 78.
Once the inputs are identified and measured, they must be valued. Inputs or goods traded
in the marketplace may have a market price, but that price may not accurately reflect true
cost. See Klarman, supranote 53, at 226. For example, some hospitals charge more for some
goods and services, such as laboratory tests, pharmaceuticals and radiological services, than
their true marginal costs, a practice known as "cost-shifting." OTA STRATEGIES, supra note
4, at 40; Conn, Aller & Lundberg, Identifying Costs of Medical Care, an Essential Step in
Allocating Resources, 253 J. A.M.A. 1586, 1587 (1985); K. WARNER & B. LUcE, supra note
1, at 142-43. Other valuation problems arise because of the difficulty of predicting future uses
of a technology, hence future economies of scale, See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 35, 41;
Greer, supra note 39, at 132 (1981). Choosing the rate at which to discount future costs to
present value can also be problematic. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 41; K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 93-95; Pliskin & Taylor, General Principles: CostBenefit and Decision Analysis, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY, supra note 35,
at 8-9; Klarman, supra note 53, at 227-28. A high discount rate favors technologies with
present benefits and with costs accruing in the distant future, while a lower rate favors technologies, such as preventive vaccination programs, that have present costs but future benefits.
See K. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 154; Klarman, supra note 53, at 227-28; OTA
STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 41; Kristein, supra note 47, at 215. To some extent, these
valuation problems are amenable to conventions, such as assuming a particular interest rate
for purposes of discounting; as long as they are applied consistently, such practices permit
comparisons between multiple technologies. This assumes, however, that the data for each
technology will be comparable in quality and quantity; if this is not true, both the reliability
and the validity of the assessment results may be compromised.
212. The benefits of a technology include direct benefits, which are tangible costs that the
technology averts (for example, the costs of future hospitalization that will not be necessary);
indirect benefits (for example, future earnings made possible by restored health); and intangible benefits or nontransferable satisfactions (for example, additional years of life or days without pain). See Klarman, supra note 53, at 229-33. Both measurement and valuations
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Cost-benefit analysis2 13 includes all of the steps involved in costeffectiveness analysis, and thus is faced with many similar
problems.2 14 However, cost-benefit analysis also requires that the
value of all benefits-direct, indirect and intangible-be converted
to common units, often expressed in monetary terms.2 15 This creates particularly difficult problems in the valuation of intangible
benefits.2 16
Intangible benefits must be included in the cost-benefit calculation, for in their absence, the assessment is more likely to conclude,
incorrectly, that a technology is wasteful. However, it is difficult, if
not impossible, 2 17 to value intangible benefits in a manner that allows various health care benefits and alternate expenditures to be
compared.21 8
problems arise when comparing the benefits from different types of technologies (diagnostic,
preventive, palliative, curative). See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 35. The most intractable of
these problems, however, is the valuation of intangible benefits. See infra notes 216-229 and
accompanying text.
213. Cost-benefit analysis, in the simplest sense in which some effort is made to associate
costs with benefits, has been conducted for many years. It was employed by Richard Petty, a
well-known English physician, in the 17th century, see K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1,
at 50, and in France in the 19th century, when Dupuit analyzed the costs and benefits of
alternate public works projects. See Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public
Works, in 12 READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 255 (K. Arrow & T Scitovsky, eds. 1969).
In the United States, Shattuck argued that the monetary benefits of sanitary reforms in 19th
century Boston outweighed their costs; and a provision requiring the Army Corps of Engineers to employ cost-benefit analysis for proposed river projects was incorporated in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 50-51.
214. Cf. K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 59-113.
215. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; Pliskin & Taylor, supra note 211, at 5.
216. Intangible benefits include relief from pain, restored mobility and freedom from anxiety of disease. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 321; Hess, Cost/Benefit Analysis-Another
Dimension, 16 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 76, 76 (1982). Hess would include anxiety from
loss of income as well as legal, ethical, social and moral considerations among intangible
benefits. In this discussion, the term "intangible benefits" is used to refer to the types of
benefits enumerated above because that is the standard term in the health economics literature. From a legal standpoint, a more accurate term to describe these benefits is "nontransferable satisfactions," since the legal term "intangibles" refers to transferable items such as
the goodwill of a business, while in cost-benefit analysis, the term is reserved for benefits such
as years of life that cannot be bought or sold. My thanks to Ronald Coffey for pointing out
this distinction.
217. See Neuhauser, supra note 54, at 34 (life is not so much "priceless" as
"unpriceable").
218. Contrary to Klarman ("[the dilemmas of valuation can be escaped by retreating
from C-B [cost-benefit] analysis to C-E [cost-effectiveness] analysis"), supra note 53, at 227;
Warner and Luce ("[tihe reason for a nonmonetary measure of program effectiveness is either
the impossibility or undesireability of valuing important outcomes in dollars and cents"),
supra note 1, at 48; and Evans (in contrast to cost-effectiveness, which "preserves a sense" of
intangible benefits, cost-benefit analysis "typically notes these but fails to assess them"), supra
note 50, at 2209, the problem is not solved by only performing the type of cost-benefit analy-
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Proponents of cost-benefit analysis suggest several methods for
valuing intangibles. The "human capital" approach measures intangible benefit as the present value of the future income stream made
possible by providing the technology.2 1 9 If a technology increased
by ten years the lifespan of a patient who earns $50,000 a year, the
value of the intangible benefit of the additional years of life would
be $500,000 discounted to present value. The flaw in this approach
is its basic assumption that the value of the intangible benefit is a
function of wealth or increased earning capacity; that a young,
white male, by virtue of having the greatest expected future earnings, would benefit more from an additional year of life than anyone
else.

220

sis that converts different health benefits into common units other than dollars, such as
QALY's. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Even under a QALY approach, the
difficult problem of comparing the utility of different health outcomes, or of the same outcome in different populations must still be addressed. Is a year of life worth the same as five
years without pain? Is an extra year of life for an 85-year-old worth the same as an extra year
of life for a 25-year-old? Is the value of an average gain of an extra year of life worth the
same if it is one year of life for an entire patient population, or five extra years of life for only
20% of the patients? See Klarman,supra note 53, at 235. Cf Veatch, supra note 73, at 14952 (objecting to the assumption that benefits can be summed over a number of individuals
and then divided by their number).
Further questions arise when patients must compete for the same scarce technology. Assuming that the benefit from the technology is one additional year of life, and that the value
of an additional year of life is the same for two patients-which may not be true because of
differing interpersonal utilities, cf Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a
Theory ofRational Choice: The Richard T. Ely Lecture, 74 AM. ECON. Rv. 1, 7-8 (1984)does the loss of the extra year of life to one patient cancel out the benefit of the extra year to
the other, so that the net benefit of the technology is zero and it is therefore wasteful? See
also Green, Should Technology Assessment Guide Public Policy?, 69 A.B.A. J. 930 (1983) (the
benefit of a superhighway to the automobile owner may be the detriment of a spoiled view to
the nature seeker). Cf Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (plaintiff in need of
potentially lifesaving bone marrow transplant not entitled to breach confidential hospitalpatient relationship to have identity of unrelated potential donor revealed to court or counsel
so that donor can be contacted with specifies of plaintiff's need when donor has indicated
willingness to donate only to relatives).
The problem of different interpersonal utilities would also affect allocation of scarce technologies based on safety and effectiveness. For example, if a technology were provided to
patient A rather than to patient B, on the ground that patient A would gain five years of extra
life while patient B would only gain one, an assumption is being made that five years of life to
patient A is worth more than one year of life to patient B. In view of the problem of verifying
this assumption, a better result would be to provide technologies to all patients who would
derive net benefit from them, but this may not be palatable in an era of cost containment and
may not be possible in cases of absolute scarcity, where the availability of the technology is
constrained by factors other than cost, such as technical obstacles to mass production.
219. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 321-22; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 208; K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, supranote 1, at 88. This approach either treats intangible benefits the
same as indirect benefits or counts indirect benefits twice, once to measure indirect benefits
and a second time to measure intangible benefits. See supra note 212.
220. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 88. The famous heart surgeon
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Another method for valuing intangible benefits suggested by
cost-benefit analysts, the "willingness-to-pay" approach, equates the
value of the intangible benefit with the amount one would be willing
to pay for it. For example,' if a 30-year-old person were willing to
pay $10,000 to avoid a heart attack at age 40, then the discounted
present value of the intangible benefits to be expected at age 40 and
beyond (additional years of life, mobility, avoidance of pain, etc.)
would be $10,000. One method for determining this discounted
present value is by survey; people simply are asked how much they
would be willing to pay.2 2 ' This has certain advantages over attempts to value intangible benefits to unidentified individuals by
other means, such as by taking an average of jury awards in wrongful death actions.2 22 By asking people directly how much they
would pay for certain benefits, the problem of having to guess what
they would pay-and the resulting risk that A's estimate of the
value to B will be different than B's because of differences in
interpersonal utility22 3 or differences in perspective 224 -can be
Debakey fell into this trap (or embraced the notion of equating wealth with entitlement to
health care) in the following argument on behalf of expensive technologies: "If the cost of an
operation is $15,000, and the patient resumes employment at $30,000 per year, in about six
months he will have contributed the cost of his operation in social productivity, and thereafter he will continue to contribute other resources instead of withdrawing from them."
Debakey, supra note 73, at 10 (1983).
221. The originator of the survey approach, Acton, asked respondents hypothetically
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid a specified risk of a future heart attack. See
Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend To Save a Life, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY
DILEMMAS 292 (S. Rhoads ed. 1980).

222. The jury valuation method fails to consider interpersonal differences in utility. Furthermore, awards may well reflect the jury's estimate of the value of the decedent's life to
survivors rather than its value to the decedent himself. Moreover, the jury's award may not
accurately reflect what the decedent or anyone else would in fact have paid in order to prevent the death, which is arguably an element, if not the key element, of the intangible value of
the decedent's life under a willingness-to-pay approach.
223. See Schelling, supra note 218, at 7-8.
224. The difference in interpersonal utility is only one type of difference in perspective.
Perspective can refer not only to differences between individuals but to differences between
groups of individuals and between individuals and organizations. See supra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text. Moreover, while the difference in interpersonal utilities might be narrowly interpreted to refer to the difference in the value to A of a benefit to A and the value to
B of the same benefit to B, the difference in perspective also includes the difference between
the value to A of the benefit to A and the value to B of the benefit to A. By obtaining values
of benefits to individuals from those individuals, willingness-to-pay alleviates this perspective
problem. The problem could also be alleviated by asking A how much B should pay to
provide A with the additional years of life. If reciprocity is assumed (A must be willing to
pay the same amount for additional years of life for B), this suggestion accords with the
principal of universalization in moral philosophy.
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avoided.22 5
The survey approach is nevertheless prone to serious inaccuracies. Respondents tend not to take hypothetical questions seriously;
are unable to discriminate between small differences in probabilities
that often must be used in willingness-to-pay questions to make
them realistic; and give answers that do not reveal their own minds
so much as what they think will please the interviewer.2 2 6 Furthermore, since the wealthy can pay more for a benefit than the poor,
the same problem arises as with the human capital approach: 2 7 the
wealthy would be likely to say they would be willing to pay more
than the poor, and therefore would seem to place a greater value on
intangible benefits than the poor. The result thus favors technologies for treating illnesses that disproportionately affect the

wealthy.

228

One solution might be to set the value of a technology as the
highest amount that anyone would be willing to pay for it and to
compare that figure with costs in a cost-benefit analysis. But this is
likely to generate a net benefit for almost any technology that is
expected to yield any patient benefit. Another solution to at least
some of the problems of asking hypothetical questions would be to
calculate the value of intangible benefits from what people actually
pay for technologies, but this too encounters problems of interpersonal differences in utility (How can the amount that one person
pays be extrapolated to other individuals?) and in wealth (If a
wealthy person pays twice as much as a poor person for the same
benefit, does this mean the benefit is worth twice as much to the one
than to the other?). Moreover, since health care for many individuals-including Medicare beneficiaries-is paid for in substantial
part by third-party payors, how is the value of intangible benefits to
these individuals to be calculated on the basis of what others (e.g.,
bureaucrats within the Health Care Finance Administration) are
willing to pay?
A further problem with the willingness-to-pay method of valuing intangible benefits is that the value of these benefits for any individual is likely to vary over time. 229 The value of an extra year of
225. Inaccuracies resulting from differences in interpersonal utilities or perspective may
recur, however, if the values derived from individual responses are averaged.
226. See Fisher, Willingness to Pay for ProbabilisticImprovements in FunctionalHealth
Status: A PsychologicalPerspective,in HEALTH: WHAT IS IT WORTH? 167, 185 (S. Mushkin
& D. Dunlop eds. 1979); Hellinger, supra note 58, at 208.
227. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
228. See K. WARNER & B. Luc , supra note 1, at 89-90.
229. See Schelling, supra note 218.
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life to one at age twenty five is likely to be different than to one at
age eighty five. The value of a year without pain is likely to be
different during the time one feels the pain than before or after. To
be accurate, a willingness-to-pay system must somehow reflect these

changing values, which entails both multiple (ideally constant) measurement and a method of transforming the resulting value stream
into a single value for the individual.

III. A

PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING WASTE

The foregoing problems with technology assessment are so formidable that its use seems fruitless-indeed wasteful-as a means to
2 30
reduce technology waste and thereby control health care costs.
Nevertheless, some form of technology assessment is inevitable in
health care decisionmaking. A physician's choice of a technology
for a specific patient is based on at least an implicit assessment of its
relative safety and effectiveness compared to alternatives.2 31 Simi230. Green has stated that "[t]echnology assessment is a useful tool for public policy only
if it is not taken too seriously." Green, supra note 219, at 933. Green argues that policy
decisions should continue to be made by "ordinary political processes" which can better reflect what the public wants, rationally or irrationally. Id. Ruby, Banta and Bums concur
that cost-effectiveness anaylsis in particular cannot in most cases be the dominant factor in
decisionmaking because it ignores such nonquantifable factors as equity and ethics. See
Ruby, Banta & Bums, supra note 133, at 150. Even the OTA admits that the value of costeffectiveness analysis lies more in going through the exercise than in its numerical outcome.
See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 60. The OTA's conception of the role of technology
assessment resembles the function of an environmental impact statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). When
required by that Act, a federal agency must prepare a public document identifying and evaluating the environmental impacts of proposed action, and it must consider these impacts in
determining whether or not to take the action. But it need not base its decision to go forward
on the results of its analysis. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223 (1980).
Necheles makes the important further observation that the utility of cost-benefit analysis
is limited by its insensitivity: "[A]ny medical program that is ambiguous enough to require
cost-benefit analysis is probably too ambiguous to be resolved by cost-benefit analysis."
Necheles, Standards of Medical Care: How Does an Innovative Medical ProcedureBecome
Accepted?, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 15, 17 (1982).
231. The basis for the physician's assessment may be more the views of influential opinion
leaders than a personal familiarity with the existing assessment data. See Greer, supra note
39, at 134; Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1089. These opinion leaders may be resistant
to new technologies, bringing them into conflict with ambitious innovators who see the new
technologies as a means not only of improving patient outcomes but of furthering their own
careers. See Greer, supra note 39, at 134. Fineberg and Hiatt list a number of factors that
they regard as affecting the adoption of a new technology by practitioners, including the
severity and urgency of the medical problem being addressed, whether any alternatives are
available, financial advantages of employing the new technology, how compatible the new
technology is with old technology, the prestige and visibility of its advocates, the manner in
which information about the new technology is diffused, promotional efforts by manufactur-
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larly, patients presented with a set of alternative technologies as
part of the informed consent process are required to assess the technologies in some sense as well. 3 ' A hospital's decision to purchase
or to provide a new technology, a third-party payor's decision

whether or not to reimburse for it, as well as a manufacturer's decision to develop it, are all based on some form of technology assessment, however informal. In the words of one commentator,
"[t]here is no question that we are doing and will continue
to do
2 33
technology assessments. The only question is how well."
Nevertheless, not all types of technology assessment are equally

worthwhile. Assessment is confounded by a number of difficult
technical problems, such as how to select technologies for assessment or how accurately to measure costs and benefits.2 34 Some of
these problems are amenable to conventions or to technical solutions. For example, if the precise value of a cost variable is uncertain, sensitivity analysis can reveal whether the range of results
obtained from the range of likely values for the variable is too large
to permit useful decisionmaking, in which case an increased effort
can be made to derive a more precise value for the variable.2 3 5 Simers, legal forces, patient preferences, and the physician's attitude toward change. See
Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1089. One point that is especially worth noting is that the
scientific literature, where technology assessment results are published, is apparently not a
very influential factor in physicians' decisions about new technologies. See Banta, supra note
16, at 76-77; Greer, supra note 39, at 139. This results at least in part from the delay between
the first dissemination of assessment results-usually through the press, trade journals or
talks delivered at conferences-and formal publication. See Banta, supra, at 76-77.
232. In the celebrated case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the
court explained that a physician is bound to disclose to the patient "all risks potentially
affecting the [patient's] decision... 'whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.'" Id. at
787. Informed consent entails a presentation of the results of an assessment of the relative
safety and effectiveness of the technology. Effectiveness enters into the court's discussion of
"risks" because, in explaining the relative risks of alternatives to the patient, the physician
must explain the risks of not undergoing the treatment, which include the potential lost benefits from the technology. See id.at 788.
233. Hearings on S. 2504, supra note 82, at 120 (testimony of David Eddy, M.D.). See
also Eddy, supra note 90, at 40. Fuchs especially disagrees with Green's position that technology assessment should defer to "soft" political decisionmaking:
[Elvery choice necessarily reflects a set of values. We do not, as the critics [of
technology assessment] imply, have an option between evaluating and not evaluating. The only option is whether to evaluate explicitly, systematically, and openly, as
CBA/CEA [cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis] forces us to do, or whether to
evaluate implicitly, haphazardly, and secretly, as has been done so in the past.
Fuchs, supra note 60, at 937. Accord K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 61 (the
alternative to attempting to quantify intangible costs and benefits is to have them valued
"subjectively and implicitly"); Kristein, supra note 47, at 203-04 (advocating cost-benefit
analysis as necessary where either no market exists or it produces undesirable results).
234. See supra notes 80-82, 208-29, and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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ilarly, the choice of an appropriate discount rate might be settled by
agreement.23 6
Beyond these kinds of problems, however, technology assessment confronts two especially intractible perplexities: the problem
of multiple perspectives in defining waste and the identification
problem of valuing intangible benefits.2 37 The problem of perspective cannot be solved by a technical improvement, at least not one
that is presently foreseeable; instead, it remains a choice to be made
between potentially inconsistent alternatives, such as the determination that a technology is wasteful despite its net patient benefit because it offers insufficient net benefit to a third-party payor,
provider or society. 238 Adopting a convention that technologies be
assessed from a particular perspective would permit assessment outcomes to be consistent with one another, but from other perspectives perhaps consistently wrong. Similarly, the problem of valuing
intangibles23 9 may be resolved by some future technical breakthrough, but it seems likely to remain a first order problem for some
time.
If there were types of technology assessment that offered the potential of reducing waste without raising these twin problems, it
would seem advisable to predicate cost control efforts on these
methods, presumably at the same time that the search continued for
better solutions to the remaining assessment obstacles. Only if the
savings resulting from the reduction in waste by these methods were
insufficient would it be necessary to confront whether or not to take
action against technologies that could be deemed wasteful on the
basis of the less defensible types of assessments.
Do any types of technology assessment minimize the problems
of perspective and valuing intangibles, yet facilitate waste reduc236. See supra note 211. Since discount rates are presumed to fluctuate over time, the
agreement would more properly be on a suitable reference point, such as the prime interest
rate, rather than on an actual number. The choice of this reference point is not likely to be
either obvious or without controversy, however.
237. See supra notes 66-76, 216-29, and accompanying text.
238. Here, too, a type of sensitivity analysis might be employed whereby the technology
is assessed from different perspectives and the results compared to determine the marginal
difference in net benefit. If the assessments show that the technology is likely to yield a large
net benefit from the patient's perspective (such as five additional years of life), but from the
perspective of a third-party payor such as Medicare, the cost is high compared to other technologies that produce the same health outcome, although perhaps in different patients, it
might be possible to decide whether the marginal increase in value of the technology from the
patient's perspective is or is not a wasteful result.
239. See supra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
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tion? Suppose waste were defined as follows: a technology or the
use of a technology
(1) that does not provide net health benefit to the patient;
(2) that provides less net health benefit another technology;
(3) that produces no more net health benefit to the patient than
another technology that costs less; or
(4) that produces less net health benefit to the patient than another technology at the same cost.
Defined in this manner, wasteful technology could be identified by
two types of technology assessment: safety and effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness assessment. 2' Safety and effectiveness assessments would identify technologies that were wasteful under the first
two criteria, while cost-effectiveness assessment would identify
waste under the third and fourth. While economic cost would be a
key factor in determining whether or not a technology is wasteful,
the consideration of cost would be limited to whether the technology affords the greatest amount of a given health benefit for the
money.
One advantage of this proposal is that a technology wasteful
from a patient perspective would also be wasteful from any other
standpoint.2 4 1 A technology unsafe from a patient standpoint, for
example, is not safe from any other.2 42 Note that the reverse is not
true for cost-effectiveness considerations. A technology that is not
wasteful from a patient perspective nevertheless might be deemed
wasteful from another perspective, such as that of a third-party
payor; even though it was the most cost-effective method of achieving a desired health outcome for patients, it might not be the most
cost-effective method of maximizing net revenue for the payor.
Under the patient-oriented approach that is proposed, however,
such a technology would not be regarded as wasteful.
Another advantage of this approach is that there is no need to
attempt objectively and quantitatively to value intangibles such as
additional years of life or days without pain by converting them into
common units; in each particular case, the health outcome from the
patient perspective can be taken as the benefit endpoint. This is not
to say that knotty valuation problems would be avoided under this
limited concept of waste. For example, if there were two technolo240. See supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
242. A technology that is unsafe for one patient might be safe for another. However, as
between patients generally, as well as between other perspective levels within the health care
system, an assessment of waste based on the suggested parameters would be consistent across
all levels, and it is the conflict between levels that is at the heart of the perspective problem.
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gies available to treat a disease, each providing different benefits and
risks at different costs, it would be necessary to compare, hence
value, different amounts of different "goods" and "bads." This is
likely to be extremely complicated. However, it is not as complicated as assessing technologies from different perspectives and attempting to assign a value for intangible benefits.24 3
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Once waste is defined and wasteful technologies are identified,
some method must be employed to eliminate them. A large part of
this problem is outside the scope of this discussion. The implementation of anti-waste policy is achieved by the health care delivery
system, which is the one aspect of health care that is not encompassed within the term technology as it is being used herein. 2" But
to understand the impact of the current prospective payment system on technology, and the potential of this system for implementing the approach to waste suggested in Section III, it may be helpful
to describe the main features of alternative methods of controlling
costs.
A.

Purely PrivateDecisionmaking

At one extreme, just as there are those who favor leaving the
a5
task of performing technology assessment to the private sector,
there might be those who favor no government role in effecting an
anti-waste cost control policy. Instead, private decisionmakers, acting rationally in the medical marketplace, would avoid wasteful
243. The doctrine of informed consent suggests that the valuation of alternative technologies is to be made by the patient, whenever possible, and this valuation tends to take place in
temporal proximity to when the technology is provided or withheld, thereby establishing the
time as of which the patient's intrapersonal utility will be determined. See supra note 229 and
accompanying text. This enables the patient in theory to select the technology that maximizes his or her own health outcome preferences by offering the best mix of goods and bads.
For example, a patient can be offered a choice between a surgical treatment that promises to
yield a certain number of additional years of life and days without pain, or a non-surgical
treatment, such as diet and drug therapy, that offers fewer additional years of life or days
without pain but with a lower risk of adverse effects.
This theory is vulnerable to a number of objections, not the least of which is that patients
cannot effectively exercise their freedom of choice because of a lack of knowledge and expertise, and that they instead rely on physician's recommendations. But physicians' recommendations and the decisions patients would make if they possessed adequate information and
expertise are most likely to coincide if the perspective and valuation problems are approached
as herein suggested. Note that these same issues of substitute decisionmaking arise in the case
of incompetent patients.
244. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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technology as part of their effort to maximize their own utility. A
number of factors make this approach untenable, however. As
noted above, 246 government dominates the market for medical
goods and services. Medicare accounts for forty percent of all hospital revenues, 4 7 while the largest single, private, third-party payor
accounts only for between three and four percent.2 48 Unless government divested itself of its role as health care payor, which is unlikely in view of its distributive function of insuring adequate health
care for the poor and the elderly, it will continue to be a major
factor in the market. It therefore bears repeating that the government does not behave according to traditional, free-market
principles.2 4 9
Even within the private segment of the health care market, classic market forces are likely to be inoperative. The effect of government is powerful and pervasive even in areas it does not directly
control; private third-party payors, for example, typically follow the
government's lead in reimbursing for technology. 5 0 Delivery of
services is separated from payment,2 51 and the payor is often not the
recipient of the services.25 ' Prices often do not reflect true costs due
to cross-subsidization. 5 3 Regulatory requirements create formidable barriers to entry2 5 4 and there are widespread externalities; for
the whole range of preventive technologies, for example, social utility is arguably greater than utility to the individual patient.2 55 Services are not fungible due to specialization among practitioners.2 5 6
Perhaps most important, patients as consumers are ill-equipped to
make rational choices because of their lack of skill and experi246. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
5496, supra note 108, at 4 (testimony of Health Insurance
247. See Hearing On H.
Association of America).
248. See id. Antitrust law prohibits private payors from combining their market power.
In any event, it would take the combined market shares of all 325 members of the Health
Insurers Association of America to match the market share of the federal government. See

id.
249. See id.
250. See OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 9.
251. See Weinstein, Economic Evaluation of Medical Procedures and Technologies: Progress, Problems and Prospects, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 90, at 52.
252. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26. Not only is there a widespread system of government and private health insurance so that patients do not pay the full cost of the
services they receive, but physicians rather than the insurers still control 80% of the health
dollars that are spent. See Sanders, supra note 118, at 27.
253. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 26-27.
256. See Id.
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ence.2 57 In short, in a number of fundamental respects, there is no
private medical market that alone can assume the task of controlling wasteful technology.2 5 8
B. FosteringPrivate Controls on Waste Through
Government Programs
Assuming some continued government role in health care, an
effort might be made to create incentives within government programs for the operation of market forces to reduce wasteful technology. This is arguably2" 9 the principal path that is now being taken,
spearheaded by the new Medicare prospective payment system. 2 °
Under this system, providers are paid a fixed amount per hospital
admission, depending on the patient's diagnosis. The diagnoses are
classified according to a grouping system of 468 categories, known
as diagnosis-related groups or "DRGs. ' ' 26 1 The amount of reimbursement the hospital receives for a specific patient admission can
be increased if the patient qualifies as either a day or cost "outlier."
For day outliers the hospital will receive an amount greater than the
basic reimbursement under the particular DRG if the patient stays
in the hospital a prescribed number of days beyond the mean
257. See Weinstein, supra note 251, at 52; OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26-27.
258. See Bunker, supranote 19, at 691; Goddeeris, supranote 68, at 57. Klarman argues
that government involvement in health care is necessary not so much because there is no
functioning market but because it functions in "undesireable ways," such as by producing
unjust results. Klarman, supra note 54, at 225.
259. The qualification is interposed because the current system creates incentives to regard as wasteful technologies that fall outside the limits of waste as proposed in this Article.
See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text.
260. A number of other efforts have been made in this same direction, such as encouraging Medicaid programs to enroll patients in capitated health plans such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982), 48 Fed. Reg. 54,013 (1983),
and relaxing federal requirements for qualifying HMOs under the Health Maintenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982), which requires certain employers to offer HMOs to
employees as an option in employer-provided health care plans.
261. These in turn are based on the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition,
Clinical Modification, known as "ICD-9-CM." For a general description of the DRG system, see Dolenc & Doherty, DRGs: The Counterrevolutionand FinancingHealth Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 19; PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 15-17. Medicare's
prospective payment sytem operates in all but four states: New Jersey, Maryland, New York
and Massachusetts. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,397 (1985). These states have been granted
waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1886(c) to operate their own cost control systems for Medicare
reimbursement. New Jersey has employed its own version of a DRG system since 1978.
Maryland has employed a revenue control system in which hospitals are reimbursed on the
basis of DRGs, but with the reimbursement level adjusted to reflect the hospital's annual
deviation from a base year amount. See id. at 73; K. WARNER & B. LucEsupra note I, at 3334. For a description of the Massachusetts system, see Kinzer, Massachusetts and California-Two Kinds of Hospital Cost Control, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 838 (1983).
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length-of-stay for patients with the same diagnosis. 2 62 For cost outliers the hospital will be paid more than the basic DRG rate if the
cost of caring for the patient exceeds a fixed dollar amount or a
fixed multiple of the normal DRG rate for that patient.2 6 3 These
provisions, however, offer only limited relief from the cost containment pressures of the prospective payment system. Not only is reimbursement lower than the extra costs hospitals incur for day or
cost outliers, but the Medicare law itself sets a relatively low limit
on the percentage of discharges that can qualify for outlier status
within the entire system. 2 4
The essential feature of the prospective payment system is that
net revenue to providers is inversely proportional to the amount of
262. For fiscal year 1986, in order to qualify as a day outlier, the patient must remain in
the hospital the lesser of 17 days or 1.94 standard deviations beyond the mean length-of-stay
for the applicable DRG. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,709 (1985). A hospital is paid 60% of the
average per diem payment under the applicable DRG for each day the patient stays in the
hospital beyond a threshold number of days, which varies from one DRG to another. 42
C.F.L § 412.82 (1985). For example, a patient who is assigned to DRG 33 (concussion, age
0-17), qualifies for day outlier status once he remains in the hospital 17 days beyond the mean
length-of-stay for DRG 33, which is 1.6 days, if that is less than 1.94 standard deviations.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,722 (1985). The hospital is then reimbursed an additional
amount beyond the standard amount of reimbursement for DRG 33 to reflect the long stay.
This additional amount is 60% of the average per diem payment under DRG 33, and it is
paid for each day the patient is hospitalized beyond the specific threshold for DRG 33, which
is 5 days. Id. Thus, in the case of a patient whose condition is diagnosed as DRG 33 and
who stays in the hospital 20 days, the hospital is paid not only the basic amount of reimbursement under DRG 33, but 60% of the average per diem amount of that reimbursement for
days 6 through 20. Clearly the system is designed to discourage hospitals from retaining
patients rather than discharging them; not only does the hospital typically have to absorb
100% of the costs of care for the extra days of stay between the mean length-of-stay under the
DRG and the DRG threshold (days 1.7 through 5 in the case of DRG 33), but it is only
reimbursed 60% of the average per diem DRG rate for the additional qualifying days of stay.
263. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(ii) (1985). For fiscal year 1986, the extra cost must exceed either $13,500 or 2.0 times the DRG rate to qualify as a cost outlier. See 50 Fed. Reg.
35,646, 35,709 (1985). If either of these thresholds is exceeded, the provider will be reimbursed an extra amount, but only 60% of the adjusted cost (72% of the billed charges) of the
covered services it has provided beyond the base DRG amount. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.84
(1985). Thus, as in the case of day outliers, supra note 263, the outlier system is designed to
discourage provision of services the costs of which exceed the base rates. Note that a patient
may qualify as a cost outlier if he does not qualify as a day outlier. Note further that additional payment for day outliers is mandated by the Medicare law, while extra reimbursement
for cost outliers is up to the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (1983 & Supp. I 1984) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii), (iii).
264. By statute, outliers may not account for less than 5% nor more than 6% of the total
projected annual payments to providers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (1983 & Supp.
1 1984). For fiscal year 1986, the limit is set at 5%. See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,709. In
contrast, the New Jersey prospective payment system permits up to 30% of patients to qualify for outlier status. See Dolenc & Dougherty, supra note 261, at 20.
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resources expended per patient. In other words, except for the relatively rare cases that qualify for outlier payments, 265 providers are
reimbursed a set amount regardless of the cost of the care they provide. If they expend more per patient than they are reimbursed,
they must absorb the difference as a loss. Conversely, if they expend less per patient than they are reimbursed, they retain the difference as net revenue or profit. The prospective payment system is
thus the antithesis of the previous fee-for-service system under
which providers were reimbursed in direct proportion to their
charges per patient.2 66
The incentives created by the prospective payment system will
affect not only provider behavior, but the behavior of manufacturers
and others who develop new technologies. Providers will channel
their technology acquisitions toward technologies that minimize
costs; this in turn will encourage developers to concentrate their
research and development on those types of technologies.
On the other hand, the process of technology development to
some extent is insulated from market pressures. Technological innovation is a complex process, characterized by a number of stages:
basic research, applied research, prototype development, product
development, introduction, and diffusion. 267 Basic research is
largely independent of any specific technology objective, and therefore not heavily influenced by the economic and regulatory pres2 68
sures that may eventually affect the resulting technology.
Furthermore, innovators include entities that are relatively insensitive to market forces, in particular academicians and health care
professionals such as physicians and surgeons.26 9 Even commercial
manufacturers may develop technologies for prestige or to gain entry to a market rather than strictly in response to cost-control pressures transmitted through their customers. Accordingly, the
problem of wasteful technology is unlikely to be solved solely by the
response of technology development to direct financial pressures on
providers.
265.
266.
267.
Care, in
panying
268.
269.

See supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
See Eden, The Engineering-IndustrialAccord: Inventing the Technology of Health
MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE, supra note 10, at 58; see also supranote 84 and accomtext.
Cf supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 152 app. D; Eden, supra note 267, at 57.

19861

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

C.

Coverage System

The Medicare prospective payment system creates a certain set
of financial incentives on providers. These incentives are intended to
encourage providers to take a more cost-conscious attitude toward
technology. An alternative to such an incentive system is a "coverage" system, in which the government or other third-party payor

specifies which technologies it will reimburse providers for.270
Under a pure prospective payment system, the provider is reim-

bursed up to a set amount regardless of the technologies it provides
to a patient. 27 1 The choice of which technologies to provide is not
dictated by the third-party payor. Under a coverage system, the
payor only pays for selected technologies. The provider is free to
provide a noncovered technology to a beneficiary, but must either
obtain payment from the patient or some other source, or must ab27 2
sorb the cost itself.
A prospective payment system might be combined with a coverage system. Providers and beneficiaries would be reimbursed a set
amount under the DRG system, but only for certain technologies.
This is nominally the case with Medicare; as mentioned earlier,27 3
the government does impose a type of coverage system on providers
under Part A of Medicare.
Theoretically, however, the prospective payment system obviates the need for a coverage system, at least beyond one that merely
provided assessment information to providers to aid them in identi270. Similarly, the government, and other third-party payors following suit, might reimburse providers in proportion to the net benefit provided by the technology furnished. See
Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 50; Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 504-05
(testimony of the American Association of Retired Persons); Neuhauser, supra note 55, at 37.
In other words, a provider would be paid more for employing a more cost-effective technology than for a less cost-effective one. Implementing such a system would involve a complex
set of rates, based on a sophisticated body of technology assessment data.
271. The same is true under a capitated system such as a health maintenance organization (HMO), but an HMO has incentives to provide different technologies to patients than,
for example, a non-HMO hospital. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
272. If the provider furnishes a Medicare beneficiary with a technology that the provider
knows or has reason to know is not covered, the provider must absorb the cost, unless the
beneficiary also knew or should have known that the technology was not covered-such as if
the provider informed the beneficiary that the technology was not a covered item according
to Medicare coverage policy, or that the contractor has previously refused to pay for the same
technology in similar circumstances-in which case the provider may charge the beneficiary
for the noncovered care. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395pp(b)-(c). If neither the provider nor the
beneficiary knew or had reason to know that the technology was not covered, Medicare will
pay for the technology even though it is not covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a). Although it
remains the law, such a technology-based payment system no longer seems highly relevant to
the Medicare prospective payment system. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
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fying waste. 7 4 Since under prospective payment, providers have an
economic incentive to withhold wasteful technologies from patients,
it is unnecessary for the government to impose additional restrictions on which technologies will be reimbursed. To the extent that
the government believes that providers are overspending on patients
in a particular DRG, the government can simply lower the amount
it pays for care within that DRG, leaving it up to providers to determine which technologies to eliminate. Thus, with the advent of the
prospective payment system, the coverage system's role under
Medicare Part A will likely diminish. 7 5
274. I am grateful to James Blumstein, Timothy Jost and Theodore Marmor for this
observation.
275. Through its Peer Review Organization procedures, see infra notes 375-84 and accompanying text, Medicare can refuse to pay for a specific portion of a DRG charge that is
attributable to a technology not covered by Medicare. See HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION MANUAL 59 (1985). Aside from the arguable
redundance of this approach, given the cost-cutting incentives of the prospective payment
system, surveillance of the specific technologies furnished patients by providers is hampered
by the Medicare reporting system. Medicare claim forms require only limited information
about the specific treatment provided to patients; the thrust of the form is to provide diagnostic information for verification of the patient's DRG assignment.
The principal and up to four secondary diagnoses are required to be disclosed on the
claims form, along with the principal and two other "procedures." But the term "procedures" is limited to surgical interventions, broadly defined to include "incision, excision, amputation, introduction, repair, destructions, endoscopy, suture, and manipulation." HEALTH
CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE INTERMEDIARY MANUAL § 3670 (1985)
Accordingly, information about nonsurgical and secondary surgical technologies would only
appear on the patient's actual medical record, which is not routinely submitted to contractors
as part of the claims procedure. Interview with Barbara DeCaeser, R.N., Professional Relations, University Hospitals, Cleveland, Ohio; Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 14548; Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Finance Administration, Medicare Program: Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal
Year 1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,369 (1985).
The medical record is reviewed by the PRO in certain cases, such as in a random sample
of a percentage of all claims, and in 50% of all claims for outlier payments. Requiring PRO's
or contractors to review all medical records, or requiring a much greater amount of detail on
claims forms, might facilitate a stronger coverage policy, but would substantially increase
administrative burdens and costs. Indeed, HCFA seems to be moving in the opposite direction. It recently authorized PRO's to reduce the percentage of outlier cases reviewed from
100% to 50%. See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,673 (1985). One method that Medicare uses to detect
specific technologies under its combined coverage-prospective payment system is to assign
specific DRGs for specific technologies; for example, DRG 355 is a non-radical hysterectomy
(age less than 70). See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,414 (1985). Only some technologies are treated this
way, since making reimbursement contingent on the technology provided to the beneficiary
deviates from the general diagnosis-based approach of the DRG system. A payment system
entirely based on technologies would resemble a rate-setting system rather than a prospective
payment system.
Coverage systems continue to be important for private third-party payors such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, see Hellinger, supra note 58, at 38, and commercial insurers, see, eg.,
Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ga. 1983) that have not yet adopted a
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D.

Restrictions on Acquisition of Technology

Reimbursement and coverage programs attempt to restrict
waste by discouraging the use of certain technologies, either those
that the provider chooses not to furnish patients under a reimbursement system, or those that a third-party payor decides should not
be reimbursed for as a matter of coverage policy. An alternative to
restricting the use of technologies is restricting their acquisition by
providers. One approach is to require government approval before
a technology can be purchased by a provider. This is generally the
approach taken by certificate-of-need (CON) laws."7 6 While the
CON program appears to have reduced the growth in the number
of hospital beds, however, it does not appear substantially to have
reduced the acquisition of new technology by providers.2 77 The ineffectiveness of the CON program may be attributable to the technological imperative2 7 8 and to the fact that the program is run by

those local interests most likely to benefit from the acquisition of
new technology.27 9
prospective payment or capitated reimbursement system. In the case of private third-party
payors, the scope of coverage is defined by the contract of insurance between the payor and
the beneficiary. Under Medicare, coverage is dictated by statute and administrative interpretation. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text. In the past, competitive pressures
have made commercial insurers reluctant to deny coverage unless the technology was explicitly excluded by the terms of the contract. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 37. Current cost
control objectives may reverse this tendency. Medicare coverage policy also remains a critical cost containment tool under Part B of Medicare, since Medicare physician payments
continue to be made under the old fee-for-service system.
276. Pursuant to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. 300(k)-(m), the Certificate-of-Need (CON) program is run by the states as a prerequisite to receipt of federal health resource development funds. Although certain details vary
from state to state, most purchases of major medical equipment or changes in the number of
hospital beds must be approved by a state Health Planning and Development Agency, acting
upon the recommendations of the local or area wide Health Systems Agency.
277. Despite the decrease in the growth rate of hospital beds, there has been an increase
in the ratio of capital equipment to beds. See Salkever & Bice, Hospital Cetrificate-of-Need
Controls:Impact on Investment, Costs and Use (1979), cited in K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra
note 1, at 41 n.10. One example of the inability of the CON laws to curb technology is the
acquisition of CT scanners in Dade County, Florida. See Iglehart, supranote 15, at 32-33. In
1974, the Health Systems Agency recommended a total of three CT scanners for the area. By
1977, however, there were seven, including one in an ambulatory care center and one in a
physician's office-both outside the jurisdiction of the CON laws. Id. For a general critique
of the CON program, see OTA STRATAGIEs, supra note 4, at 161; Maloney & Rogers, supra
note 2, at 1415.
278. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
279. See Cohen, Information Needs in the Public Sector, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 90, at 19 (CON program fails because "[L]ocal people who get the benefit from
any capital project, including new technology, decide whether they should have access to it.
Their decision that they 'need' it triggers an unlimited flow of dollars into that area to pay for
the costs.... We have a nonoperative constraint due to circularity.").
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Another approach to restricting the acquisition, rather than the
use, of technology is to limit the amount of capital expenditures by
providers. In contrast to the CON program, a capital expenditure
restraint limits how much providers may spend, but not what they
may purchase. Capital expenditures can be limited either directly
by the enactment of a legal ceiling, or indirectly through a reimbursement system. For example, Congress has mandated that beginning in 1986, Medicare-which currently fully reimburses
providers for capital expenditures on behalf of Medicare patients2 80
-must instead restrict capital reimbursement to a percentage of actual provider expenditures.2 8 ' If the reimbursement rate for capital
expenditures is low enough and the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries out of a provider's total patient population remains high
enough, this could be a significant deterrent to technology
acquisition.
However, it is not clear that the Medicare capital expenditure
limitation will operate to reduce costs at least not beyond the short
run; such limits tend to discourage providers from acquiring technologies with high initial capital costs even though the technology
28 2
would be likely to reduce future capital or operating costs.
Moreover, providers might purchase wasteful technologies with low
initial acquisition costs even if the technology were not likely to be
the most cost-effective technology later on.
E. Diffusion Controls
A more direct method of implementing controls on waste is to
prevent wasteful technology from being disseminated in the first
place. In the case of drugs and medical devices, this is the system
imposed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.283
Before a new drug or device may be introduced into interstate commerce, the manufacturer must persuade the Food and Drug Admin280. Providers are reimbursed for capital expenditures on what is called a straight passthrough basis; reimbursement is determined by the proportion of the provider's capital expenditures that corresponds to the proportion of their patients who are Medicare beneficiaries. The same system operates under Medicaid. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL, Part I, § 2200.1 (1985); OTA
MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 102-04 (1984).
281. Capital expenditure restrictions have been advocated as a means of controlling
health care costs. See Hearingson HR. 5496, supra note 108, at 504 (testimony of American
Association of Retired Persons); Whitted, Medical Technology Diffusion and its Effect on the
Modern Hospital, 6 HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV. 45, 52 (1981).

282. See Whitted, supra note 281, at 52.
283. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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istration (FDA) that it is safe and effective.2 84 But the system of
controls on drugs and devices is incomplete. For example, the
FDA cannot control the use of drugs and devices once they are
approved.2 85 Furthermore, the FDA has generally interpreted its
statutory mandate to preclude a comparison of the safety or effectiveness of one product with another,2 86 or any consideration of
cost. 2 87 Any attempt to expand the scope of the agency's authority
in these directions would probably encounter fatal opposition from
drug and device manufacturers.2 8 8
Furthermore, the FDA has no direct jurisdiction over surgical
and medical technologies.28 9 As mentioned above,2 90 there are difficulties in identifying wasteful surgical and medical technologies,
and even if they could be identified, it would be even more difficult
to control their use. 29 1 This would entail a monitoring system that
would detect and penalize unapproved changes in non-marketed
technologies that are provided in the relative privacy of the doctor's
office or the operating room. The administrative costs of an effective surveillance system, even if one could be designed, are likely to
outweigh any reductions in waste that would be achieved.
As an alternative to controlling the dissemination of new tech284. Far more new technologies would be diffused if the government were required to
show that a new technology was not safe and effective in order to prevent its being marketed.
Waste control, in the sense of protecting the public from unsafe and ineffective technologies,
would thus be sacrificed in favor of promoting innovation. This is essentially the system that
is imposed on food additives under the Act. Cf. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(S) (definition of food
additive).
285. See Hellinger, supranote 58, at 36. The FDA can only control the use of drugs and
devices after they are approved for marketing through their labelling, which the agency reviews and approves. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6). If a manufacturer wishes to promote an approved
drug for a purpose not set forth in the approved labelling, it must obtain the FDA's approval
for a change in the labelling. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3). While a physician is not liable under
the Act for using or prescribing a drug or device in a manner not provided for in the labelling,
doing so risks malpractice liability. See; eg., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332,
181 N.W.2d 882 (1970).
286. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
287. See Gewecke & Weisbrod, ClinicalEvaluation vi Economic Evaluation:The Case of
a New Drug, 20 MED. CARE 821 (1982); K. WARNER & B. LUcE, supra note 1, at 198.
288. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of the National
Center for Health Care Technology). For a model and critique of such an expanded role for
the FDA, see OTA IMPLICATIONS, supranote 73, at 92-98. See also K. WARNER & B. LUCE,
supra note 1, at 200 (objecting to discouraging innovation by requiring manufacturers to
submit expensive cost-effectiveness data to the FDA).
289. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
291. For a proposal to do so, see Note, supra note Ill, at 560 n.53. Requiring prior
approval of surgical and medical technologies involves such problems as distinguishing between old and new technologies to determine which require approval. See id. at 568, n.80.
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nologies to reduce waste, the government might instead attempt to
control their development. A system that precluded the development of wasteful technologies would alleviate later battles over their

dissemination, reimbursement, or provision to patients. It would
also save sponsors some research and development expenses and, by
reducing uncertainty as to which technologies the government
would later approve, perhaps reduce the cost of research-and-development capital.
Controls on development to an extent are embodied in the present system: the FDA must give prior approval before a new drug or
device may be shipped in interstate commerce for purposes of being
tested in humans.29 2 If the agency does not believe that the proposed tests could show that the technology is safe and effective, it
can delay or prohibit the testing, thus arresting the technology prior
to the sponsor's request for FDA permission to disseminate it for
commercial use.29 3 Conceivably the government might broaden the
current system to embrace medical and surgical technologies as well
as drugs and devices, and it might even institute a monitoring system that required it to be notified of and approve in advance any
animal or even laboratory testing of technologies for human use,
thus pushing the government's go/no-go decision even farther
back.2 94 Aside from the overwhelming practical difficulties and cost
of instituting and enforcing such a system, however, the intrusion of
the government at such an early stage of development, where the
future risks, costs and benefits of the technology are so unpredictable, is likely to result in highly arbitrary restrictions on technology
development that preclude nonwasteful technologies before their
benefits can be established.
F.

Direct Control of Health Care

The most extreme form of government control of waste would
be for some agency to mandate detailed rules of medical practice as
a prerequisite for reimbursement under any government health care
program. These rules would specify the technologies to be used and
the circumstances and manner in which they would be employed.
292. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i).
293. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(d)(6) (FDA denial of permission for investigation that is not
reasonable to establish safety and effectiveness).
294. Due to fear of the unknown, such an early warning system was in fact imposed,
largely on a voluntary basis, on research on recombitant DNA technology. See Department
of Health & Human Services, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,266 (1984).
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This "protocol" approach has been severely criticised by organized
medicine and others. 295 As with the approach of requiring prior
approval of technologies, it raises insuperable political policing
problems.
G.

Shortcomings of the CurrentApproach

The present prospective payment system rewards providers who
reduce their technology costs per patient admission. This can be
done in a number of ways. Providers can eliminate unsafe or ineffective technologies and can substitute cheaper, more cost-effective
technologies for more expensive, less cost-effective ones. Thus far,
providers would remain within the boundaries of the controls on
waste proposed in Section III. But the system also penalizes providers who furnish technologies that increase their costs per admission, even if the technologies are safer or more effective than a
cheaper alternative.2 9 6 In short, prospective payment is not neutral
with regard to technology. 297 It creates a distinct incentive in favor
295. See, eg., Moloney & Rogers, supra note 2, at 1415 (protocol approach inappropriate
because clinical circumstances cannot be adequately foreseen). This resistance partially explains why a system of national health insurance, with an attendant risk that the government
would attempt to dictate medical practices to providers, has not been adopted in the United
States. Cf.Altman & Blendon, supra note 20, at 15 (national health insurance not a viable
U.S. option for controlling costs in the foreseeable future).
296. The exception might be providers such as health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) that furnish hospitalization and primary care, as well as being insurers of their subscribers. They might be willing to incur a higher cost for one admission to avoid the need for
or to reduce the cost of future care, assuming that the discounted value of the savings were
greater than the present value of the additional current expenditure. Providers that are not
also insurers would have no comparable incentive under prospective payment to provide
more expensive present care to avoid future expenditures, since they would not have the same
expectation as an HMO that the patient would return to the same provider or that the savings
in care would be in the form of reduced expenditures for a future admission rather than, say,
in the form of better general health status or reduced physician office visits. In short, the
utility of the more expensive care would be an externality for the non-HMO provider under
the present system.
The only situation in which the non-HMO provider has an incentive to furnish more
expensive care to reduce future costs for the same patient is when, in the absence of the more
expensive care, the patient will end up being readmitted to the same hospital within a prescribed time for the same diagnosis. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 47. This is
deemed a premature discharge and readmission, and Medicare regulations prevent the provider from being paid an additional fee for the readmission. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.48.
297. A number of commentators recognize that prospective payment only encourages a
free market approach toward wasteful technologies to the extent the payment system is neutral, providing neither positive nor negative incentive. See Moloney & Rogers, supra note 2,
at 1416-17; Schroeder, supra note 82, at 638; PROPAC 1985, supra note 1,at 24,465. Propac
states, for example, that "[t]he Medicare prospective payment system should have an unbiased effect on technological advancement. Prospective payment levels should not inhibit the
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of cost-reducing technologies and against cost-increasing ones. 2 9 8
Yet as suggested earlier,2 99 a technology is not wasteful merely
because it increases costs. Whether or not it is wasteful depends on
the relationship between the increase in cost and the increase in
benefit it produces, the relative costs and benefits of alternative technologies, and the perspective of the assessment. A technology is not
necessary wasteful even from a societal perspective merely because
it increases the cost per patient admission.3c° For example, under
prospective payment, a hospital has no incentive to provide a technology that increases short run costs (i.e., costs per admission), even

though it may significantly decrease the cost to patients, other providers, and society in the long run.3 ° ' Thus, a hospital (other than
one run by an HMO) 3°2 has no incentive to provide a patient with a
development or diffusion of new technologies and practices, nor should payment levels result
in their inappropriate adoption." Id.
In a free market, a provider might increase the quality of its product, and its cost, and
expect to recover the additional cost by charging a higher price. This is foreclosed by the set
fee-per-admission aspect of prospective payment (unless the patient can be charged a premium above the third-party payment). The system can only respond to cost-increasing technologies by increasing the amount of payment for the relevant DRGs, by relaxing the rules
for patients to qualify for outlier status, or by increasing DRG weights across-the-board to
reflect technology cost increases-a so-called "update factor."
To an extent, these adjustments are being made. For example, the Health Care Finance
Administration (HCFA) adopted a 1.5% addition to the annual DRG update factor (known
as the policy target adjustment factor) for 1986, stating: "Certain technological changes, especially those related to the adoption of new product (with accompanying labor and nonlabor
inputs), increase the operating cost of treating illness but also improve health status commensurately. We believe the prospective payment rates should recognize new science and technology factors, which are cost-increasing, but also enhance health status. This should provide
positive incentives for continued technological and scientific excellence." HCFA, Medicare
Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year
1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,707 (1985). To place this 1.5% increase in perspective,
the annual historical increase in health care costs attributable to the increased use of technology or to the use of new technologies has been between 4% and 5%. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 182-83.
298. See PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,465; HCFA, Medicare Program; Changes to
the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1986 Rates; Proposed
Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,443 (1985); OTA COMPaTITION, supra note 67, at 19. These
incentives are also clear to providers. For example, one of the largest chains of for-profit
hospitals in the country, Humana, reports that it is seeking technologies that "increase efficiency, decrease costs, and are safe and efficacious." Hearingon H.R. 5496, supranote 108, at
536 (testimony of Frank E. Samuel).
299. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
300. See PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,465 (adjustment may be needed in prospective payment system to encourage adoption of technologies "more costly on a per admission
basis but 'cost-effective' when considered from a broader health care system perspective over
a longer period of time").
301. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 184.
302. See supra note 296.
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more expensive but better quality prosthesis, even if it is more cost30 3
effective in the long run by having a longer useful life.
The inherent bias of the prospective payment system leads to a
more fundamental problem: it creates a conflict of interest between
provider and patient by encouraging providers to withhold cost-increasing technology from patients, thus placing the provider's own
financial interests above the health interests of patients. 3 1 Since
prospective payment under Medicare currently applies only to hospital inpatient care and not to office care by physicians, 30 5 physicians now have little direct financial incentive to side with the
hospital, and therefore less of a conflict of interest with the pa303. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 184. A similar case is the implantable
infusion pump that administers chemotherapeutic agents automatically into patients with
liver cancer. Although the cost-per-patient is $3,000, it may be more cost-effective than conventional chemotherapy by avoiding the cost of repeated hospital admissions. See Hearingon
H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 537 (testimony of Frank E. Samuel). Another consequence of
prospective payment is to encourage providers to avoid admitting, or to transfer, more seriously ill patients who are likely to require more care than others. One commentator describes
as follows the analogous situation in Canada where physicians are paid a set fee per patient
visit regardless of the care provided: "Being paid the same amount to do a vaccination as to
treat a case of jaundice, the Canadian general practitioner vaccinates like crazy and refers
jaundice to an internist, who refers the case to a gastroenterologist, who refers it to a liver
specialist, who, having no one to refer it to, emigrates to the United States." Fisher, supra
note 73, at 33 (1983).
304. See, eg., Moloney & Rogers supra note 2, at 1418 (advocating rewarding providers
for "technology restraint"). In an article in a hospital journal recommending that hospitals
establish policies on technology in response to cost-containment pressures, for example, hospitals are advised to "cost-out" a technology and to "assess its incremental effect on the
profitability of services." Goodhart, Technological.AcquisitionPoses Thorny Dilemma to Hospitals, 58 Hosp. 34, 38 (1984). The recommendations are silent on assessing the effect of
technology on quality of care.
It should be noted that, as pointed out by Capron and Brock, in this Symposium, the
previous fee-for-service system also created a conflict of interest between patients and providers. Under the old system, however, it was in the provider's economic interest to provide
more care than what might have been in a patient's interest, since the more care provided, the
more the provider was paid. Under a prospective payment or capitated system, it is in the
provider's economic interest to provide less care than might be in the patient's interest, in
order to pocket the difference between the cost of the care furnished the patient and the
amount of the prospective or capitated payment.
305. Outpatient care by hospitals is also covered under Part B, and therefore is also excluded from prospective payment coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(B) (scope of benefits
under Medicare Part B includes "medical and other health services"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(s)(2)(B) ("medical and other health services" defined to include outpatient services).
Physicians continue to be reimbursed under Medicare on a "reasonable charge" basis, which
is the lowest of several alternatives, including the physician's customary charge, the prevailing charge in the locality, and the actual charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.501, 405.502. Physician reimbursement has been frozen at 1984 levels in order to
control costs. See Emergency Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-107, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1985).
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tient.3 ° 6 Nevertheless, hospitals are seeking ways to put pressure

on physicians to be cost-conscious, such as monitoring physician
practices to identify those prone to "overspend" on patients.3" 7
Furthermore, hospitals are devising more formal financial arrangements with physicians to encourage them to act in the hospital's
best interests. These include joint ventures, such as MeSH plans,
the object of which is to have physicians share with hospitals the
financial risks and benefits of providing hospital care to their
patients.30 8
Consideration is also being given to extending prospective pay30 9 to physicians. 3 10
ment, or systems that create similar incentives,
306. See Dunlop, supra note 73, at 44 (individual physicians, dealing with individual patients, cannot be expected to consider costs of care). In addition to pressures directly stemming from prospective payment systems, physicians and hospitals are prone to conflict in a
number of areas. See Greer, supra note 39, at 137. In contrast to physicians who will opt for
a closed staff at a hospital at which they have privileges to admit and tend to patients, for
example, the hospital itself has an interest in maintaining "open staffs," thereby creating a
larger number of physicians to form the hospital's patient-referral pool. See Spivey, The Relation Between HospitalManagement and MedicalStaff Under a Prospective-PaymentSystem,
310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984 (1984). Physicians and hospitals also compete with each other,
such as by establishing outpatient care facilities. See id; Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of
Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985).
307. At present, the objective seems to be limited to confronting the doctor with his profligate behavior, and perhaps allowing him to be pressured by his peers into changing his
practice habits, but Morreim speculates that hospitals may attempt to revoke admitting privileges of those who are unrepentent or unable to reform. See Morreim, supra note 17, at 34.
This could be a powerful threat to a physician, who owes an "economically essential allegiance to the hospital, without which he cannot adequately treat the most seriously ill patients." Id. at 32. Morreim notes that this tactic so far has not been tested in the courts.
308. For a description of such arrangements, see id. at 34. Morreim attributes them to a
desire to keep quality-of-care considerations within economic restraints, and suggests that the
resulting conflict of interest between physicians and their patients can be avoided by requiring
physicians to disclose to their patients the physician's financial interest in the provider. See id.
For a critique of this approach, see infra note 334-37 and accompanying text.
309. Physicians also have financial incentives to reduce patient care under capitation systems where the physician is paid a flat rate per patient for a set time period, such as one
month or one year. This is the system under which health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) operate, and they can be expected to place physicians in the same conflicts of interest with their patients as prospective payment, especially where the HMO is run by the physicians so that they have a direct financial stake in it, or where the physician staff is
remunerated in part in proportion to the income or profit of the organization. See Stern, Will
the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contractbe Extended to Health Maintenance Organizations?,
11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 12, 13 (1983):
It is expected by the members that in the exercise of such judgment [as to which, if
any, health care services are vital to the interest of the member at that time] by the
physician/agent, the interest of the patient, rather than the costs to the HMO, is the
paramount concern of the decision-maker. The plan, on the other hand, perceives
that it has a concurrent duty to its overall membership [and possibly its investors]
to preserve its resources by avoiding the provision of unnecessary and inappropriate
services.... How can an interested director (of an HMO) who is also a provider
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Unlike alternative methods of controlling the cost of physician care
for Medicare patients, such as discounted service arrangements or
government-imposed fee-for-service rates, 311 reimbursing physicians
under a prospective payment system would create the same conflictpatient as between hospital and
of-interest between physician and3 12
patient under the present system.
The shortcoming of this result is all the more evident in light of
the fiduciary duty traditionally imposed on physicians and hospitals

in relations with their patients.313 The fiduciary relationship tranadequately fulfill his or her dual obligation to both the company [and its investors]
and to the HMO's enrollees he or she treats?
310. See, eg., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES: STRATEGIES FOR MEDICARE

(1986).

311. Physicians might refuse to accept Medicare patients if the government imposed flat
fee-for-service rates, but increased competition between growing numbers of physicians
should make corrective steps such as mandatory assignment unnecessary.
312. Warner and Luce observe that the cost of care is irrelevant to physicians paid on a
fee-for-service basis to treat well-insured patients, and a "curiosity" to salaried physicians
who treat the same type of patients, such as physicians on the staffs of a health maintenance
organization. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 178-79: "Only if the physician
works within the context of prepayment-that is, if he or she bears financial liability for the
use of resources--does the professional concern with cost-effectiveness begin to approach the
social concern." Id at 179. At that point, Warner and Luce observe, the physician is in a
hopeless position:
A physician's primary responsibility is to weigh allthe costs and benefits of a
procedure to the patient. If a particular test has a small probability of improving the
diagnosis that could affect case management, the physician's responsibility to the
patient is to compare that potential benefit with the cost to the patient-out-ofpocket costs, time lost, pain, and so on.... From society's perspective, social costs
may exceed social benefit; but asking the physician to adhere to the social standards
of desirability requests him or her to deviate from the patient's best interests. In
effect, the physician is placed in the untenable position of violating either the patient's or society's interests.
Id. (emphasis in original).
313. Many cases have recognized the fiduciary relationship between physicians and their
patients. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) cerL denied, 409
U.S. 1064; Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F.Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio
1965); State ex rel. McCloud v Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1978). Cases recognizing a
fiduciary relationship between hospitals and their patients include Gopaul v. Herrick Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1005, 113 Cal. Rptr. 811,813 (1974) and Grodjesk v. Jersey
City Med. Center, 135 N.J. Super. 393, 413, 343 A.2d 489, 500 (1975). Hospitals are also
held to have a fiduciary duty to the public to maintain competent staff; the issue arises in
challenges by physicians to denials of staff privileges. See, eg., Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J.
113, 459 A.2d 680 (1983). In Nutty v. Jewish Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ill. 1983), the
only federal court that appears to have considered the issue stopped short of clearly recognizing a fiduciary relationship between a hospital and a patient-in Nutty, a patient complaining
of malpractice on the part of hospital nursing staff and interns- on the ground that the
physician-patient relationship differs from that of a nurse- or intern-patient relationship.
Nutty, 571 F. Supp. at 1052-53. "While physicians clearly have a fiduciary relationship with
their patients," the court stated, "the relationship between a hospital and a patient is more
difficult to characterize." Id. at 1052. Nevertheless, due to the "superiority of knowledge of
the hospital staff, and the confidence and trust which patients must place in nurses and in-
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scends the ordinary duty to act reasonably toward another; it requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiary, and
to avoid placing the fiduciary's interests above those of the beneficiary.314 Yet that is precisely the provider behavior that is encouraged by prospective payment systems. To draw an analogy
with corporate directors, who owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders
to maximize the value of shareholder equity in the corporation, it
terns," id. at 1053, the court held that, as the result of assurances to the plaintiff by nurses
and interns that his treatment was proper, the hospital was estopped from asserting that the
statute of limitations had run on plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1054. Cf. Tunkl v. Regents, 60 Cal.
2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (voiding waiver of hospital liability for negligence, inter alia, on basis of hospital's relationship to patient). Insurers have also been
deemed by the courts to owe fiduciary duties to their policy-holders. See Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1104, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (as fiduciary, insurer must act
in "utmost good faith" and must afford the interests of the policy-holder "at least as much
consideration as it gives to its own interest"); Stern, supra note 309, at 14.
314. The fiduciary need not elevate the beneficiary's interests above all others, however.
For example, despite owing a fiduciary duty to the patient, a physician may be liable if, in
upholding the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship, he fails to disclose information necessary to protect the health of third parties. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
Similar issues of fiduciary duty arise in the case of publicly held corporations, where the
issue is whether the corporate directors may divert funds to philanthropic causes without
violating their fiduciary duty to shareholders. Some courts have held the directors' action to
be protected by the so-called "business judgment rule," on the ground that, although the
value of shareholder equity thereby may have been reduced in the short term, the action was
calculated to produce long-term maximization of equity value by enhancing the corporate
image or the political and social climate in which the corporation does business. See eg.,
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow,
13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed per curiam, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). Other courts
have refused to permit diversion of corporate wealth under these circumstances. See, eg.,
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The issue is unsettled,
with the American Law Institute and some state statutes adopting the view that philanthropic types of corporate activity do not violate fiduciary obligations of directors. See AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1984); Pa. Bus. Corp. Law § 408B, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 1408B (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). This view may be justified insofar as disgruntled shareholders can vote out a board of directors that takes action contrary to the shareholders' interests, and insofar as the value of shares in states with pro-philanthropy statutes
can be discounted appropriately, although this only benefits future investors. (I am indebted
to Ronald Coffey for these observations.)
One aspect of the law is clear, though: if a corporate fiduciary has a conflict of interest
with shareholders, he is not protected by the business judgement rule and instead bears a
heavy burden of demonstrating that his action is inherently fair to shareholders. See, eg.,
Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Iowa 1979); Karris v. Water
Tower Trust & Sav. Bank, 389 N.E.2d 1359, 1369, 27 Il1. Dec. 951 (1979); Schreiber v.
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978); Adelmnan v. Conottie Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779,
215 Va. 782 (1975). For a general discussion of fiduciary law, see Anderson, Conflicts of
Interest: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25 UCLA L. REv.738 (1978); Kaplan,
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976);
Scott, The Fiduciary Principle,37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949).
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would be as if directors were compensated in proportion to the diminution of the value of shareholders' equity that they achieved.3 15
In line with the recent rise of the doctrine of informed consent,
it might be argued that the fiduciary obligation of health care providers is merely a misguided relic of paternalism that should be discarded under the new regime of patient autonomy. Patients are
entitled to be treated as intelligent, choosing adults, rather than as
incompetents for whom health care choices must be made by professionals. A fiduciary relationship between patient and provider, it
might be said, undermines the patient's independence and freedom
of choice.
This argument fails for several reasons. First, a fiduciary obligation on health care providers requires them to act in the best interests of the patient, not instead of or in derogation of the patient's
wishes. Advocates of patient autonomy would no doubt insist that
informed health care choices made by patients are in the patient's
best interests. The provider's fiduciary duties would therefore require it to respect and facilitate this patient decisionmaking. Furthermore, the fiduciary obligations on health care providers, like
those on corporate and other fiduciaries, are not mere historical artifacts. These special duties are mandated by factors inherent in the
circumstances that give rise to the fiduciary relationship. First, the
fiduciary is necessarily invested with a substantial degree of discretion, 3 16 and must exercise it in a manner that precludes active supervision by the beneficiary.3 17 Thus, corporate officers and
directors must make day-to-day management decisions without
consulting corporate shareholders. Similarly, due to the complexity, variety and uncertainty of diseases and their treatment, it is not
possible for patients and providers to agree in advance to all of the
details of the treatments that will be provided.31 8 The fiduciary ob315. In contrast to shareholders of a corporation who can vote out of office directors
whose policies they reject, patients are often not in a position to replace their health care
providers with others who might be more willing to provide better care. Even if patients
possessed sufficient information to realize that they were being denied proper care, those in
extremis would not have the time to shop around, and only the wealthy might be able to
afford to pay extra to induce another provider to supply more care. In other respects, furthermore, patients are at a disadvantage in dealing with conflicts of interest on the part of
hospitals and physicians compared to corporate shareholders; for example, patients lack an
effective watchdog such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the elaborate system of rules that govern corporate activity in the shareholders' interest.
316. See Anderson, supra note 311, at 757 n.57; Weinrib, The FiduciaryObligation,25 U.
TORONTo L.J. 1 (1975).
317. See Anderson, supra note 311, at 757-61.
318. The fiduciary relationship is the product of assent between the parties, here mani-
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ligation on the provider mandates that he act in the patient's interest in regard to the aspects of treatment that must be left up to
provider discretion.
Fiduciary obligations also derive from the inherent inability of
the beneficiary to possess the knowledge and expertise of the fiduci-

ary. Physicians and other health care professionals have undergone
years of specialized training to prepare them for the subtleties, complexity and diversity of modem medicine. Their judgments cannot
be duplicated by laymen; even if the provider and patient discussed
every step of treatment, the patient would still be handicapped in
guiding the behavior of the physician by a lack of knowledge and
expertise. 31 9 A reimbursement system that disturbs the traditional
fested by the initiation of the provider-patient relationship. While the doctrine of informed
consent requires the provider to obtain patient assent to the specifies of treatment to the
greatest possible extent, some situations preclude the provider from obtaining patient consent
to every element of the provider's actions; instead, the provider is obligated to describe the
options only in relatively general terms. For example, it would be unusual for a surgeon to
explain and obtain consent for every single step of an operation.
319. See Greenberg, Demand, Supply, and Information in Health Care and Other Industries, in INCENTIVES VERSUS CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 96
(J. Meyer ed. 1985). This is a serious problem with efforts to control health care costs by
relying on consumer behavior under market-like conditions. It might be suggested that, if
patients feel that providers are encouraged to withhold patient benefits under prospective
payment, patients can bargain with providers for greater benefits. But this presupposes that
patients are in a position to observe and accurately evaluate provider behavior, which is not
the case. Furthermore, third-party insurers, rather than patients, typically are in the bargaining position. Yet as discussed earlier, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, their
assessment of costs and benefits, hence their bargaining behavior, is based on a different perspective than the patient's. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the "price" agreed upon
by third-party payors and providers will be the same that would be arrived at by providers
and patients.
One approach to giving patients a greater economic stake in their health care purchases in
order to encourage more prudent buying is to increase their insurance premiums. See Sisk,
Effects of Increased Competition in Health Care on the Use and Innovation of Medical Technology, 9 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 21, 22-23 (1984). Another suggestion for reducing the
discrepancies between patient/provider and third-party payor/provider bargaining outcomes
is to require patients to pay for a substantial portion of the cost of care before the third-party
payments begin. See id. at 22-23. See generally A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 67; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A PRIMER ON COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CONTAING

HEALTH CARE COSTS (1982); OTA COMPETITION, supra note 66; Feldstein, A New Approach to National Health Insurance, 23 PUBLIC INTEREST 93 (1971).
Co-payment is already a feature of the Medicare system and of most insurance plans. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395e (1983); 50 Fed. Reg. 39,940 (1985). In fiscal year 1986, for example,
Medicare beneficiaries will be required to pay an annual deductible of $492, and a daily coinsurance amount for each day they are hospitalized beyond 60 days. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,940
(1985). The coinsurance rates are $123 per day for each day of hospitalization between 61 and
90 days, and $246 per day for each day between 91 and 100 days. Id. These rates have
increased substantially in recent years. In fiscal year 1976, for example, the deductible was
only $104. 42 C.F.R. § 409.82(b) (1985). Nevertheless, they do not appear to have had a
significant impact on health care costs, in part because Medicare beneficiaries often purchase
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fiduciary relationship by introducing a conflict of interest between
provider and patient must therefore be viewed with considerable
*320
misgivings.

H. PressuresTo Hold the Line At Waste
1. ProfessionalEthics
The extent, if any, to which providers submit to the pressures to
deny patients nonwasteful, cost-increasing care depends on whether

these pressures are outweighed by counterpressures to act strictly in
patients' interests. One of the most important of these counterpressures is the ethics of the medical profession, inculcated in physicians
by their medical training. 32 1 The Principles of Medical Ethics of
private insurance to cover their deductible and coinsurance payments. Further increases in
these amounts might be more effective at inducing patients to control their own health care
costs, but perhaps not without undermining the fundamental objectives of the Medicare program, which include protecting patients against the costs of health care without impoverishing them. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 23, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1943, 1964.
Even if patients were motivated to seek cheaper health care alternatives, it is questionable
whether they possess sufficient bargaining power to affect prices significantly. In Tunkl v.
Regents, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the court refused to uphold a
release from liability signed by a patient in part on the ground that the patient lacked equal
bargaining power with the provider: "As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the
economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possess a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services." Id. at
60 Cal. 2d at 99-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
Finally, one commentator notes that the growth of technology's role in medicine is due in
part to the growth of a better-informed public with higher expectations. See Schroeder, supra
note 16, at 19. This suggests that an increase in patient information, without countervailing
cost pressures such as increased first-party financial responsibility, would actually increase
health care costs.
320. Some approaches to health care cost containment do not create a conflict of interest
between providers and patients. CON laws which limit technology acquisition by providers,
for example, do not reward providers for acquiring less technology than would benefit their
patients. For a discussion of CON laws, see supranotes 276-79 and accompanying text. Coverage decisions, whereby a third-party payor declares in advance of treatment that it will not
reimburse providers for a particular technology, create a conflict only if the provider regards
the technology as non-wasteful for a patient. In this case, the provider has a conflict between
doing what it believes to be in the patient's interest and avoiding the risk of having to absorb
the cost of the technology if the patient is unable to pay. The same is true of rate-setting
systems in which payors limit the amounts they will reimburse providers for a particular
technology, except that the risk to the provider is the risk of having to absorb only the marginal difference between the set rate and the provider's normal price. While providers may not
have a conflict of interest with patients under these approaches, this is not true of the agencies
administering the CON law, the rate setters and the coverage decisionmakers, who may have
to choose between nonwasteful technologies and fiscal imperatives. See, eg., Blumenthal,
supra note 129, at 603 (HCFA has a conflict of interest in assessing technologies because of its
cost control mission).
321. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,443; Mamana, Ethics and Technology: Crossroadsin
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the American Medical Association reflect the physician's primary
duty to the patient:
A physician has a duty to do all that he can for the benefit of his
individual patients without assuming total responsibility for equitable disbursement of society's limited health resources. To expect a physician in the context of his medical practice to
administer governmental priorities in the allocation of scarce
health resources is to create a conflict with the physician's primary responsibility to his patients that would be socially
undesireable.32 2
The Principles also state that the physician's duty to his patients
takes precedence over cost concerns:
While physicians should be conscious of costs and not provide or
prescribe unnecessary services or ancillary facilities, social policy
expects that concern for the care
the patient receives will be the
32 3
physician's first consideration.

It is particularly noteworthy that the Principles direct physicians to
avoid providing patients with "unnecessary" services. While this
term is not defined, it is safe to assume, in light of the emphasis on
the physician's responsibility to his patients, that it is consistent
with the approach to wasteful technology discussed in Section
111.324
Decision Making, 35 TRUSTEE, Jan. 1982, at 33-38; Mulley, The Allocation of Resourcesfor
Medical Intensive Care, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING AcCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABIL-

OF HEALTH SERVICES 255, 301-02 (1983). Dolenc and Doherty regard the ethics of the
medical profession as so compelling that they insist that "[s]urely physicians will not act
against a patient's best interests." Dolenc & Doherty, supra note 261, at 25. They admit,
however, that, as a result of cost control pressures, physicians may withhold technology from
patients where the patients' interests are unclear, or where the benefits of the technology are
marginal. See id.
ITY

322. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2.03 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES].

323. Id. at 2.08.
324. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. The Statement of Patient Rights and
Responsibilities of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is much more ambiguous, stating simply that "[i]ndividuals shall be accorded impartial access to treatment or
accommodations that are available or medically indicated, regardless of ...sources of payment for care." JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, AMH/86: ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS xi (1985). While this arguably prohibits a hospital
from refusing to provide an indigent patient with a medically indicated technology that it
furnishes to those who have insurance or other means of payment, the statement would seem
to allow a hospital to deny all patients a technology that was medically indicated but that did
not result in a net benefit to the hospital.
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2. Legal Pressures
Legal constraints constitute another major impetus for practitioners and providers to furnish nonwasteful but cost-increasing
technology and otherwise to minimize the adverse impact of the
conflict of interest between providers and patients under prospective
payment. The body of law that protects patients and other subjects
in medical experimentation,3 2 5 for instance, exemplifies legal reaction to conflicts of interest between providers and patients. These
laws are arguably necessary because of potential conflict of interest
between what is best for the researcher's patient and what will best
attain his research objective.
No laws appear to have been enacted as yet specifically in response to the conflict of interest created by prospective payment.
While some states are beginning to enact laws prohibiting physicians from engaging in certain activities that create conflicts of interest, these efforts appear to be aimed at fraud and abuse in
connection with state assistance programs rather than at denials of

nonwasteful technology.326 Conceivably, criminal laws aimed specifically at the conflict of interest between providers and patients
325. Federal laws protecting the rights of experimental subjects apply to experiments
conducted at any health care facility receiving federal funds, and to any experiment for the
purpose of obtaining FDA approval to market a drug or medical device. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.101-46.408 (1985); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.48 (1985).
326. See Relman, Editoriak Dealing With Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
749, 750 (1985). Specifically, Michigan law now prohibits referrals to facilities in which the
practitioner has a financial interest, while a similar statute has been adopted in Pennsylvania
but applies only to patients receiving medical assistance from the state. Id. California law
requires disclosure of a financial interest in a free-standing diagnostic facility to which a
patient is being referred, and the legislature is considering enacting a ban on such referrals.
Id. These provisions resemble the general anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions of Medicare
and Medicaid. See Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95142, 91 Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
No reported cases appear to have been brought under these federal provisions against
providers accused of denying nonwasteful technology to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries.
This may be due to the fact that such denials have not occurred or are difficult to detect. But
see Guillot v. Cherry, No. 794371-F, slip op., (E.D. La. 1979) (suit by 7-year-old Medicaid
patient with leukemia against state for denying bone marrow transplant on grounds technology was experimental alleged that state cannot override physician's prescribed treatment regimen; suit settled by state agreeing to pay for technology), cited in Necheles, supra note 230, at
17. The federal provision that comes closest to reaching the conduct in question is the prohibition against giving or receiving remuneration for referring a patient to a facility where
Medicare or Medicaid services are provided or for ordering a Medicare or Medicaid service.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1982). A court might hold that the statute had been violated if a
referring physician were compensated by a provider for helping to hold costs down. However,
if the physician were deemed an employee, such as a salaried physician on an HMO staff, the
statutory exemption for payments to employees of the provider might apply. See id.
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could be enacted,3 27 but since they parallel the civil liabilities already imposed by malpractice law,328 they may not be worth their
transaction costs.

329

a. MalpracticeActions. The fear of malpractice suits is probably the most effective pressure on providers to refrain from denying
nonwasteful technology to patients. Under general standards of
malpractice, a provider may be liable in tort if it fails to give the
patient the care that should be furnished under generally accepted
medical standards.33 ° Moreover, malpractice law essentially takes a
patient point of view: no reported cases have denied a plaintiff's
claim for relief on the ground that, although generally accepted
practice called for a technology to be provided to the patient, the
interests of that patient were overridden by the interests of other
patients or of society. Nor has any case upheld a denial of care on
the ground that the patient's interests were overridden by the interests of providers or of payors. Historically, the law has also been
unsympathetic to the defense to a claim of malpractice that generally accepted practice was not followed because it was too costly for
the provider or payor,33 1 although the defense has yet to be ad327. For example, a federal or state law could prohibit providers from withholding technology from patients for reasons other than those in the patient's direct interest.
328. For a discussion of the role of malpractice law in addressing denial of nonwasteful
technology resulting from a conflict of interest under prospective payment, see infra notes
330-32 and accompanying text.
329. The major advantage criminal laws would offer over patient-initiated damage actions would be enforcement by government agencies, such as state health departments. These
agencies can be expected to possess greater expertise and information than patients, and
therefore to be in a better position to detect improper provider behavior. It is unclear
whether they would be more likely to take a patient perspective than other "watchdog" entities-such as peer review organizations (PROs). See infra notes 375-84 and accompanying
text. If the agency entrusted with enforcing an anti-conflict law is also the agency responsible
for maintaining the fiscal integrity of a health care budget, such as a state health department
or HCFA, it is not likely to consistently take a patient perspective on technology. Even if the
agency does not have a formal budgetary or cost-control function, as an executive government agency it may be responsive to pressure from cost-conscious government officials. To
avoid a conflict of interest, a separate bureaucracy to oversee patient care might be created,
but is likely to be expensive to run, inefficient and difficult to insulate from cost pressures.
Nevertheless, if data show that patients are being denied nonwasteful technology, such a
governmental entity may need to be established.
330. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 185-89 (5th ed. 1984).
331. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941) (hospital liable for injuries to plaintiff after discharging him prematurely due to his inability to
pay); Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (1891) (jury instructed that physician owes indigent
and wealthy patients same degree of care); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937)
(complaint against physician who refused to continue treatment of patient who could not pay
old bills).
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dressed by the courts since the beginning of the current cost containment movement. Malpractice law therefore would be a strong
incentive to a provider to afford patients technologies that had become generally accepted, even if they increased provider costs.
It might be argued that malpractice law is not the bulwark
against the undesirable effects of cost containment described above,
since the basic standard of care applied to providers in malpractice
actions is the standard of care generally accepted by the medical
profession. What is to prevent the medical profession, as a result of
cost containment pressures and the resulting changes in health care
delivery practices, from recognizing the denial of beneficial technologies to patients as accepted practice? In other words, what is to
prevent physicians from concluding that ordering a particular costraising technology for their patients can no longer be justified because, although it provides a net benefit to patients and is the most
cost-effective treatment available, its costs outweigh its benefits
from a non-patient perspective? If this view became sufficiently
widespread to be deemed the generally accepted attitude of the profession, which is certainly the objective of some cost containment
enthusiasts, malpractice law would not ordinarily hold providers liable for denying the technology to patients.
Erosion of generally accepted standards of practice must be prevented in the first instance by the ethics of the medical profession.
The profession will continue to provide patients with non-wasteful
technology so long as physicians practice medicine in the best interests of their patients, and so long as they retain the power to do so.
It is also possible, albeit unlikely, that if this notion of ethical practice changed within the profession, the courts nevertheless would
hold providers to a patient-based standard of care on the theory
that the customs of the profession do not establish an appropriate
standard of care. 32
332. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (malpractice claim for
damages resulting from ophthamalogic practice consistent with generally accepted standard
should not have been dismissed, since generally accepted practice may not be synonymous
with reasonable care). See also The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740
(2nd Cir. 1932) ("Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence;Zbut
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required"). This judicial approach may be subject to the
charge of overreaching, however.
In theory, the legislature can reverse the courts, as long as the standard of the patient's
perspective is not deemed to be constitutionally mandated. The legislative effort is not always
successful, however. One year after the Helling case, for example, the Washington State
legislature passed a law apparently intended to protect health care practitioners from mal-
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One aspect of malpractice law that may exert a particularly
powerful pressure on providers to furnish patients with nonwasteful
technology is the principle of informed consent. Under this principle, providers are required to inform patients of all material alternative technologies and their relative risks, and must obtain the
patient's consent to the specific alternative that is provided.33 3
Two main issues arise in connection with informed consent
under cost control systems such as prospective payment. First, is it
required, or even appropriate, to inform patients of the cost of alternate technologies? Second, should providers inform patients of alternate technologies that the provider does not regard as material
because of their cost?
As to the first issue, it would seem that patients are entitled to
be told the cost of a technology as one of the factors that may influence their choice of treatment. This is rather obvious when the patient is paying for the care; it is less obvious when care is paid for by
a third party, such as by Medicare. When third-party payors and
providers are themselves at financial risk, cost information may be
used contrary to the direct interests of the patient. Providers or
payors may try to pressure patients into accepting less costly technology, even though the third party payment scheme in which the
patient is entitled to participate by statute or by contract arguably
was purchased by the patient or was enacted in part in order to
insulate patients from such cost pressures. It is therefore imperative
that, when cost information is furnished to patients as part of the
informed consent process, patients concurrently be informed of the
extent of their financial obligation, if any, for the various technology
alternatives.
practice liability when they adhered to custom. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1986).
However, the court in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979), ruled that the
statute did not absolve practitioners of malpractice liability on the basis that they adhered to
custom.
333. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) ("We now find, as a part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient, a
similar duty of reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the
dangers inherently and potentially involved."); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014
(1977) (duty to disclose requires a physician to reveal to his patient the nature of the ailment,
the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success and any alternatives available). Another type of legal response to a provider refusing to furnish a nonwasteful technology might be an action by the patient for breach of contract or for breach of fiduciary duty by
the provider. See Stern, supra note 309, at 15 (discussing breach of contract). Breach of
fiduciary duty of an HMO to patients-in essense an action in tort-has been suggested by
Binford. See Binford, Malpracticeand the PrepaidHealth Care Organization,3 WHrrIER L.
REV. 337, 340 (1981).
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The doctrine of informed consent can only be an effective pressure on providers to provide patients with nonwasteful technology if
it is construed further to require providers to inform patients of all
material alternate technologies, including those for which the provider believes it would not be reimbursed or that should not be provided because of their cost. The provider would be liable if it failed
to provide this information and the patient could show that he was
injured as a result of not receiving the alternate technology.3 34 This
would preclude in this country the British practice whereby, in line
with cost control objectives, certain classes of patients such as the
elderly, in need of certain expensive technologies such as kidney dialysis, are not told that the technology exists or that it would keep
them alive.335
Morreim recommends that the conflict between patient and provider be mitigated by requiring the provider to disclose the existence of the conflict to the patient. She does not discuss what a
patient should do when told: "You should be aware that financial
pressures on me create a conflict of interest in which I may not
always act in your best interests." Only a persistent, highly intelligent and probably medically trained patient might be able to discover when the provider was in fact acting contrary to the patient's
interest; the average patient is more likely merely to be unnerved
and confused by the provider's disclosure.
A better approach is to place the burden on the provider to identify and to disclose precisely when and in what way it is failing to
act in the patient's interest. This would help relieve the patient of
the need to detect such instances on his own. It would also serve
several important practical functions. First, it would give those patients who could afford it the option of paying for the technology
themselves. 3 36 Second, it would facilitate patient challenges to prospective denials of treatment or of reimbursement by third-party
334. See Kapp, Legal and EthicalImplicationsof Health CareReimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, (Dec. 1984, at 251; cf Marsh, Health
Care Cost Containmentand the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 177-78 (1985).
335. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HosPrrAL CARE 100-04 (1984). The British do not recognize the doctrine of informed consent.
See Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480
(House of Lords); Grubb, A Survey of Medical MalpracticeLaw in England: Crisis? What
Crisis?, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 75, 98-111 (1985).
336. Even if, in an excess of cost containment zeal, the government attempted to prevent
beneficiaries of government programs from purchasing such technologies themselves (and
this effort survived constitutional challenge), patients should still be entitled to be informed of
the existence of these technologies so that they can purchase the technologies elsewhere if
they so desire.
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payors.33 7 Third, disclosure would encourage providers to recognize when they are proposing to deny patients nonwasteful technologies because of the conflict of interest in which they are placed by
prospective payment. This in turn would aid in preventing inappropriate denial of technologies and in identifying patterns of practice
that compromise quality-of-care so that they could be brought to
public attention.
b. Administrative Processes. A further type of legal constraint
that may affect a Medicare provider's decision to withhold nonwasteful technologies from beneficiaries is the administrative process by which claims and coverage decisions can be disputed. In
theory, a generous opportunity to contest the denial of technologies
to patients might be afforded beneficiaries and other interested parties.33 As noted earlier,3 39 under prospective payment the coverage
system is no longer necessary as a measure to contain costs, except
perhaps as a means of generating technology assessment data for
providers. But the coverage system could be turned into a potent
weapon with which patients could discourage providers from withholding nonwasteful technologies.
Under this approach, a coverage determination would no longer
be an indication that Medicare would or would not pay for a specific technology, since reimbursement would be governed by payments under the DRG system on the basis of the patient's diagnosis.
Instead, a coverage decision would be an atrmation that a particular technology was reasonable and necessary for a patient under certain circumstances, and could not lawfully be withheld by a
Medicare provider. The provider would still be free to reduce care
to patients to create a greater difference between the cost of the care
it provided and the amount of the DRG payment that it received,
but it could not deny a patient a technology that was the subject of
337. In Heckler v. Ringer, the Supreme Court precluded a declaratory judgment action
by the patient prior to receiving the technology and having a claim for reimbursement denied.
104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984). See infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text. In light of this decision, it is important that patients be given the right to have a peer review organization or
provider conduct a prospective review of a proposed denial of technology and for a negative
result to trigger the Medicare appeals process, including, ultimately, judicial review. Provider disclosure to the patient of its intention to withhold a technology on grounds of cost is a
crucial prerequisite to this right of review.
338. Interested parties other than beneficiaries themselves might include next of kin,
providers who disagreed with a claims denial by a contractor or by the Health Care Finance
Administration, sponsors of technologies such as manufacturers, and interest groups such as
patient advocacy and professional organizations.
339. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
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such an affirmative coverage decision by the government.3 " 0 Providers caught between an affirmative coverage determination and a
skimpy DRG could press for an increase in the payment for that
particular DRG. In fact, HCFA and the Prospective Payment
Commission could be required automatically to assess the adequacy
of all DRG payments affected by an affirmative coverage
decision.34 1
Coupled with a robust administrative and appeals procedure,
such a coverage system could be a significant deterrent to denying
non-wasteful technologies to patients. In a number of respects, however, the procedural process afforded patients under the current system is inadequate to achieve this result.
In the first place, the statutory provisions governing which technologies beneficiaries are entitled to receive under Medicare are not
clearly defined. The basic governing provision of law is section
1862(a)(1) of the Social Security Act, which prohibits payment for

items or services that are not "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body part."34 2 The key phrase, "reasonable and
necessary," is not further defined in the statute, in the legislative
history of the statute,34 3 or in the copious Medicare regulations. 34
340. Presumably, technologies with only marginal net benefit would not be required to be
provided under such coverage determinations, since it would not be worth the effort to secure
a coverage decision in their respect.
341. Some patients who are entitled to specific technologies under a coverage policy
might qualify as cost or day outliers, thereby earning the provider an additional payment
beyond the normal DRG amount.
342. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1984 & Supp. 1985). The law also limits payment for
certain specified services, such as dental care, ia § 1395(a)(10).
343. The key Senate report, S. Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1989 (1965), merely
repeats the language of section 1395y(a). It then classifies the rental of a special hospital bed
as an item that might be covered, depending on the circumstances, and describes personal
comfort items and services such as massages and heat lamp treatments, and custodial care, as
items or services that would not be covered.
344. Letter from Peter Bouxsein, Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 11, 1985). The regulations merely
restate the language of the statute. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.3 10(k)(e) (1985); Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974) ('reasonable and necessary" not defined in
regulations). A 1977 communication from HCFA to a fiscal intermediary interprets the statutory phrase to mean that the item or service is generally accepted as safe and effective and
not experimental, or is so proven by authoritative evidence. See HCFA, Part A intermediary
Letter 77-4/Part B intermediary Letter 77-5, MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 128,
152 (1977). In addition, the term is interpreted to mean that the item or service is medically
necessary in the particular case and is furnished in accordance with accepted standards of
medical practice and in an appropriate setting.
At one point in 1980, HCFA considered adopting a formal interpretation of the "reasonable and necessary" language of the Social Security Act that would have permitted national
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Nor has the phrase substantially been interpreted by the courts. 34 5
Therefore, even if there were adequate procedures by which patients
could challenge technology decisions, the lack of clear statutory
standards might preclude patients from successfully contesting the

withholding of nonwasteful technologies.
This could be remedied by defining the governing term "reasonable and necessary" in section 1862(a) of the Social Security Act to
mean, along the lines suggested in Section III, items or services that
are unsafe, ineffective, less safe or effective than alternate items or
services, or not cost-effective from the patient's standpoint. This
definition could be adopted by the Department of Health and
Human Services as an interpretive rule or general statement of policy, or as a formal regulation. It could also be enacted by Congress
as an amendment to the Act, although an amendment does not
seem necessary since this interpretation does not conflict with provisions of the Act and is arguably within the broad rulemaking au346
thority vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Once adopted, this definition would apply to all coverage determinations-including those at the contractor and peer review organization (PRO) levels-to all quality-of-care review programs, and to
all reimbursement decisions.34 7
Even if the statutory standard were interpreted in this fashion,
coverage determinations denying reimbursement for technologies to have been made on the
basis of cost, economic, ethical and social considerations, developed through a series of questions such as: "How does the cost and effectiveness of this item or service compare with that
of available alternatives?" and "are the projected (net) expenditures for this item or service
warranted in view of alternative health care measures that might be undertaken with scarce
resources?" This proposal was never issued for public comment. Letter from Peter Bouxsein, Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Sept. 11, 1985.
345. The first and still key case is Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734 (M.D. La.
1974), in which a Medicare beneficiary challenged a denial of a claim for hospital services.
The claim presumably had been denied on the basis that the services could have been rendered in a less expensive setting than a hospital. After noting that the term "reasonable and
necessary" is nowhere defined, the court stated that, where there is no "direct conflicting
evidence," the opinion of the attending physician "is to be given great weight," and that "the
responsibility for determining what services the patient requires rests primarily with the treating physician." Id. at 737. Accord Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (3rd
Cir. 1974); Westgard v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (D.N.D. 1975); Kuebler v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep't HHS, 579 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 405.
347. The degree to which the definition controlled those activities would depend on
whether it was issued as a binding statutory or regulatory provision or merely as a nonbinding rule or policy. The latter might be easier for a cost-conscious administration to accept,
although this presents some risk that contractors and peer review organizations (discussed
infra at notes 375-84 and accompanying text) would substitute their own interpretations of
waste.
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however, the current procedures for challenging technology decisions under Medicare limit the effectiveness of an affirmative coverage system. This presumably results from the original cost control
thrust of the Medicare coverage system.
The most effective affirmative coverage system would inform the
patient in the hospital that the hospital is proposing to deny the
patient a particular technology on grounds of cost and would then
allow a Medicare beneficiary (or his doctor) immediately to challenge the hospital's proposal. Under current procedures, this challenge would be made, if it could be made at all, to the PRO, which

is staffed in part by health professionals such as doctors and nurses,
and which contracts with the Health Care Finance Administration
(HCFA) to perform certain review functions,34 8 including determining if a technology is reasonable and necessary.34 9 It is not clear
if a PRO would entertain such a challenge by a patient or his physi-

cian. HCFA regulations require a PRO to monitor patient discharges to determine if they are premature, 350 and a patient may

obtain immediate PRO review of a hospital's decision to discharge
him before actually being forced to leave the facility.35 1 But there is
no formal procedure for obtaining immediate PRO review of a hospital decision to deny a particular technology to a patient unless the
hospital's position, if sustained, would entail the patient's
discharge.3 52
Assuming the PRO reviewed and affirmed a prospective chal348. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1-1320c-3. Providers may not obtain Medicare reimbursement unless they have entered into a written agreement of cooperation with a peer review
organization to have this review performed. See 42 C.F.R. § 466.78.
349. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCE
ADmIsTRATION, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION MANUAL § 2060.2 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited as HCFA PRO MANUAL].
350. See id. § 3000. HCFA defines a premature discharge to occur "when a patient is
discharged even though he should have remained in the hospital for further testing or treatment, or was not medically stable at the time of discharge." Id.
351. See id. at § 2080. Medicare has recently proclaimed that beneficiaries must be notified upon admission of their right to obtain PRO review of a discharge request by the hospital. See HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE FEDERAL INTERMEDIARY
BULLETIN No. 86.18 (Feb. 18, 1986).
352. The PRO itself can decide to review a proposed use of a technology for a particular
patient in what is called a "pre-procedure review." See HCFA PRO MANUAL, supra note
349, at § 2050.5. Reflecting the original cost control function of this review, it is limited to
certain specified technologies, such as permanent cardiac pacemaker implantation, that are
thought to be overused. See id. at § 2080. But there is no formal procedure whereby a patient or physician, rather than the PRO itself, can obtain a preprocedure review, and PRO's
do not ordinarily provide an opportunity for such a review. Telephone interview with Barbara DeCaeser, R.N., Professional Affairs Staff; University Hospitals, Cleveland, Ohio (Dec.
20, 1985).
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lenge to the withholding of a technology, the beneficiary 5 3 may request a reconsideration by the PRO.35 4 If upon reconsideration, the
PRO's decision is still adverse to the beneficiary, he can obtain an
administrative review by an administrative law judge (ALJ)355 if the
controversy involves an amount in excess of $200.356 If the AL's
decision is adverse, the beneficiary may obtain a review by an Appeals Council.3 57
This would seem to be a generous, multilevel appeals procedure. However, only limited relief for beneficiaries should be expected from PRO's or from the HCFA Appeals Council. The
outcome of an appeal is likely to favor the provider's position, since
both PRO's and HCFA are obligated in the main to control health
care costs. 358 Given this mission, they are more likely to view the
relationship between costs and benefits of a technology from the
provider's rather than the patient's perspective, even if technically
forbidden from doing so by a redefinition of "reasonable and necessary" in the Medicare statute. Thus it becomes important for bene353. Under Medicare, the hospital itself is made a party to the beneficiary's appeal. See
42 U.S.C. § 1395pp. The hospital therefore would automatically have an opportunity to defend its proposed denial of the technology in question.
354. See 42 C.F.R. § 473.16.
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4. The administrative law judge (AJ) has subpoena powers.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.950. He is bound by regulations and published rulings of the HCFA, but not by publications in HCFA manuals. See 42 C.F.R. § 401.108;
telephone interview with Henry Goldberg, Office of the General Counsel,)ICFA (Nov. 8,
1985). Thus, HCFA coverage determinations, which are published in the manuals but are
neither formal rulings nor regulations, are not binding on AL's.
356. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 473.40, 405.701(c), 405.724; 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. The beneficiary
should be able to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement by the cost of the disputed
technology to the provider. If the beneficiary ultimately wins, the provider will have to provide the technology and absorb the cost within the amount it will be paid under the prospective payment system; unless the additional cost makes the patient a cost-outlier, see supra
notes 263-64 and accompanying text, HCFA will not increase the amount it pays the provider for the beneficiary. Nevertheless, the fact that the provider will have to absorb the cost
of the technology should qualify to establish an amount in controversy, so that the beneficiary
should be able to appeal the PRO reconsideration if the cost of the technology to the provider, if it is ultimately ordered to provide it, would exceed $200. Similarly, the provider
should be entitled to appeal a PRO's decision that the technology is reasonable and necessary,
but only when the delay created by the appeal would not adversely affect the beneficiary's
health status.
357. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 473.40 405.701(c), 405.724; 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. The Appeals
Council has jurisdiction to review an AUL decision when there is an abuse of discretion by the
ALJ, the ALU has committed an error of law, the AI's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, new evidence is submitted with the request for review, or the AI's decision
raises broad issues of policy that may affect the general interest of the public. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 473.46; 20 C.F.R. § 404.970.
358. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 603 (discussing bias of HCFA); see also infra
notes 378-84 and accompanying text.
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fiiaries to be able to obtain judicial review of an adverse decision of
the Appeals Council, since the courts are likely to be more neutral
with regard to the conflict between patient and fiscal interests.
Under current Medicare law as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, however, judicial review of the proposed withholding of a
technology from a beneficiary is precluded. Normally, review of an
adverse decision by the Appeals Council may be had in a United
States district court if the amount in controversy exceeds $2,000.3 5 9

But in 1985 the Court ruled in Heckler v. Ringer that judicial review
is only available when a claim for Medicare reimbursement is denied, and that such a claim can only be presented after a technology
has been provided to a beneficiary, thus preventing prospective
challenges.36 °
Unless Congress or the Court overrules the Heckler case, judicial review would only be available to a beneficiary if, when faced
359. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4. The beneficiary's appeal procedure is more limited under
Part B of Medicare, which covers physician and outpatient services and is not governed by
prospective payment. See supra note 305. A beneficiary whose Part B claim is denied by a
contractor is entitled to a hearing before a hearing officer (not an ALJ) if the amount in
controversy is at least $100. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.820, 405.823. The hearing officer's decision is final. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.835.
360. See 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984). Plaintiffs challenged a ruling by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services that a surgical technology known as bilateral carotid body resection was
not reasonable and necessary and therefore was not covered under Medicare. Id. at 2018.
The procedure involves removal of the small carotid bodies in the neck, which its proponents
claim will reduce symptoms of asthma, bronchitis and emphysema. Id at 2018 n.3. The
Secretary had originally issued a nonbinding guideline recommending noncoverage of the
technology, but the guideline was ignored by many ALI's who overturned contractor denials
of claims. Id. at 2018. The Secretary then replaced the guideline with a ruling, which is
binding on AIJ's and on the Appeals Council. Id. at 2018.
By a six to three majority, the Court held that sections 405(g) and (h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h), deprived the courts of subject matter jurisiction over the
action. 104 S. Ct. at 2022. Section 405(g) states in pertinent part that an individual may
obtain judicial review of "any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he
was a party." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(h) states that "[n]o findings of fact or decision
of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal or governmental agency except as
herein provided," and that no action may be brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28 of the
United States Code "to recover on any claim arising under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
The Court noted that there were two groups of plaintiffs-one that had had the operation
and that sought to challenge the ruling before completing the Medicare appeals process, and
an additional individual, Ringer, who had not had the operation and who contended that,
since he could not afford to pay for it himself, the result of the ruling was that no provider
would furnish it to him. 104 S. Ct. at 2020-21, 2024. The Court held that, insofar as all
plaintiffs were essentially seeking a prospective determination of their right to be reimbursed
for the technology, their challenge was a "claim arising under" the Medicare Act and could
not be brought until they had exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 2023. The
Court also held that a mandamus action against the Secretary also would not lie because of
plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. at 2022-23. Ringer, who had
not received the operation, was likewise barred from suit because, having no claim for reim-
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with a provider decision to withhold a technology under Medicare,
the beneficiary proceeded to obtain the technology by offering to
pay for it himself. (As a practical matter, unless the beneficiary
offered to pay for the technology, his medical condition might not
allow enough time for the beneficiary to contest the provider's position before the technology or an alternate form of treatment or diagnosis had to be obtained). Once the beneficiary had paid for the
technology himself, he might then seek to have Medicare reimburse
him on the theory that the technology was covered and should have
been provided by the hospital.3 6' This would afford him the same
bursement to submit, he had not had a claim denied and thus had not obtained a final decision of the Secretary after exhausting the Medicare appeals procedure. Id. at 2025.
As Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated in dissenting to that
portion of the opinion that barred Ringer from suit, the majority's holding with regard to
Ringer makes it impossible for a beneficiary to challenge a coverage ruling (or a guideline, for
that matter) until a claim for reimbursement for the procedure is denied and the appeals
process is exhausted; the beneficiary must therefore be able to afford to pay for the technology
to perfect such a challenge. Id. at 2029-30. "[The majority's] one-eyed procedural analysis
frustrates the remedial intent of Congress as plainly as it frustrates this litigant's plea for a
remedy," Justice Stevens asserted, adding: "The cruel irony is that a statute designed to help
the elderly in need of medical assistance is being construed to protect from administrative
absolutism only those wealthy enough to be able to afford an operation and then seek reimbursement." Id. at 2030.
361. Technically the beneficiary would be challenging a determination that he knew or
ought to have known that the technology was not covered, and that he was therefore financially liable for the technology after he received it. See supra note 272. One problem that
would arise is how to set the amount that Medicare will reimburse the beneficiary if the
technology ultimately is found to be covered. The hospital's charge would not necessarily be
the correct amount, since it might be unreasonably high. Prior to the adoption of the DRG
prospective payment system, hospitals were paid on the basis of their reasonable costs as
calculated by Medicare. This would presumably be an appropriate amount for the patient to
have to pay the hospital, and thus the amount the patient should be reimbursed by Medicare
if the technology was paid for out of the patient's pocket.
This would necessitate establishing the reasonable cost in cases where beneficiaries successfully challenged a provider's initial determination that the technology was not covered. It
would also require that the hospital be limited in the amount it could charge the patient to
the amount the patient would be reimbursed. Note that as an artifact of the former fee-forservice system, if a PRO determines that a patient has received a non-covered technology
along with a covered technology, Medicare will exclude from the DRG payment for that
patient an amount corresponding to the non-covered technology. See HCFA PRO MANUAL,
supra note 349, at § 2050.3. Thus there must be some method by which Medicare can calculate the proper charge for a particular technology under the DRG payment system.
This raises the further question of whether Medicare or the hospital ought to absorb the
cost of the covered technology. The hospital would seem to be the more appropriate costbearer, since otherwise it would be paid both a DRG-based Medicare amount for the patient's
care and an additional amount by the patient for a technology that, if ultimately determined
to be covered, it should have provided to the patient in return for the DRG-based payment
alone. An alternative to making the hospital refund the amount it collected from the patient
would be for Medicare rather than the hospital to reimburse the patient so long as the hospital's initial denial of the technology was in good faith and was a reasonable interpretation of
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appeals procedure as in the preprocedure context described above,
with the added availability of judicial review.36 2 However, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Heckler v. Ringer,3 63 only those
patients wealthy enough to afford a technology would be able to
take advantage of this retrospective appeals procedure, including
availing themselves of the potentially critical protection of the
courts.
As an alternative to relying on individual patients to press for a
coverage decision upon being told that a provider proposes to with-

hold a technology from them, patient groups and others might petition HCFA directly for a prospective coverage determination. 316 If
HCFA granted the request, it could issue a guideline or a formal
ruling. The process of formulating a coverage guideline is not governed by any specific statutory or administrative procedures under
its Medicare obligations. One method of determining the reasonableness of the hospital's
actions would be to monitor the frequency of beneficiary affirmative coverage challenges for
that hospital. Excessive challenges could create a presumption of unreasonableness or bad
faith on the part of the hospital that could subject it to sanctions, such as being disqualified
from being reimbursed for serving Medicare patients. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 474.32-.58.
362. If the beneficiary is able to obtain judicial review, it may not be too difficult for him
to prove that he is entitled to the technology. The burden of showing that a technology
merits Medicare reimbursement is on the claimant. See, e.g., Psychiatric Hosps. of Florida,
Inc. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,811 (M.D. Fla. June 18,
1985). The burden is not a difficult one to meet, however. Under the current Medicare
system, if the government denies a claim for reimbursement and the beneficiary (or provider)
appeals, the claimant has the burden of coming forward with evidence why the claim should
be allowed. If the claim is denied on the basis that the technology provided is not covered
under Medicare, the few decided cases suggest that the claimant can meet this burden merely
by showing that the technology was ordered by the attending physician. See, eg., Breedon v.
Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974).
The burden then appears to shift to the government to show that the technology is inappropriate notwithstanding the physician's order. Ultimately, the government will be sustained if its decision is supported by substantial evidence, see id. at 738, but the courts have
taken a hard look at the government's interpretation of what is "reasonable and necessary"
for Medicare patients under 1862(a)(1)(A). See Kuebler v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep't HHS
579 F. Supp. 1436, 1438 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Westgard v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1011, 1019
(D.N.D. 1975). Cf Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3rd Cir. 1974) (rejecting
government's interpretation of section 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)). The burden on the claimant
could be relaxed even further by creating a presumption that technology is reasonable and
necessary and placing the burden on the government to defeat the presumption in order to
deny a claim for a specific technology.
363. 104 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
364. Section 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), mandates an
opportunity for persons to petition a federal agency to initiate rulemaking proceedings.
While section 553(a)(2) of the Act exempts "benefits" programs from the requirements of
section 553, and Medicare has been held to be such a program, see, e.g., Humana of South
Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1082-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the Department of
Health and Human Services waived this exemption in 1971. See 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971);
Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, at 1084.
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the Social Security Act, and has not been the subject of any reported case. By virtue of their nonbinding nature, guidelines would
most likely be regarded as interpretive rules or general statements of
policy under the Administrative Procedure Act.3 65 They would
therefore be exempt from any procedural requirements under the
act.3 66 Neither notice nor an opportunity for public comment,
much less a hearing or judicial review, would have to be provided. 67 Since HCFA routinely affords notice and an opportunity
for comment to members of the public, the agency in fact extends
greater procedural protections to those potentially adversely affected by the guidelines than are required by law.
Formal rulings would qualify as informal rules, and, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, require public notice and an oppor36
tunity for comment prior to being issued, but no formal hearing.

Nor would a party adversely affected by a ruling be entitled to judicial review, since none is provided in the Medicare statutes, 369 and
none is mandated under the Administrative Procedure Act for informal rulemaking.3 70
In short, greater rights for participation by interested parties,
including rights to a hearing, to review by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, and to judicial review, may become necessary
to augment other pressures to avoid denying nonwasteful technologies to beneficiaries.3 7 1
A final method by which affirmative decisions on coverage
might be made is in the course of establishing and recalibrating
365. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). In Bond Hosps., Inc. v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 1268,
1273 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 762 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court held that the Health Care
Finance Administration's PROVIDER REVIEW MANUAL, which is similar to the MEDICARE
COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL in which coverage guidelines are published, is an interpretive
rule under the Administrative Procedure Act and thus exempt from formal rulemaking requirements. See also American Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(agency action is general statement of policy where it is not a binding norm, is prospectively
applied, and leaves decision makers free to exercise discretion). Cf Roberts v. Weinberger,
No. C-74-49, (W.D. Tenn. 1975), reported in [1 Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid
Rptr. (CCH) 27,396 (Medicare coverage guidelines excluding technologies from coverage
may not be applied retroactively).
366. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
367. See id.
368. See id. at §§ 553(b),(c). The Social Security Act does not mandate a hearing before
such rulings may be issued, and therefore no hearing is required under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See id. at § 553(c).
369. See Heckler v. Ringer, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2021-22 (1984).
370. See id.
371. Cf Hearings on H.R. 5496, supranote 108, at 496 (testimony of Jack Christy, American Association of Retired Persons) (advocating hearing rights in government technology
assessment proceedings).
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DRG's under the prospective payment system.3 72 In its first annual
report, for example, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (PROPAC) noted that it was reviewing several new technologies, such as cochlear implants, to determine if they merited the
creation of technology-specific DRGs-that is, DRGs providing
Medicare reimbursement for using a particular technology.37 3 In
the absence of technology-specific DRGs, providers might not have
an adequate incentive to provide a new technology under existing
DRG payment levels if the technology substantially increased provider costs. A refusal to establish a technology-specific DRG for
such a technology would then have the same discouraging effect on
its availability to beneficiaries as a negative coverage determination.37 4 It is therefore discouraging to note that Congress exempted
the entire DRG process from administrative and judicial review.37 5
3. Peer Review Organizations
Another potential source of pressure to provide nonwasteful
technologies is the peer review organization (PRO). As discussed
earlier,3 76 these are organizations of health professionals and others
under contract with Medicare to perform certain oversight functions. One of these functions, mandated by statute, is to review the
"completeness, adequacy, and quality of care provided. ' 37 7 HCFA
interprets this to require PROs to reduce unnecessary readmissions
due to substandard care during a previous admission; assure that
technologies avoid a "significant potential for causing serious patient complication;" and reduce avoidable deaths, unnecessary surgery and avoidable complications.37 8 PROs are authorized to
invoke a number of sanctions against providers who fail to provide
adequate care to beneficiaries, including recommending to the Of372. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
373. See PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 50-51; see also OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2,
at 27.
374. On the other hand, if the new technology were cost-saving, providers may be reaping
an unwarranted windfall under existing DRG payment levels. See PROPAC 1985, supra
note 1, at 43-44 (discussing percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty).
375. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (Supp. I 1983) ("[t]here shall be no administrative or
judicial review... [of] the establishment of diagnosis-related groups, of the methodology for
the classification of discharges within such groups, and of the appropriate weighting factors
thereof ......
376. See supra notes 348-58 and accompanying text.
377. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(F) (Supp. 1 1983).
378. See Health Care Finance Administration, Request for Proposal RFP No. CFA-84015, Operation of Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations(1984), 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 12,872.03 (Feb. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as RFP No.
HCFA-84-O15].
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fice of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services that the provider be denied payment for a specific
admission or procedure, be fined, or be excluded from serving Medicare patients.3 79
The PROs' watchdog responsibilities and sanctions potentially
make it a powerful source of pressure on providers. However, quality control is not the PROs' only, and perhaps not its prime, objective.380 In addition, it has a major cost containment role. The
contract between the HCFA and the PRO must include a specific
target for reducing Medicare admissions; the PRO in Kentucky, for
example, is obligated to achieve an 8.1% reduction in Medicare admissions between 1983 and 1986.381 If the PRO fails to achieve its
target, it may lose its contract or risk nonrenewal.3 82 Moreover, the
PRO is responsible for validating the providers' DRG assignments
and assuring the legitimacy of outlier claims.3 83 The PRO's satisfactory fulfillment of its contract depends not only on achieving specific contract targets, but on producing net dollar benefits to the
government (savings resulting from PRO review minus the cost of
the PRO contract to the government).3 84
In short, the PRO is caught between the conflicting goals of insuring quality of care and reducing costs. The logical resolution of
this conflict would be for the PRO to adopt the approach to technology waste advocated herein, recouping the cost of providing
nonwasteful, cost-increasing technologies through savings from not
providing wasteful technologies. Nevertheless, the PRO may well
conclude that it can protect its contract better by concentrating on
its cost control objectives than by achieving quality-of-care objectives. 3 5 Administrative and judicial patient challenges to PRO determinations should therefore be anticipated and facilitated.
379. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 474.32-.41 (1985).
380. See, eg., Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations:Promises and Potential
Pitfalls, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1136 (1985).
381. See 2 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 12,872.
382. See RFP No. HCFA-84-O15, supra note 379.
383. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
12,872.05 (Aug. 6, 1984).
384. See RFP No. HCFA-84-O15, supra note 379.
385. The solution might be to create two separate review entities, one with cost control
targets and the other with quality-of-care objectives, in effect placing them in an adversarial
position. This would require the creation of another administrative body to resolve disputes
between the two PROs.
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Competitive Pressures

A final source of pressure on providers to provide nonwasteful
technologies to patients is competition with other providers. This is
a relatively new phenomenon; until recently, the health care system
has not been highly competitive. Now, however, there is an oversupply of hospital beds and physicians, a scarcity of patients, and a
growing militancy on the part of third-party payors to bring costs
under control. This is leading providers to attempt to attract patients-either as individuals or as members of group health care
plans-by a variety of competitive methods, including competition
on the basis of price and services.38 6
To some extent, providers are beginning to compete on the basis
of the quality of their care. So far this seems to be limited to promoting the types of services offered. Providers thus extol their newest technology acquisitions but do not emphasize other potential
quality-of-care parameters, such as low malpractice claims frequency, mortality rates and readmission frequencies. Nevertheless,
these quality aspects of health care may receive greater attention as
patients and third-party payors attempt to purchase the best care
for the money. To the extent that these parameters would be negatively affected by a practice of denying patients nonwasteful technologies, increased competition between providers might therefore
become a potent source of pressure to maintain quality of care.
One major limitation on its effectiveness, however, is the degree
to which patients are given and can act upon accurate quality-ofcare information about providers. Currently, although patients
may be receiving greater information on health care prices, there is
virtually no information available to patients on the relative performance of different hospitals, let alone on that of hospitals compared to alternative delivery systems such as health maintenance
organizations, or on that of different physicians.38 7 Even if this in386. See, eg., Punch, Publicity on Prices Has Little Impact, in HEALTH CARE MARKETING 243 (P. Cooper ed. 1985) (hospital administrations believe consumers will start paying
more attention to public disclosure of hospital charges).
387. A number of efforts are now underway to increase the information available to
health care consumers. On the federal level, recent Peer Review Organization (PRO) regulations require the PRO to disclose nonconfidential information to "any person upon request."
42 CFR § 476.120(a). Nonconfidential information includes information that either explicitly or implicitly identifies a hospital or institution, aggregate statistical data collected by the
PRO, quality review study data, and routine reports submitted by the PRO to the Health
Care Finance Administration (HCFA). Id. Confidential information is defined as "information that explicitly or implicitly identifies an individual patient, practitioner or reviewer." 42
CFR § 476.101. In addition, the PRO "may disclose to the public PRO interpretations and
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formation were available to patients, it is questionable that they
would use it to make informed choices in view of their lack of expertise and the time and effort that would be required. Third-party
payors are in a better position both to obtain (and if necessary gen-

erate) this information and to use it to choose providers for their
subscribers, but, as noted earlier, 3 8 third-party payors do not have
the same perspective on waste as patients, and therefore may make
different health choices than subscribers who possessed and
processed the necessary information. Pending improvements in
both the quality and quantity of provider performance data available to patients, and in methods for assisting patients in making
health care choices on the basis of those data, therefore, competition remains a promising but uncertain pressure on providers to
maintain the quality of their care.
generalizations on the quality of health care that identify a particular institution." 42 CFR
§ 467.141. This includes information on the length of stay, surgical mortality rates, and the
percentage of patients with post-operatic infections, for particular institutions. See Wolfe, As
Hospital Ratings Go Public, Let's Rate Doctors, Too, Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1985.
The significance of the PRO-disclosure requirements are based, in part, on two factors:
the amount of information the PRO has access to and the ability of some entity to translate
the PRO's data into meaningful and accessible information for consumers. With regard to
the former, the PRO has access to all records on Medicare patients and other patients whose
care they are authorized by contract to review, and to records on other non-Medicare patients
if authorized by the institution or provider. See 42 CFR § 476.111. In addition, the PRO
can access records or data held by intermediaries or carriers as necessary. See 42 CFR § 112.
In regard to the latter, at least one consumer group, founded by Ralph Nader, has announced its intention to collect, process and disseminate PRO data to its subscribers. See
Public Citizen Health Research Group, Health Letter, July-Aug. 1985, at 8. The Nader
group also advocates that physician-specific data be released by PROs, which is currently
prohibited by the regulations. See supra. It responds to objections by the American Medical
Association that these data would be misleading due to factors such as variations in patient
mix (some doctors see a sicker group of patients than other doctors) by arguing that statistical corrections can be made for such variables, and that even imperfect data are better than
nothing. See PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED
RULE OF ACQUISITION, PROTECTION AND DISCLOSURE OF UTILIZATION AND QUALITY
CONTROL PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION INFORMATION 4 (July 5, 1984).

Bills have also been submitted to Congress to establish a health data clearinghouse. See
H.R. 2882, S. 1367, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1985) (introduced by Ron Wyden, D. Ore., and
Albert Gore, D. Tenn., respectively). The clearinghouse would be located within the Department of Health and Human Services, would collect information on and provide technical
assistance to individuals or organizations engaged in gathering, processing and disseminating
aggregate health care information, and would make this information public. See id.
State activities are concentrated on collecting health care cost rather than care-quality
data. As of May, 1985, eleven states had passed laws requiring cost information to be submitted to state health agencies: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Wyoming. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, STATE
DATA COLLECTION LEGISLATION, Pt. III at 22 (1985).
388. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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I. Evidence on Waste Curtailment
The data are not yet available to show if the financial pressures
exerted by the prospective payment system are sufficient to overcome the foregoing counterpressures in favor of providing nonwasteful technologies to patients. The Medicare prospective payment system has not been in effect long enough to allow evaluation
of its effect on the overall quality of patient care, much less on the
development, acquisition and use of technology. 8 9 It is known that
during the first year of prospective payment, the average hospital
length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries declined, at least in part
due to the new system.3 90 Moreover, the number of Medicare hospital admissions declined by over 4% from the previous, pre-prospective payment year.391 While it has been reported that Medicare
patients are being discharged prematurely and in poorer health than
before prospective payment, 392 no systematic quality-of-care studies
have been completed, and the Health Care Finance Administration
denies that quality of patient care has decreased.39 3 Data demonstrating no decline in quality-of-care under prospective payment,
despite reductions in variables such as length of stay, might mean
that providers are resisting pressures to cut beneficial care or merely
that there is still waste in the present system.39 4 In any event, in
view of the lack of definitive data, the issue remains to be
resolved.3 95
389. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTVE PAYMENT
SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALrIY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 35-

47 (1985).
390. See id. at 37-39.
391. See id. at 40.
392. See id. at 39-40.
393. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,439 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412) (proposed June
10, 1985) ("We do not at the present time have objective data demonstrating that the quality
of or access to care has declined. We have noted a significant decrease in average length-ofstay, a slight decrease in admissions, and an increase in average case mix.").
394. See Schroeder, supra note 16, at 11.
395. Some data on the impact of conflict of interest on patient care has emerged from
prepaid health delivery systems such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which
are vertically integrated providers that combine an insurance function with the delivery of
care. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 36. An HMO has the incentive to withhold
nonwasteful technologies from its patients except insofar as this will require additional care,
presumably from the same HMO provider, in the future. In one respect, the impact of the
provider's conflict of interest on the quality of patient care may be more adverse in the case of
an HMO than in the case of Medicare prospective payment: when a third-party payor like
Medicare refuses to reimburse a provider for a technology, the quality of care to the patient in
question may not directly be affected, since the patient may have received the technology
before the claim for reimbursement is submitted. See supra note 275.
In the case of an HMO (other than one reimbursing another provider, such as an out-of-
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CONCLUSION

Cost-containment initiatives intensify public and private efforts
to identify and control wasteful technology. Although these efforts
are prone to a host of technical and conceptual difficulties, some
form of technology assessment is inevitable. Technology assessment must adopt approaches that avoid these difficulties as much as
possible, while methodological refinement continues.
The two most serious problems in technology assessment are the
choice of perspective and the valuation of intangible benefits. These
problems arise most conspicuously in performing cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly, cost-control efforts should be focused on technologies that are wasteful in terms of being unsafe, ineffective or not
cost-effective. Curtailing these sorts of wasteful technologies has
town hospital, for care for one of its subscribers), on the other hand, the decision to refuse to
pay for the technology precludes the patient from obtaining it-at least from that HMO. See
Stem, Will the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract be Extended to Health Maintenance
Organizations?,11 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 12, 13 (1983). In other respects, however,
HMO patient care may be less prone to suffer from the provider's conflict of interest than
non-HMO care, since the HMO has an incentive to maximize patient welfare when doing so
will prevent the need for future care by the HMO, while the non-HMO provider has an
opposite incentive to encourage the patient to return as another prospectively-paid admission.
In any event, HMO patients appear to have lower rates of hospitalization and surgery than
non-HMO patients, but the same or higher rates of office or ambulatory visits. See OTA
COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 37-39. As of 1982, however, the lower rates of care did not
appear to result in lower quality-of-care, nor was there any clearcut evidence that HMOs
denied their subscribers needed hospitalization or surgical treatment. See id. at 64-65. This
may have been due to the need for HMOs to compete on a quality-of-care basis with nonHMO providers. See OTA IMPLICATIONS, supra note 73, at 123.
There is some indication that patients will sacrifice the quality of their own care when
they are financially responsible for health care. For example, in a major study by the Rand
Corporation on the effect of varying degrees of patient co-payment on frequency and quality
of care, RAND CORPORATION, THE EFFECT OF COINSURANCE ON THE HEALTH OF ADULTS
(1984), a direct correlation was found between the level of co-payment and consumption of
services. The highest co-payment population consumed about 30% less care than the population whose care was free (no co-payment or insurance premiums). Id. at 25. Reduced consumption did not affect five general health status measures (physical health, role functioning,
mental health, social contacts and health perceptions) for the average person. Id. at 26. Nor
was there any effect on risk factors for cardiovascular disease or cancer like smoking, weight
and cholesterol. Id. at 25-26. But those subjects whose health care was free had significantly
less myopia and hypertension. Id. at 26. Insofar as hypertension is a risk factor for death,
the Rand investigators calculated that, in the population of 50-year-old men, there would be
eleven fewer deaths per thousand if care were free rather than if a high co-payment were
required. Id. at 27. In interpreting the significance of this study, it is important to note that
there was an income-related ceiling on health care expenditures for poor subjects, and that
the study excluded those over 60 and the disabled. Id. at 27-28. Thus, the study may have
underestimated the impact of co-payment on the most vulnerable populations: the elderly and
the poor.
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the additional advantage of allowing cost-containment objectives to
be consistent with patient interests.
Cost-containment methods such as Medicare's prospective payment system, while presenting certain advantages over other methods of controlling technology waste, create incentives for providers
and third-party payors to deny patients not only technologies that
are wasteful but also technologies that provide net benefit to the
patient but that increase provider costs. Insofar as the relationship
between patient and provider is concerned, these incentives introduce a conflict of interest between provider and patient, a situation
that is especially troubling in view of the factors that have led the
duties that the provider owes to the patient to be characterized as
fiducial. At the same time, providers are under a variety of pressures to act strictly in the patient's interest. Whether cost-control
incentives or these counterpressures will be the stronger determinant of provider behavior is not yet known.
In any event, greater assurance is needed that Medicare's prospective payment system will limit its control of wasteful technologies to those that are wasteful both from a patient and a cost-control
perspective. This requires both greater clarity in the standards by
which Medicare determines which technologies to reimburse for,
and increased assurance that these standards are being adhered to.
At the same time, the methodology for assessing technologies
should continue to be improved so that more cost-effective methods
of identifying wasteful technology can be developed. This will facilitate extending cost controls, if necessary, to more marginal
technologies.
This approach to waste is suggested as a first, but not necessarily
last step in reconciling cost controls with technical assessment capabilities and with social goals. If insufficient reductions in technology costs result, the impetus will grow for more severe cost-control
measures, including measures dependent on assessment techniques
that are presently of questionable value. At that point, it may be
necessary to come more starkly to grips with the basic question of
how much health care is worth.

